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ABSTRACT
Despite democratic theory’s fundamental expectation that voters punishing cor-
ruption at the polls is a key mechanism whereby democracies secure accountability,
voters in many countries fail to vote out corrupt parties consistently, even while
expressing rising indignation at its pervasiveness. Instead, the pattern that emerges
across transitioning as well as consolidated democracies is that while in some
countries corrupt parties and representatives are effectively voted out of office,
in others they are able to maintain voters’ electoral support and even consolidate
their hold on power. Why is this the case? What types of strategies, resources, and
policies do corrupt governing parties employ to assuage voters’ electoral wrath,
counter electoral backlash, and optimize their political payoffs? And how do inter-
national actors and organizations respond to migration pressures that often arise as
a consequence of the underperforming economies of corrupt states?
My dissertation examines the relationship between political corruption, electoral
accountability, distributive politics, and the political economy of fiscal lending by
international organizations in the age of migration. The research revolves around
three major questions which I examine via a combination of qualitative and em-
pirical methods: “What types of distributive strategies do corrupt political parties
adopt to curtail voters’ electoral wrath?”, “Do fiscal funds allocated by the Euro-
pean Union to member states deliver an electoral advantage to corrupt incumbent
parties?”, and “Do migration pressures faced by the IMF’s major shareholder states
xii
affect the size and conditions attached to the loans granted by the IMF to migrant
sending countries?”
My first chapter examines the types of strategies, resources, and policies that
corrupt governing parties employ to deter electoral accountability. I develop a
model of “corruption compensation” whereby, in a bid to preempt electoral back-
lash, corrupt incumbents strategically target higher shares of government resources
to regions where corruption perceptions are higher and demands for political ac-
countability are more likely to emerge. To systematically examine the theory I
engage in a cross-time, within-country analysis of the highly corrupt, post-socialist
state of Albania. Using an originally constructed, district-level data set, I employ a
methodological approach that combines qualitative evidence with a multivariate
empirical analysis and find support for my hypotheses.
The second chapter builds on these findings to examine additional sources of
funds available to corrupt governing parties and the impact they have on their
electoral advantage. Focusing on the EU’s geopolitical space, this chapter takes into
account the degree of executive corruption in EU member states to examine and
confirm the novel theoretical expectation that higher fiscal allocations to corrupt
recipient states deliver political latitude that incumbents utilize to advance their
electoral outcomes and governing authority.
The third chapter assesses the migration dimension of the link between political
corruption, accountability, and distributive politics. It focuses on the policy and
fiscal measures taken by international organizations and migrant-hosting states
in response to rising migration pressures from migrant-sending states. Drawing
on novel data on all IMF programs from 1978 to 2013, this chapter examines and
finds empirical support for the theoretical expectation that the IMF grants larger
loans and less stringent loan conditions to migrant-sending states that pose greater
migration pressures to the Fund’s largest shareholder states.
xiii
Combined, this project contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship
between political corruption, distributive politics, electoral accountability, and the
political economy of fiscal lending by international organizations, particularly the
EU and the IMF. The findings presented here enhance our current understanding of
impediments to robust democratic development and shed light on the forces that
shape the decision-making processes of supranational organizations.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Introduction
“Mr. Prime Minister, Please respond [to our demands] by 4PM. We have a
German seminar at 5PM.”
—Student anti-corruption protesters
Tirana, Albania, December 11, 2018
At the time of this writing, thousands of Albanian students from all corners of the
country have gathered in the streets of Albania’s capital, Tirana, to protest against
corruption, lack of government accountability, and minuscule education funding by
the Albanian government. The peaceful protests are immensely powerful1. Taking
place daily in front of the Education Ministry and the Albanian government’s main
building, the student rallies—estimated to be the country’s largest to date—are
reminiscent of the student protests of December 1990 that initiated the collapse of
Albania’s nearly five-decades-long communist regime.
While the spark that ignited the current protests was provoked by a recent policy
proposal, the socioeconomic and political grievances shared by both generations
profoundly connect today’s students to their history-making predecessors from
28 years ago. The present protests arose due to a government decision to impose
1While currently peaceful, the protests are likely to escalate given their growing intensity.
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an additional fee of approximately 5 Euros per credit for public university stu-
dents’ resit exams. The now-abolished obligatory fee imposed a burden of 30 to
45 Euros per exam on students whose extremely limited financial resources and
grim employment opportunities in Albania’s struggling economy made the cost of
higher education prohibitively high.2 The protests swiftly took on anti-corruption
and anti-government tones as students identified Albania’s long-standing corrupt
political culture, ineffective judicial system, and unaccountable governance as hin-
drances to quality education, employment opportunities, and economic and life
security—factors that leave Albanian youth and the overall citizenry with little
choice but to turn to migration as the only tenable pathway to socioeconomic relief.
Thus, while announcing over megaphones the names of professors and public
officials who have demanded bribes in exchange for positive evaluations and college
admissions, the students point to dire economic conditions, the proliferation of
corruption at all levels of the education and political system, a limited budget of only
3.1% of the national GDP allocated to education spending, and non-materialization
of fiscal funds allocated by international donors to support Albania’s education
system3 as the fundamental factors that prevent Albanian youth from thriving
within the geographical borders of the Albanian state. To address these grievances,
student protesters request that the government, currently headed by Albania’s
Socialist Party, lower tuition costs, allocate a higher proportion of the state budget
to education expenditures, establish fiscal and political transparency, and ensure
students’ participatory role in the government’s decision-making processes.
2According to Albania’s Institute of Statistics, education spending, which constitutes the largest
expense for the average Albanian family, has increased by 2.3%, while monthly incomes (of approxi-
mately 400 Euros per family) have declined by 3% between 2017 and 2018.
3Among other cases, student protesters and MPs representing the opposition party Socialist
Movement for Integration (LSI) point to the non-materialization of a multimillion-Euro grant by
the KfV Frankfurt am Main, allocated for purposes of rehabilitating and reconstructing Albania
University’s student dormitories. The project, which was expected to conclude by 2018, has yet to
start despite the 2017 sum of 4.5 million Euros having been approved by the parliament for alleged
progress on the project.
2
While taking place at two distinct times in Albania’s history, the 1990 and 2018
Albanian student protests share a number of similarities that expand beyond the
protests’ scope, demographics, and familiar locations. They represent two decisive
moments in Albania’s history where the students’ voices echo the concerns of the
larger Albanian population. They represent the people’s apprehensiveness that
their governments share a history of being neither representative of the Albanian
people nor accountable to them; that the country’s socioeconomic conditions have
consistently declined while political corruption and organized crime have rapidly
proliferated; that foreign aid by international actors and institutions is channeled
toward personal and political rather than policy and humanitarian purposes; and,
importantly, that similar to the early 1990s when Albanian citizens “voted with their
feet,” migration continues to remain their most rational path toward educational
attainment and economic security.
These student protests, similar to other anti-corruption protests that have taken
place in recent years across several European states, including Bulgaria, Hungary,
Romania, Slovakia, and others, call attention to several factors that are inherently
and consequentially related to democratic developments and international relations.
They bring into focus the salient association between political corruption, distribu-
tive politics, electoral accountability and the impact of international actors and or-
ganizations in influencing—via both fiscal resources and policy recommendations—
not only the socioeconomic and political dynamics of individual states, but also the
migration pressures that arise both within individual states and across members of
the larger international community.
Several important questions arise when considering the ways in which these
factors interact with one another to shape socioeconomic and democratic devel-
opments. Among them: What helps corrupt political parties survive attempts to
impose electoral accountability? What types of resources do they utilize to optimize
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their electoral payoffs? And how do international actors and organizations respond
to the migration pressures born as a consequence of underperforming economies,
often due to political extraction by governing elites?
My dissertation contributes to our understanding of these dynamics by examining—
both theoretically and empirically—the link between political corruption, electoral
accountability, distributive politics, and the political economy of fiscal lending by
international organizations, particularly the EU and IMF, in the age of migration.
The analysis is conducted at two theoretical and empirical strata: state and inter-
national organizations. At the state level, I systematically examine the interaction
of these factors by analyzing the ways, extent, and conditions under which incum-
bent political parties (mis)allocate domestic fiscal resources and development funds
granted by international organizations to strategically form distributive policies that
compromise electoral accountability, reshape voter-party alignments and bolster in-
cumbents’ political power at the cost of democratic robustness. At the international
organizations level, I examine how allocation of fiscal funds by international orga-
nizations affects the domestic politics of recipient states and addresses migration
pressures faced by the organizations’ major shareholders.
Specifically, my work examines three major research questions, all related to
distributive politics and fiscal resources as mechanisms for impacting voter be-
havior, electoral outcomes, and migration pressures: “What types of distributive
strategies do corrupt political parties adopt to curtail voters’ electoral wrath?”, “Do
fiscal funds allocated by the European Union to member states deliver an electoral
advantage to corrupt incumbent parties?”, and “Do migration pressures faced by
the IMF’s major shareholder states affect the size and conditions attached to the
loans granted by the IMF to migrant sending countries?”
My findings suggest that these questions are interconnected in important the-
oretical ways and have long-term implications for policy outcomes and demo-
4
cratic efficacy. In the following pages, I show that distributive politics and fiscal
resources—whether domestic or external—are strategically utilized by individual
states and international organizations as key instruments for reconfiguring patterns
of electoral accountability and promoting the personal and political interests of
allocating parties and entities. At the state level, I find that in a context of political
corruption, governing parties are particularly effective in utilizing state resources
and external funds granted by international entities to mediate potential electoral
punishment and gain a competitive, governing advantage over opposition forces.
At the international organizations’ strata, I find that distributive policies and fis-
cal allocations are used as bargaining chips for promoting the socioeconomic and
political interests of international organizations and their major shareholder states.
However, their degree of efficacy in reaching the desired political outcomes varies
across organizations and over time. In this vein, I find that the IMF effectively
addresses migration pressures faced by its major shareholder states by granting
larger loans with fewer conditions to migrant-sending countries. In the case of the
EU, the political payoffs of distributive politics are more complex, as greater shares
of allocations to EU member states demonstrate variation across time and space in
promoting EU economic objectives and democratic values across the EU’s political
space.
My research arrives at these findings by examining the three questions presented
above via an eclectic methodological approach. First, I rely on interviews and
qualitative evidence gathered during my fieldwork in the region to derive the
study’s main theoretical expectations. Second, I assemble an original data set which
I use to test my theoretical expectations in a within-country analysis. Third, I rely
on additional, novel data sets to engage in cross-country and cross-time analysis
that places the study’s main theoretical conjectures under further empirical probing.
My findings contribute to two diverse bodies of literature: democratization and the
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political economy of fiscal lending. In regards to the democratization literature, by
examining the combined effect of political corruption and distributive politics on
patterns of electoral accountability, my work expands the literature’s current focus
on the origins, spread, and effects of political corruption, to systematically test: (1)
politicians’ response to past and looming electoral punishment; and (2) the ways in
which this response affects patterns of democratic consolidation in transitioning
and developing democracies. In regards to the political economy of fiscal lending
literature: by examining how IMF tailors loan size and conditions to mediate the
migration pressures faced by its major shareholders, my coauthors and I contribute
a novel, migration dimension to the nature of forces that drive variation in fiscal
lending by international organizations. Thus, our findings help explain variation in
IMF loan terms and conditions among otherwise similar recipient states.
In the second chapter, I examine a puzzling and contradictory pattern that has
emerged in recent years across the transitioning democracies of Eastern and South-
eastern Europe: as political graft and institutional misconduct have increasingly
tainted the region’s fragile political and institutional structures and have provoked
voters’ rising indignation and numerous anti-corruption protests in countries like
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and others, electoral support for parties and elites
engaged in abuse of power manages to persist across the region. These develop-
ments contradict the expectations of the retrospective voting model (RVM), which
postulates that voters punishing corruption at the polls is a key mechanismwhereby
democracies secure electoral accountability. Against this democratically consequen-
tial backdrop, this chapter asks: What strategies, resources and policies do political
parties employ to assuage voters electoral wrath and counter electoral backlash?
To examine the conditions that underlie the spatial and temporal variation in
patterns of electoral backlash against political corruption, I assess the link between
voters’ perceptions of corruption and distributive policies that parties adopt to
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effectively preempt voters’ demand for electoral accountability in transitioning,
post-Communist European democracies. I develop a model of “corruption com-
pensation” whereby, in a bid to preempt electoral backlash, corrupt incumbents
strategically target higher shares of government resources to regions where cor-
ruption perceptions are higher and voters likelier to have heightened demand for
political accountability. To systematically test the theory, I employ a methodological
approach that combines a multivariate empirical analysis with qualitative evidence
from the highly corrupt, transitioning democracy of Albania and find support for
my hypotheses.
In the third chapter, I build on the findings of the within-country analysis to
examine additional sources of funds available to corrupt incumbent parties and the
impact they have on corrupt governing parties’ electoral advantage. Specifically,
the research question examined in the second chapter is: Do fiscal funds allocated
by the European Union (EU) to member states deliver an electoral advantage to
corrupt incumbent parties? Current works assessing the link between EU transfers
and political corruption focus primarily on the impact of EU funds on recipient
states’ patterns of political corruption and do not engage with the question of how
EU funds interact with political corruption to shape party dynamics in recipient
states. Despite public and policy makers’ concerns about the linkage between
rising political corruption and inefficient use of EU transfers by member states’
authorities, the impact of EU funds on political corruption has received minimal
empirical attention. This is even more so the case in regards to the question of
how allocations to corrupt EU states affect domestic party politics and the political
longevity of recipient states’ governing parties.
I fill this theoretical and empirical gap by taking into account the degree of exec-
utive corruption across recipient states to analyze the impact of EU fiscal allocations
on domestic politics and governing parties’ electoral outcomes. I propose a novel
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theory whereby fiscal allocations to corrupt recipient states deliver political latitude
that incumbents utilize to advance their electoral outcomes and governing authority.
I argue that access and allocation authority over the EU’s fiscal inflows enable cor-
rupt governing parties to engage in a combination of distributive strategies aimed
at maintaining the loyalty of their personalistic networks and appeasing electorally
significant constituencies in ways that ultimately strengthen their hold on power.
Examining data on EU fiscal allocations over the period of 2000-2015, I find that
fiscal transfers to EU member states are correlated with higher electoral margins for
incumbents in corrupt countries. I interpret this as suggestive of misallocation of
EU transfers by corrupt parties to buffer their political latitude over the opposition.
The fourth chapter addresses the migration dimension of the link between
political corruption, accountability, and distributive politics. It focuses on the policy
and fiscal measures taken by IOs and migrant-hosting states in response to rising
migration pressures from migrant-sending states. The specific question addressed
in this co-authored4 chapter is, “Do migration pressures faced by the IMF’s major
shareholder states affect the size and conditions attached to the loans granted by the
IMF to migrant sending countries?” Existing models of international organizations
focus on the strategic and special interests of major shareholders to explain why
some countries can secure better deals from international organizations. Focusing
on the International Monetary Fund, we argue that migration is an important
consideration among the IMF’s major shareholders.
Stringent loan conditions often exacerbate short-term economic distress in the
recipient country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where
their co-ethnics reside. Therefore, major IMF shareholders that host a large number
of nationals from the recipient country face a disproportionately high level of mi-
gration pressure when the IMF places demanding loan conditions on the recipient
4Co-authoredwithMerih Angin (HarvardUniversity) andAdrian J. Shin (University of Colorado
Boulder)
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country. Since the citizens of major IMF shareholder countries tend to oppose
immigration inflows, we argue policymakers from these countries will pressure the
IMF to minimize short-term adjustment costs in the recipient country when they
host a large number of the country’s nationals. Analyzing all IMF programs from
1978 to 2013, we test our hypothesis that IMF recipients with larger diasporas in the
major IMF shareholder countries tend to secure better deals from the IMF. Our find-
ings confirm that when migration pressures on G5 countries are present, recipient
countries receive larger loan disbursements and more lenient labor conditions.
The conclusion summarizes the study’s main findings and examines the impli-
cations for the relationship between accountability, corruption, and distributive
politics in an integrated world.
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CHAPTER II
Killing with Kindness: Corruption and Accountability
in Distributive Politics
2.1 Introduction & the Puzzle
In theory electoral democracy should root out corruption when voters hold cor-
rupt politicians and parties to account for misdeeds by voting them out of office. Yet
existing democracies worldwide—especially transitioning democracies—display
considerable variation in patterns of electoral backlash against corrupt governing
parties. This failure to vote out corrupt incumbents in turn allows them to con-
solidate power and retrench institutional mechanisms of accountability, stunting
democratic consolidation or prompting authoritarian backsliding. Yet the question
of which factors drive this variation in voters’ demand for accountability remains
the subject of much research. Recent anti-corruption protests in Hungary, Romania,
Slovakia and other transitioning European societies signal citizens’ rising indigna-
tion at political graft and the salience of this issue for the political and economic
trajectories of post-Communist states. Eurobarometer data indicates that 80% of
respondents in post-Communist states consider corruption to be a major problem
facing their countries. In Romania, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slo-
vakia, nearly 90% of surveyed respondents identified corruption as a major problem
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facing their country1. Bulgaria is the only country showing a downward trend in the
share of people considering corruption a national challenge since 20092. Yet the po-
litical survival and, in certain cases, thriving careers of corrupt politicians across the
region point to a contradictory trend in the politics of Europe’s transitioning states:
despite the proliferation of political graft and voters’ fury at its occurrence, elec-
toral backlash against culpable parties and representatives remains an exception3,
rather than a norm across the region4. In the case of the post-Socialist Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president and member of the Croatian Democratic
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) Party, Zviko Budimir, remained in
office despite his 2013 arrest for corruption and bribery5. Budimir’s arrest had no
impact on the parliamentary vote share obtained by the HDZ BiH party during the
2014 elections. Similarly, Croatian prime minister Ivo Sanader remained in office
from 2003 to 2009 despite his involvement in siphoning off funds from state-run
companies, which in 2014 resulted in a nine-year conviction. In Albania, former
prime minister Ilir Meta was appointed president in July 2017 despite evidence and
common public awareness of his recurring engagement in political graft6. Thus,
across Europe’s transitioning states, as political corruption continues to taint the
region’s fragile political and institutional infrastructures, electoral accountability
1Eurobarometer Data
2Despite this decrease, corruption perceptions remain relatively high in the country.
3An analysis of demand for electoral accountability does not imply that backlash is an unlikely
phenomenon. In the case of Italy, voters’ punishment in response to the 1990s Tangentopoli inves-
tigation brought about the downfall of the existing party system and ended the ”First Republic”.
Similarly, Mexican voters’ electoral support for Vicente Fox as the country’s new president during
the county’s 2000 national elections signaled their punishment of the long-reigning PRI (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional) party. Yet, these cases are not uniformly replicated(Treisman 2000).
4While political corruption is present in both developed and developing democracies, previous
research suggests that developing democracies and authoritarian regimes are comparatively more
corrupt than developed democracies(Treisman 2000).
5Budimir accepted bribes in exchange for granting 162 pardons to, among others, individuals
accused of murder.
6This pattern is visible in non-European transitioning democracies as well. In the case of Brazil,
former president Lula da Silva was a leading presidential contender in the country’s 2018 elections,
despite longstanding corruption allegations against himwhich in July 2017 had resulted in a ten-year
conviction.
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for politicians and parties engaged in abuse of power remains variable. This is the
case despite the presence of democratic accountability mechanisms.
Within this context, this study asks: Why do voters vary in their demand for
accountability and under which conditions does corruption prove to be of greater
or lesser electoral salience? I theoretically and empirically assess this puzzle by
analyzing the effect of parties’ distributive policies on voters’ electoral response to
political graft. While previous studies on the topic have focused on country- and
individual-level factors such as the state of the economy, information asymmetries
or partisanship to explain variation in electoral punishment of corrupt parties, I
develop a theoretical model of ”corruption compensation” that identifies strategic
allocation of resources by governing parties as a proactive and retroactive reimburse-
ment mechanism for mediating electoral backlash. I posit that a critical component
of parties’ allocating calculus is the electorate’s perceptions of the corrupt practices
of governing parties. I argue that variation in spatial allocation of benefits according
to regional voters’ corruption perceptions shapes variations in patterns of electoral
tolerance of political graft. This theory of corruption compensation’ helps identify
the conditions under which electoral punishment of political graft is more likely to
emerge and contributes new insight into the puzzle of why there are non-punishing
voters in high-corruption states.
With its integration of parties’ allocating strategies with voters’ corruption per-
ceptions, this theoretical account extends work in both the distributive politics
and clientelist literatures focusing on resource allocation as a method of procuring
political support. However, by treating strategic allocation of resources as a defen-
sive shield—a mechanism to buy off voter demand for accountability—a theory
of corruption compensation expands the scope of analysis beyond an examination
of how parties use resource allocation to enlist electoral support, to evaluate how
and when corrupt parties use compensation strategies to maintain said support and
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deter potential defectors.
Advancing our understanding of this puzzle is important on several counts.
Electoral accountability constitutes a central mechanism of democratic robustness
(Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986): when voters fail to punish malfeasant representatives,
the latter’s incentives to curb their corrupt practices decline even further (Acemoglu
et al. 2003). This has important implications for long-term economic develop-
ment and ultimately jeopardizes democratic consolidation by depleting valuable
resources, undermining policy outcomes and reducing citizen’s trust in democratic
institutions (Mauro 1997; Lauderdale 2010; Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Thus
identifying the factors that drive voters’ electoral sensitivity to corruption provides
insight into the democratic prospects and performance of transitioning states. In
light of its significance, theoretical and empirical works on the topic have explored
the origins, spread, causes and effects of corruption in Europe’s transitioning states7.
Despite substantial advancement in this regard, there is still limited understanding
of the effects of corruption on political behavior8, particularly in regards to the
question of why some voters tolerate corruption while others do not. I contribute to
this conversation by exploring 1) the strategic role of parties’ distributive policies in
shaping political behavior and 2) corrupt politicians’ response to credible threats
of electoral backlash—a question that as noted by (De Vries and Solaz 2017) has
currently received “scant empirical attention” (pp. 397).
To dissect and test the effect of corruption compensation strategies on voters’
response to political graft, I focus my present analysis on post-socialist Albania
one of Europe’s struggling new democracies and the region’s third most corrupt
state. This within-country analysis allows me the advantage of constraining state-
level variation (in, e.g., macroeconomic performance or political culture) while
7See among others, (Kneen 2000; Philp 2002; Miller et al. 1997; Mishler and Rose 2005)
8Some exceptions include works on the effects of corruption on political participation (Kostadi-
nova 2012)
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engaging in a detailed qualitative and empirical analysis of the effect of party-level
distributive policies on electoral outcomes. The analysis covers the period between
2005 and 2010. Beyond the Albanian case, I construct a general theory of variation
in demand for accountability as a contributor to electoral volatility that applies to
any transitioning and developing state.
2.2 What We Know
Political corruption, often understood as a form of particularistic exchange
between patrons and clients, is a phenomenon that is neither exclusive to a particular
type of political regime nor fixed across time and space. It has characterized the
domestic political contexts of classic and contemporary societies and has proven
flexible in its ability to adapt to shifting political, economic and cultural dynamics
of its environment (Chang et al. 2010; Hicken 2011). Theoretical and empirical
works find that corruption disrupts foreign direct investment, hinders international
trade, inversely affects income equality (Habib and Zurawicki 2001; Wei 2000;
Hines Jr 1995; Gupta et al. 2004) and challenges economic growth by channeling
scarce resources toward private gains (Hicken 2011; Mauro 1997; Me´on and Sekkat
2005). In the realm of institutions and democratic governance, corruption hinders
collective action, impairs citizens’ ability to hold their governments accountable
and undermines trust in democratic institutions developments that impede the
maturing of a democratic political culture and jeopardize democratic consolidation
by provoking support for alternative methods of governance (Mishler and Rose
2001; Morris 1991; Rose et al. 1998).
Its damaging powers, however, do not go unchecked. The underlying expec-
tation of the retrospective voting model (RVM) is that voters sanction corrupt or
under-performing politicians when they have the opportunity and institutional
means to do so (Key et al. 1966; Fearon 1999). Electoral rules, checks and balances
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and the rule of law, robust opposition and clear demarcation of responsibilities have
the power to effectively curtail political corruption (Brown 2006; Persson et al. 2003;
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Carey and Shugart 1995; Golden and Mahdavi
2015; Easterly and Levine 1997; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Tavits 2007). Nonetheless,
anti-corruption measures have had limited impact on constraining political graft in
states where voters demonstrate lower demand for accountability (Treisman 2000).
Several empirical works find that voters do punish political corruption when it
leads to low economic performance (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Krause and Me´ndez
2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Klasˇnja 2016). While others find that cor-
ruption allegations also have a negative affect on incumbents’ reelection rates,
such effects are disproportionately small relative to the gravity of the allegations
(Ba˚genholm 2010; Chang et al. 2010; Welch and Hibbing 1997). These works focus
primarily on allegations versus specific cases of political corruption and share with
other works in this group a general confinement in their ability to explain the
electoral survival of parties and politicians with a history of engaging in corrupt
and non-democratic practices.
At the other end of the spectrum, studies find that the effect of corruption on
electoral outcomes is not detrimental to political survival and corrupt politicians are,
in fact, often reelected (Chang et al. 2010; Vivyan et al. 2012; Ferna´ndez-Va´zquez
et al. 2016; Reed 1999; Rundquist et al. 1977). These findings point to country-level
and individual factors as drivers of voters’ tolerance of political corruption. The
state of the economy (Klasˇnja and Tucker 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga
2013), partisan alignment (Anduiza et al. 2013; Mun˜oz et al. 2016; Wagner et al.
2014), ethnic identities (Banerjee and Pande 2007), voters’ educational background,
viable candidate choices (Anduiza et al. 2013), information asymmetries (Chang
et al. 2010; Botero et al. 2015) and political culture (Chang and Golden 2004; Barbera´
and Ferna´ndez-Va´zquez 2012) may all reduce the intensity of voter demand for
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accountability from incumbents9. However, while a few of these studies take
into account the heterogeneity of voters in punishing corruption (Klasnja 2011),
most share a homogeneous consideration of the electorate that does not capture
variation in voters’ corruption perceptions, especially voters situated in similar
economic contexts, institutional structures, and group compositions. Moreover,
the literature’s current focus on economic and institutional factors and voters’
individual attributes does not contemplate an effect of party strategies on reducing
demand for accountability.
My theoretical account of corruption compensation attempts to reconcile these
divergent results by assessing the effect of parties’ distributive policies on vari-
ation in voters’ response to political graft. Specifically, I use the term corruption
compensation to describe the joint mechanism formed of two distinct hypothesized
relationships for which I provide evidence below:
H1: Increased perceptions of corruption do indeed increase the probability
of harm to incumbents’ vote share. However,
H2: Incumbent parties’ strategic allocation of higher shares of government
resources to regions where corruption perceptions are higher reduces the level
of harm to their vote share.
This approach offers a heterogeneous perspective of the electorate and con-
tributes to our understanding of how politicians respond to the looming threat of
accountability being imposed at the ballot box. If, as expected by the RVM, holding
politicians accountable requires that voters10 1) observe a change in their societal
welfare, 2) attribute responsibility accordingly, 3) adjust their voting decisions and 4)
prompt a change in political behavior by incentivizing actors to adjust their actions,
then a theory of corruption compensation offers insight into what factors affect the
intensity of voters’ accountability requirements (step 3) and to what extent, and to
9For an excellent overview of the literature see (De Vries and Solaz 2017)
10For a detailed review of this literature, see (Healy and Lenz 2014)
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whose benefit, politicians adjust their actions (step 4). Hence, a theory of corruption
compensation contributes a linkage to a key step in voters’ electoral calculus when
faced with corrupt incumbents.
2.3 Corruption Compensation: A Strategy for Reducing Electoral
Sensitivity to Political Graft
In what follows, I provide definitions of this study’s central concepts and in-
troduce the theoretical basis for the hypothesized impact of parties’ compensation
strategies on voters’ electoral response to political graft.
Political Corruption
This study conceptualizes political corruption as fraudulent political and eco-
nomic conduct by elected party representatives while in office. In alignment with
established understandings of the concept, fraudulent behavior includes, broadly,
the exploitation of public resources for personal or party gains (Nye 1967; Rose-
Ackerman 2008; Treisman 2007). However, to avoid subjective explanations of
”exploitation” and subsequent biases resulting from its broad nature (Olken 2009;
Rose-Ackerman 2008), I focus specifically on cases where party representatives
engage in political misconduct that directly contradicts voters’ expectations of the
office they represent. This type of political misconduct includes violations of the
”universality” norm11 and expands beyond it by including cases where parties and
representatives disregard citizens’ interests despite contrary stipulations of the law.
Strategic Allocation of Resources
In alignment with current understandings of distributive politics as policies
involving states’ allocating decisions (Golden and Min 2013), I define strategic
11As defined by (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), the norm of universality refers to the process of
decision-making during which government officials exclude consideration of any citizen-related
factors not previously stipulated by the rule of law.
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allocation of resources as funds and privileges that are institutionally granted from the
central government to sub-regional governments. The decision-making authority
regarding the amount of resources distributed to sub-national regions rests with
the incumbent leadership. Once received, however, these resources are invested
in ways deemed fit by the sub-regional units, with the underlying expectation
that the chosen investment routes benefit the receiving region’s economic and
social development. While granted to regional governments rather than voters
directly, strategic benefits provide long-term gains and are observable to voters
via materialization of regional infrastructure, employment opportunities and other
advances in their region’s development. Therefore, strategic allocation of resources
enables incumbent parties to engage in a process of credibility-redemption by
compensating the electorate in ways that reduce voter demand for accountability
for graft.
2.4 Theoretical Framework
2.4.1 Parties’ Incentives to Engage in Corruption Compensation Strategies
At the foundation of my theoretical account rest two assumptions about the
incentives of incumbent parties and political elites to influence voters’ electoral
decisions. First, both parties and political elites are invested in maintaining political
power. Second, parties and elites are interested in accumulating rents and other
perquisites. While these assumptions hold across political parties, they are more
pronounced for corrupt incumbents, whose ability to maximize payoffs is largely
contingent upon their ability to maintain political power.
Corrupt parties’ capacity to achieve their desired outcomes is jeopardized when
information on political misconduct is made available to voters by the media
and trusted news sources (Chang et al. 2010; Botero et al. 2015; Ferraz and Finan
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2008; Klasˇnja et al. 2016). This type of information triggers an update in voters’
priors on party performance and initiates the process of blame attribution, which
ultimately shapes voters’ electoral accountability calculus. When this is the case,
parties’ electoral outcomes and ability to continue accumulating the desired rents
are uncertain, particularly when parties cannot intimidate voters (Mares 2015) due
to the presence of a robust opposition that provides voters with viable electoral
alternatives (Grzymala-Busse 2008). Under these conditions, parties have credible
and rational incentives to find strategies to assuage voters’ wrath and forestall
electoral backlash.
I argue that to reduce voters’ demand for accountability, incumbents engage
in corruption compensation — that is, strategic targeting of higher shares of gov-
ernment resources to regions where the electorate’s corruption perceptions are
high enough to merit compensation benefits yet manageable enough to be miti-
gated by them. Corruption compensation can grant parties electoral payoffs across
ideological contexts. In ideologically or group-aligned regions where the loyalty
foundation is preexistent and parties’ propensity to boost their support among core
supporters and potential defectors is likely (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Anduiza
et al. 2013; Banerjee and Pande 2007), the strategy reaffirms parties’ commitment to
the electorate. It induces elasticity in voters’ electoral demands by providing them
with a resource trade-off for political misconduct.
A compensation strategy can also provide incumbents with relative benefits
in both swing and non-aligned regions. In the former (Lindbeck and Weibull
1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996), the strategy can provide swing voters with tan-
gible returns for their electoral support. Similarly, in ideologically non-aligned
regions, particularly under proportional representation (PR) systems, where elec-
toral rules permit allocation of seats according to the number of votes received,
the compensation strategy ”buys” the electoral support of certain proportions of
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the electorate (Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Ferna´ndez-Va´zquez et al. 2016; Stokes
2007; Grzymala-Busse 2008; Hicken 2011). The logic of corruption compensation
and parties’ incentives to engage in it is reflected in the following response by an
Albanian MP to the question: ”How do parties whose reputation has been tainted
by corruption grapple, if at all, with voters’ distaste of it?”12
Look, politics and corruption go hand in hand. This tale is as old as time. It’s
naive to think voters don’t know or expect this. Corruption only becomes a
problem when parties overdo it and voters learn about it from the media, newspa-
pers or personal sources. Then, the parties’ long-term success much as that of a
skilled businessman depends on the ability to find the solution that best solves
the problem and then invest its energy and resources into it. And like with most
problems solved by money, the strategy to solving this particular one is to become
the good guy, or the good party. And you become the good guy by way of giving.
You give so they forgive. It’s possible but morally challenging to chide someone
who has been good to you and yours versus otherwise. This works for the voters,
but it works for the politicians rather nicely too. The good lamb nurses from two
mothers.
Once strategic resource allocation has been identified as a viable measure for
addressing corruption perceptions, incumbents face the challenge of identifying
the regions where a compensating strategy returns higher electoral payoffs. This
step is key to parties’ optimal use of their limited resources as a mechanism for
influencing voting outcomes. Incumbents gather information on where resources
should be allocated that is, where demand for accountability is likely to be most
elastic through political ”brokers” (Stokes et al. 2013) and direct engagement with
voters. This enables parties to assess, for instance, which stronghold regions must
12Interview conducted in July 2018. Tirana, Albania.
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be compensated with higher shares of resources and which others will continue
supporting the party regardless of the share they receive. I argue that in gauging
the respective elasticities in demand for political accountability, parties take into
account information on the corruption perceptions of regional electorates.
A member of the Albanian Parliament representing the Fieri region described
parties’ approach to identifying punishing voters in the following manner13.
You address a problem by getting to the heart of it. When you have a party that
is about to be penalized on grounds of corruption first thing to address is find
out who is about to punish. Where are these people? Have they punished in the
past? What does it take to be on their good side? You find out the answer to these
moving parts and then plan aggressively and give accordingly. Everything can
be purchased. Loyalty and intentions are no exception. You need a plan, though,
and you need the resources – that is crucial.
2.4.2 Voters’ Electoral Response to Corruption Compensation
How do voters respond to parties’ allocating strategies? I analyze the variation
in their response as a function of the interactive effect of two particular influences:
first, voters’ perceptions of parties’ engagement in political graft; and second, the
amount of resources allocated to sub-national regions by governing parties. In
regards to the first, when voters differ in their evaluation of party misconduct,
their voting decisions vary accordingly by either punishing corrupt incumbents
(Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; Klasˇnja et al. 2016; Krause and Me´ndez 2009) or
tolerating their engagement in political graft, especially when they ideologically
align with the party (Vivyan et al. 2012; Chang et al. 2010; Mun˜oz et al. 2016). Hence
13Interview conducted in June 2018. Fier, Albania. Question:”How do you think parties whose
reputation has been tainted by corruption address potential punishment by the electorate?”
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I expect variation in voters’ stated corruption perceptions14 to lead to variation
in their electoral response to political graft. In regards to the second dimension,
when voters reside in regions with higher inflows of corruption compensation,
they stand to gain more by mere virtue of regional growth, which in turn induces
lower demand for accountability for political graft—an expectation that can be
theoretically extrapolated from voters’ tendency to reward economic performance
(Klasˇnja and Tucker 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013).
I further expect distinct patterns of interaction between voters’ corruption per-
ceptions with regional gains from parties’ compensating resources to lead to vari-
ation in voters’ reaction to political misconduct. Table 2.1 presents the expected
interactive effect of these dual influences on electoral outcomes.
Table 2.1: Theoretical Expectations of Variation in Electoral Punishment
Corruption Perceptions
Low High
Low Conditional Punishment PunishmentGains from
Compensation
Resources High Status Quo/Support Low Punishment/Support
In regions where voters’ corruption perceptions are too low to credibly threaten
punishment, parties’ incentive to engage in strategic allocation of resources is also
14A potential concern with the validity of this measure in operationalizing the explanatory
variable is that a proportion of voters may underreport their true perceptions of corruption due
to, for instance, partisan bias. However, the prevalence of underreporting is likely low given that
a majority list political corruption to be the second most pressing issue facing the country next to
unemployment B.2. In the region of Tirana, a largely and consistently Democratic region, these
numbers reached 38.8% (INSTAT, 2010).
A further concern with reported corruption perceptions may be that they indicate voters’ knowledge
of widespread corruption but may not necessarily be interpreted to imply voters’ censure of it.
However, the widespread anti-corruption protests in response to the Gerdeci events and in the
following years (2017 the most recent one) suggest that rising political corruption has indeed aroused
voters’ normative censure.
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low. Under these conditions, voters exercise conditional punishment of governing
parties based on individual- and macro-level factors like the state of the economy,
partisanship etc. However, parties’ incentives to compensate for political miscon-
duct in regions where constituents’ corruption perceptions are not high enough to
warrant compensation shift when information provided by the media threatens to
increase voters’ awareness in ways that increase their demand for electoral account-
ability. Under these conditions, parties engage in strategic allocation of resources
to counteract voters’ demand for accountability with regional gains from party-
provided compensation. Therefore, I expect low-corruption-perception voters from
resource-favored regions to withhold electoral punishment of corrupt incumbents
in ways that maintain the political status quo.
Thus my formal hypotheses are as follows.
H1 - Increases in the corruption perceptions of the electorate have a negative
effect on party vote shares.
Moreover, I expect parties to attempt to appease voter dissatisfaction via al-
location of higher shares of compensating resources among constituents of high-
corruption perceptions regions. Hence,
H2 - Corruption Compensation Hypothesis: Increases in the amount of re-
sources allocated to regions with high corruption perceptions reduce the negative
effect of those perceptions on party vote shares.
To summarize, I expect distinct patterns of demand for electoral accountabil-
ity for political graft to be driven by voters’ perceptions of corruption and the
interactive effect of strategic benefits allocated to sub-national regions with higher
corruption perceptions among regional constituents.
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2.5 Albania: A Motivating Case
In this section, I introduce the transitioning democracy of Albania as a moti-
vating case for analyzing the effect of parties’ corruption compensation on voters’
demand for accountability for political graft. In what follows, I provide a brief
overview of the country’s transition and its electoral systems, followed by a precis
of a case of graft and voters’ electoral response to it. Methodology and findings
follow.
2.5.1 Background and Electoral Systems
Albania, one of Europe’s highly corrupt transitioning states, is a parliamentary
republic whose democratization has been marked by frequent shifts in the country’s
electoral patterns and systems. The collapse of the Communist regime in 1991 and
the country’s transition to a parliamentary democracy marked the end of Albania’s
pure majority system and a move towards a mixed, proportional-majoritarian
system. The latter lasted from 1992 to 2005 and was replaced prior to the country’s
2009 parliamentary elections by a proportional representation system. The Albanian
Parliament is comprised of 140 MPs, who are elected every four years through a
party-list proportional representation system with closed candidate lists.
In coherence with the European Parliament’s regulations for common classi-
fication of territorial units for statistics (NUTS), the regional structure of Albania
is divided into three NUTS 2 statistical regions (North, Center, South) and twelve
NUTS 3 administrative units. Combined, there are 36 main electoral municipalities
consisting of 61 smaller municipalities comprised of 308 communes (Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2: Statistical Regional Structure of Albania
NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 Municipalities Communes
Republic
of Albania
Diber 3
Durres 2
North Kukes 3 109
Lezhe 4
Shkoder 3
Elbasan 4
Center Tirane 2 67
Berat 3
Fier 3
South Gjirokaster 3 132
Korce 3
Vlore 3
Note: Throughout this paper, I refer to NUTS 3 units as electoral counties.
2.5.2 A Case of Political Corruption: The Gerdeci Explosions
On March 15, 2008, the capital of Albania, Tirana, was shaken by an explosion
originating from a munitions decommissioning facility designated to dismantle
Communist-era military ordnance. The explosion, compared to the detonation of a
nuclear bomb, occurred in the village of Gerdec, located some fifteen kilometers
from Tirana. According to UNDAC15, a total of 10,000 people were affected by
the powerful blasts, and approximately 4,000 people had to be evacuated from the
disaster area. Twenty-six people lost their lives, including women and children;
one person was declared lost; and another 300 citizens were injured and flown to
Italy, Switzerland and Greece for medical treatment. Aside from human costs, the
explosions further damaged critical infrastructures: roads, water and power supply
networks, public schools, buildings, health centers and destroyed nearly 3,000 local
businesses, further exacerbating the crisis for the surviving inhabitants lacking the
resources to abandon the area (UNDAC).
15(United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination 2008)
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While the Gerdeci explosions had devastating security and socioeconomic rami-
fications for the region’s residents, they also presented critical political and electoral
challenges for the incumbent Democratic Party (DP), whose leadership was im-
plicated in the scandal. Cognizant of the country’s upcoming 2009 parliamentary
elections, the growing momentum of the opposing Socialist Party and Albania’s im-
pending NATO membership, the Democratic Party’s leadership engaged in several
damage-control strategies to impede the political repercussions of the scandal. Three
hours after the explosions, government and Democratic Party representatives took
to the media to claim non-involvement in the Gerdeci scandal. Despite Berisha’s
claims to the contrary, opposition forces led by the Socialist Party pointed to Berisha
and his family’s involvement in the sale of surplus weaponry and mismanagement
of the disposal of obsolete weapons. They demanded his resignation on grounds
of corruption and political misconduct (Kulish 2008). The oppositions’ demands
were underpinned by domestic and international media accounts pointing to the
prime minister’s involvement in the illegal sale of the weaponry. Media reports on
the involvement of Berisha’s family in the Gerdeci scandal were widespread across
the country and gave imminent rise to voter protests16. Citizens and the victims’
families demanded an investigation into the causes of the explosions and called for
a change in government and legal accountability for Berisha and his collaborators.
2.5.3 Gerdeci: The Electoral Aftermath
Expectations of democratic accountability suggest that citizens’ fury at the
Gerdeci explosions should have led to electoral punishment of Berisha and the
incumbent DP. Yet this was not the case in the electoral aftermath of the Gerdeci
scandal. Despite reports by media and opposition forces aimed at generating public
awareness of Berisha’s involvement in the Gerdeci tragedy, Berisha and the DP-run
16Media and news reports maintained that the Gerdeci factory was under the management of
Berisha’s son, brother-in-law, and a number of additional family members.
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coalition proceeded to claim electoral victory in the country’s 2009 parliamentary
elections. What was puzzling about this outcome was Berisha’s and the DP’s
anticipation of that victory. Berisha’s confidence in his party’s ability to assuage
voters’ wrath was evident in his choice of electoral district where he ran as the
head of his party’s list. Berisha, who could have theoretically chosen to run in
regions far removed from the scandal in order to curtail electoral backlash, chose to
run in the region of Tirana, where the Gerdeci explosions had taken place only a
few months prior. His calculated risk paid off as Berisha secured electoral victory
and the DP matched the Socialist Party in winning fifteen parliamentary seats
in the Tirana region. In other sub-national regions, distinct patterns of electoral
punishment of Berisha’s DP emerged. While in the counties of Vlore, Shkoder
and Durres, the DP lost considerable portions of its vote share, in the counties of
Fier and Korce its electoral losses were only modest with, respectively, a 5.7% and
3.01% decline in vote share. In the counties of Kukes, Diber and Berat, however,
electoral punishment for DP did not materialize and the party’s vote share grew
by, respectively, 6.4%, 2.69% and .43% in comparison to the 2005 parliamentary
elections.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 capture distinct patterns of regional variation in electoral
support for the DP during Albania’s 2009 parliamentary elections. Figure 2.1
presents vote shares for Albania’s main competing political parties Democratic
Party, Socialist Party and the Movement for Social Integration (LSI) during the
2005 and 2009 parliamentary elections according to NUTS 3 statistical divisions.
Figure 2.2 further dissects the DP’s vote shares in the 2009 parliamentary elections
according to the country’s main 36 electoral counties.
When analyzing the DP’s 2009 vote shares in accordance with voters’ assessment
of escalating political corruption between the 2005 and 2009 elections, a pattern
that emerges is that in regions where electoral punishment for the DP was more
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Figure 2.1: Party Vote Shares by Electoral Counties
Data Source: CEC Albania.
Note: The pie charts represent vote shares by statistical region for the main political parties during
the 2005 & 2009 Parliamentary Elections.
likely to emerge, losses in DP vote share were either modest or did not materialize.
To illustrate, Figure 2.3 captures regional public perceptions of mounting political
corruption during the period 2006-201017.
As shown, in the counties of Fier and Korce, where the proportion of respondents
who believed corruption had escalated between the two elections grew by 50% and
46% respectively, losses in the DP’s 2009 vote shares were only 5.7% and 3.01%
relative to its 2005 vote shares. In the counties of Berat and Diber, on the other
hand, a significant increase of 48% in the proportion of respondents who believed
corruption had surged over the last three years did not result in electoral backlash
and the DP’s vote shares actually increased during the 2009 parliamentary elections
by .43% and 2.69% respectively.
Figure 2.3 further addresses the point of voters’ awareness of corruption as a
17Percentage of respondents is calculated by combining the proportions of survey participants
who responded that they ”Disagreed” and ”Strongly Disagreed” with the statement: ”There is less
corruption today than three years ago”.
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Figure 2.2: Party Vote Shares by Main Municipalities, 2009
factor that impacts their imposition of electoral accountability (Chang et al. 2010;
Botero et al. 2015). The increase in public perceptions of mounting political corrup-
tion across the country’s twelve electoral counties signals the electorate’s general
awareness and disapproval of their governments’ under-performance 18. This
awareness is further reflected in the electorate’s rising distrust of government, par-
ties and political institutions over the period 2006-2010. Figure 2.4 displays national
levels of institutional distrust during the period of 2006 and 2010. The data suggest
an overall increase in distrust across all presented political institutions. Distrust
in political parties increased from 45% in 2006 to 53% in 2010, while distrust in
government reached a high of 44% in 2010 relative to 31% in 2006 19.
18When asked about the trajectory of corruption in the last three years prior to the 2010 survey (a
period that coincides with the time of the Gerdeci scandal), approximately a third of Albanian voters
believed that corruption had increased, while more than 40% considered it to have remained stable.
19Question: ”To what extent do you trust the following institutions: The Presidency, the gov-
ernment/cabinet of ministers, regional government, local government, the parliament, courts,
political parties, the police?” To capture total national levels of distrust in each institution, I combine
the proportions of respondents who expressed ”Some distrust” and ”Complete distrust” of each
institution.
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Figure 2.3: Corruption Perceptions by Electoral County, 2006 vs. 2010
Given voters’ awareness of and distrust of political institutions due to political
corruption, what drove the distinct patterns of electoral backlash against the DP in
the wake of the Gerdeci events? In accordance with my theoretical expectation of
parties’ compensating strategies, I expect that the governing DP strategically allo-
cated higher shares of government resources to sub-national regions where voters’
high perceptions of corruption signaled a credible threat of electoral backlash. An
empirical implication of this expectation is that regions with smaller proportions
of citizens who think that corruption has increased should have received compar-
atively lower amounts of resources relative to their corruption-alert counterparts.
Figure 2.5 lends empirical support to this expectation. The correlation plots indicate
the presence of a positive relationship between unconditional transfers (UT) per
capita distributed to regional municipalities by the party in government and the
proportion of respondents who consider political graft to have increased over time.
Alternatively, the inverse relationship between UT per capita and proportion of
respondents who believe that corruption has decreased in recent years suggests
that municipalities with lower proportions of corruption-wary voters receive fewer
resources from the party in government 20. I test the effects of this relationship on
20Survey Question: ”To what extent do you agree with the following statement: There is less
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Figure 2.4: Distrust in Political Institutions (2006-2010)
voters’ electoral decisions in the empirical section of the article.
Figure 2.5: Resources vs. Corruption Perceptions, 2005 & 2010 (by Municipality)
Data Sources: Albanian Ministry of Finance, LITS 2006, 2010
Finally, the corruption compensation hypothesis raises two information-related
questions that call for theoretical validation. First, how aware are parties of the
electorate’s corruption sentiments? And, second, how aware is the electorate of
regional benefits provided by the incumbent? Given parties’ electoral incentives to
constrain voter discontent, I expect parties to engage in strategies that, similar to
corruption today than four years ago.” The Resources vs. High-Corruption Perceptions figure
denotes the percentage of respondents who ”Disagreed” and ”Strongly Disagreed” with the state-
ment. Alternatively, the Resources vs. Low-Corruption Perceptions figure denotes the percentage of
respondents who ”Agreed” and ”Strongly Agreed”” with the statement.
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”machine politics”(Dixit and Londregan 1996), enhance communication with the
electorate and make the latter aware of past and present benefits provided by the
party. These measures, which range from personal contact with voters to use of
regional networks, provide parties the dual benefit of engaging in credit-claiming
and gathering information on voter attitudes. To illustrate, in his 2009 pre-election
interview with Ora News Television titled ”This Is Why My Victory Will Be by a
Large Margin”21, prime minister Sali Berisha addressed concerns that voters had
been offered little opportunity to understand Berisha’s past performance and his
plans for the next four years, in the following manner.
I think that the campaign this time has had several dimensions. There is one
dimension that has come to little media attention, our focus on the citizens . .
. all our group leaders and candidates for deputies, all our party bodies have
had intensive contacts with the citizens, talking to them, listening to them, and
collecting their opinions. Such contacts, which could be hundreds in a day, have
been little reported in the media. I have taken great care of this dimension and
have issued clear directives to my people to have such contacts with the citizens.
Besides, in addition to addressing rallies with thousands of people overflowing
the squares, I have had individual meetings with young people. I have worked
hard on this dimension. 22
Therefore, I expect that by building informational connections with the elec-
torate, parties inform them about regional benefits and gauge voter attitudes in
ways that help parties adjust their compensating algorithm according to the per-
ceived elasticity of voter demand for accountability.
21The interview was conducted by Alfred Peza in the last days leading up to the 2009 election.
22Albanian PM rules out opposition’s election victory; BBC Selected Newspaper Articles:
Albania; June 25, 2009. Link: http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/openurl?ctx_ver=
z39.88-2004&rft_dat=document_id\%3Anews\%252F1291D9791E1A19B8&rft_id=info\%3Asid\
%2Finfoweb.newsbank.com&rft_val_format=info\%3Aofi\%2Ffmt\%3Akev\%3Amtx\%3Actx&
svc_dat=AWNB&req_dat=0D1A2AB84F2D3D40
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In the following section, I discuss sample selection, data sources and the struc-
ture of the main variables in the analysis followed by systematic tests of my theoret-
ical expectations.
2.6 Empirical Analysis
2.6.1 Sample Selection: A Within-Country Analysis
To examine the effect of parties’ distributive policies on voters’ electoral re-
sponse to corruption, I conduct a within-country analysis in the case of post-Socialist
Albania. This methodological choice is grounded on a theoretical and empirical
rationale. From a theoretical perspective, post-Socialist Albania demonstrates sev-
eral characteristics central to the puzzle of electoral tolerance of political graft. The
most critical of these is the country’s excessive political corruption. According to
Transparency International’s23 2017 ranking, Albania with a CPI score of 38 and a
global ranking of 91 trails Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and its bordering neighbors
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in transparency, making it one of the most
corrupt European democracies.
A second dimension to this puzzle involves the country’s incentives to gain
EU membership. Having survived the longest and most isolationist Communist
regime among the former Socialist countries, Albania entered its democratic phase
as Europe’s poorest and most struggling transitioning democracy. Under these
conditions, the country’s elites and its electorate have long considered EU mem-
bership a symbolic form of acceptance by the larger European community and,
most importantly, a viable mechanism for remedying Albania’s economic disad-
vantage. The electorate’s rising expectations of EU integration, largely due to the
economic advantages linked to EU membership, present Albania’s post-Socialist
23Transparency International, 2017 Report. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/
corruption_perceptions_index_2017
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political elites with increased electoral pressures to join the EU an incentive that
has made EU membership a primary objective and politically rewarding subject of
rhetoric among the country’s post-Socialist leadership24. Under these conditions,
the country’s elites face credible and rational incentives to comply with the EU’s
anti-corruption measures in order to potentially secure membership.
Yet, despite EU-related constraints, the involvement of Albania’s political rep-
resentatives in political graft has persisted over time. Issues concerning illegal
funding of political parties, the involvement of the country’s political elites in faulty
privatization practices and misappropriation of state revenue and property, etc.,
were at the base of Albania’s 2012 ranking as the most corrupt country in Europe
and one of the most corrupt in the world under Berisha’s government25. In parallel
with the country’s growing political corruption, the electoral tolerance of Albanian
voters, despite established mechanisms of democratic accountability, has also per-
sisted over time. A case that illustrates both of these tendencies is the political
rise of Ilir Meta, the leader of Albania’s LSI (Movement for Social Integration)
Party26 and an avowed supporter of EU integration. Meta’s tendencies toward
graft were nationally broadcast when a 2011 video recording of his private, corrupt
dealings with his collaborator, Dritan Prifti who at the time served as the Minister
of Economy, Trade and Energy (2009 to 2010) was leaked to the national media by
a disgruntled Prifti. Despite the scope of the scandal and subsequent outrage by
the electorate, Meta, who at the time of the recording was Deputy Prime Minister
under Berisha, continued his political rise. He became chairman of the Albanian
parliament in 2013, and most recently, following the country’s 2017 elections, was
appointed president of the Albanian Republic.
24Albania submitted its application for EU membership in 2009 and was granted candidate status
in 2014.
25Transparency International Report, 2012
26LSI aligned with Berisha’s Democratic Party during the 2009 parliamentary elections to form
the country’s governing coalition.
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Similar cases of limited consequences for political misconduct by elected repre-
sentatives persist in Albania, even while voters consider corruption to be a signifi-
cant issue facing their country. According to the Albanian Institute of Statistics, in
year 2010, nearly 50% of Albanian voters believed political parties to be involved
”often” and ”very often” in corrupt practices, while 60% believed the same of their
central government (Figure B.1). In light of these parallel tendencies, the Albanian
case constitutes, from a theoretical perspective, a fitting choice for an analysis of the
strategies parties adopt to reduce voters’ demand for electoral accountability.
From an empirical perspective, a within-country analysis is also a fitting selec-
tion. General data limitations on types of corruption across Europe’s post-Socialist
space hinder our ability to effectively explore variation in the forms of corruption
and in voters’ electoral response to it. In cases where the data allow for an ex-
ploration of types of corruption, the patterns that emerge are often contradictory
and caution against treating the post-Socialist region as a whole. For instance, an
analysis of the V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2016) indicates a general decline in
public corruption, but an increase in executive, legislative and judicial corruption.
A cross-country analysis of VDem’s Corruption Perception Index27 of several post-
Socialist states indicates no clear pattern from which generalizable conclusions can
be drawn (Figure 2.6).
In light of such empirical challenges, assessing the effect of parties’ corruption
compensation policies on electoral outcomes in a single country of the larger post-
Socialist space enables a concentrated analysis of variation in patterns of electoral
accountability while constraining variation in country-level factors.
27VDem’s corruption perception index (v2x-corr) is constructed byweighting equally four various
government spheres (executive, legislative, judicial and public sector).
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Figure 2.6: Corruption in Post-Socialist States - VDem Dataset
2.6.2 Data Sources
To operationalize my hypotheses, I have compiled an original dataset consisting
of electoral and fiscal indicators at Albania’s municipality strata, which I merge with
pre-existing data on micro-level corruption perceptions indicators. The sources
of the data are multiple. To assemble district-level electoral data for the main
political parties during the country’s 2005 and 2009 elections, I rely on statistics
from Albania’s Central Election Commission (KQZ). For fiscal data on the amount
of unconditional transfers distributed by the central government to the country’s
sub-national municipalities, I collect original indicators from the Albanian Ministry
of Finance. I then map the unconditional transfers data, available at the district
level, into the country’s electoral municipalities to match the unit of analysis of
the electoral data. Moreover, I rely on indicators from the Central Bank of Albania
to collect data on economic indicators (e.g. gross domestic product, growth rate
and gross value added by sub-regional governments to the central one). Economic
indicators are only available at the county strata. Finally, I collect municipality-level
population data from the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT).
To capture voters’ corruption perceptions and attitudes toward political graft,
I use the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) data. Administered by the European
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the LIT Survey, conducted in
the years 2006 and 201028, captures the experiences and attitudes of citizens in
transitioning, post-Communist European states. The LITS asks direct questions
about respondents’ perceptions of corruption trends and structurally align with this
study’s temporal frame and sub-regional focus29.
Combined, the dataset I assemble is of a time-series-cross-sectional nature and
its multileveled structure consists of repeated observations on fixed sub-regional
units.
2.6.3 Dependent Variables
To test the combined effect of strategic allocation of resources with voters’ cor-
ruption perceptions on parties’ electoral outcomes, I concentrate the empirical
analysis on two outcomes of interest: 1) the DP’s vote share, and 2) changes in
the DP’s vote share between the 2005 and 2009 elections. I formally construct the
dependent variables as follows.
Party Vote Shareimt =
n
Â
j=1
Party Votesjit
n
Â
j=1
Valid Votesjit
⇥ 100
Where Party Votes Shareimt is the vote share for each political party at county i,
municipality m at time t. Party Votesjit is the total number of votes for each party in
each district j of municipality m of county i at time t, and Valid Votesjit are the total
valid votes in each district j of municipality m of county i at time t.
D(Vote Share)cmt = Vote Sharecmt  Vote Sharecmt 4
28The third round of the LIT Survey was conducted in 2016.
29In the case of Albania, the LITS uses the electoral register and divisions as the basis for the PSU
(Primary Sampling Unit) sample frame.
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Where c is the county, m is the municipality and t denotes year 200930.
2.6.4 Independent Variables
My theoretical expectation is that a policy of corruption compensation, whereby
parties allocate greater resources to regions where the electorate is more alert about
increases in political graft, is associated with higher electoral returns for corrupt
parties in government. Therefore, I examine the interactive effect of two main
explanatory variables on parties’ electoral outcomes: 1) voters’ perceptions of
escalating political corruption and 2) its interaction with unconditional transfers
per capita from national to local governments. I expect that the combined effect
of these variables yields variations in patterns of electoral outcomes for Albania’s
Democratic Party under Berisha’s government.
2.6.4.1 Corruption Perceptions
To capture voters’ attitudes toward political corruption before and after the
Gerdeci explosions, I collected regional responses to the following LITS question
asked in both 2006 and 2010: ”To what extent do you agree with the following
statement: ’There is less corruption today than three years ago’?” I estimate the
proportion of respondents who believed corruption had increased over the pe-
riod 2006-2010 by combining the proportion of respondents who stated that they
”disagreed” and ”strongly disagreed” with the statement. I formally construct the
corruption perceptions variable as follows.
Share of Respondentsimt =
n
Â
j=1
Respondents per Questionjit
n
Â
j=1
Survey Participantsjit
30Tables B.1 and B.2 provide descriptive statistics of the dependent, explanatory and control
variables included in the analysis.
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Where Share of Respondentsimt is the share of respondents in each county i, mu-
nicipality m at time t. Respondents per Questionjit is the total respondents who
”disagreed” and ”strongly disagreed” that corruption had decreased over the
last four years in each district j of municipality m of county i at time t, and
Survey Participantsjit is the total number of survey participants in each district
j of municipality m of county i at time t.
2.6.4.2 Unconditional Transfers as Revenue Sources for Sub-regional Govern-
ments
Albania’s Organic Law ”On the Organization and Functioning of Local Govern-
ments” specifies three types of transfers from the national to local governments:
unconditional transfers, conditional transfers and shared taxes, which have yet to
be created. The law states the intended purpose of unconditional transfers is to
establish fiscal equalization between local governments. These include funding
operating expenditures and investments such as reconstruction and maintenance
at the local level. According to the National Strategy of Decentralization, uncondi-
tional transfers include: 1) a transfer of vertical compensation based on the ratio
of responsibilities and functions between the central authorities and local ones
to be used for general and non-targeted support of expenses for public services
and functions of local governments, and 2) equalization grants to support local
governments that have an insufficient local revenue and resource base.
The Organic Law, however, does not provide a definition of the allocating
formula or the amount of unconditional transfers to be distributed to local gov-
ernments. The law’s ambiguity on both the size of the transfer and its allocating
formula has allowed the party in government full discretion over the amount of
unconditional transfers to be received by local governments and created an op-
portunity for manipulating both factors via repeated amendments to the national
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government’s Annual Budget Law31. I argue that this discretionary fiscal authority
provides an opportunity for malfeasant incumbents to engage in corruption com-
pensation by strategically allocating greater shares of resources to regions where
electoral backlash against parties’ grafting practices is more likely to be assuaged.
Therefore, I use the share of unconditional transfers provided to local governments
as a proxy for strategic allocation of resources by the Democratic Party. Normalizing
the amount of unconditional transfers by the total number of voters per munici-
pality accounts for the fact that larger municipalities require greater amounts of
transfers in order for a distributive strategy to be effective.
Formally, Unconditional Transfers per Capita to each municipality m of electoral
county i at time t is the ratio of the sum of the total amount of unconditional
transfers distributed to each county’s municipality j at time t, divided by the sum
of total voters32 in each county’s municipality j at time t:
Unconditional Transfers per Capitaimt =
n
Â
j=1
UTjit
n
Â
j=1
Total Votersjit
where Unconditional Transfers per Capitait is the unconditional transfers per capita
distributed from the national government to county i, municipality m at time t. UTjit
is the total amount of unconditional transfers to district j of municipalitym of county
i at time t, and Total Votersjit is the number of voters of district j of municipality m
of county i at time t.
2.6.5 Control Variables
To address alternative explanations for variation in voters’ electoral tolerance of
the DP’s misconduct, I control for confounding variables associated with resource
31NALAS. Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe
32To accommodate lack of data availability on district-level population, I use total number of
voters as a substitute for district population.
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distribution, corruption perceptions and the party’s electoral returns. To account
for the effect of voter’s ideological alignment on the DP’s electoral outcomes (An-
duiza et al. 2013; Mun˜oz et al. 2016; Peters and Welch 1980), I construct a dummy
variable that accounts for each district’s ideological alignment during the previous
election. I then include in the analysis the mean of this variable across each electoral
municipality. This data comes from Albania’s Central Election Commission (KQZ).
An alternative explanation for voters’ lack of electoral retribution relates to the
opposition’s strength. A viable opposition not only constrains party misconduct
out of fear of retaliation; it also affects voters’ response to party performance by
providing them with credible electoral alternatives (Ferejohn 1986; Fearon 1999;
Grzymala-Busse 2008). To account for this tendency, I control for voters’ perceptions
on the strength of political opposition33 across each subregional municipality.
Moreover, voters who perceive corruption to have increased over time may
choose to abstain from voting altogether, particularly when the opposition is per-
ceived to be an equally corrupt alternative. Under these conditions, voters have
a low expectation of altering the political status quo and therefore choose not to
turn out for elections.34 To account for the possibility of non-engagement in the
electoral process as a potential voter response, I therefore control for voter turnout
by calculating its mean across each electoral municipality’s various districts.
Finally, I include in the analysis a set of economic measures and population
controls that may also affect the response variable. I account for regional GDP and
growth rate as measures of the unconditional relationship between transfers and
party vote shares. These controls enhance the models’ accuracy and address the
literature’s findings that economic performance is a strong predictor of election
33To capture the strength of the opposition, I calculate at the municipality-level the proportion of
respondents who responded ”Agree” and ”Strongly Agree” to the question: ”To what extent do you
believe that the following exists in your country: Strong Political Opposition.”
34While turnout rates have indeed been on the decline throughout Eastern Europe in recent years,
in the case of Albania, the drop in turnout rates between years 2006 and 2010 was only 2 percentage
points, going from 51% in 2006 to 48% in 2010.
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outcomes (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Economic
variables are only available at the county strata.
2.7 Empirical Strategy
To examine the combined effect of strategic allocation of resources and the
electorate’s corruption perceptions on party vote shares, I estimate a hierarchical,
mixed effects linear model with random intercepts by municipality and county for
municipality nested within county. The advantage of this model is that it contains
year fixed effects that control for unobserved time-invariant confounders, while
allowing for the inclusion of random effects other than those associated with the
error term (Laird and Ware 1982). Hence, the model is a fitting choice for the
structure of the data consisting of multiple levels of nested groups. Formally,
DP Vote Shareicm = b0 + b1UT Per Capitaicm + b2Share of High CPicm (2.1)
+b3(UT Per Capita ⇥ Share of High CP)icm
+
n
Â
j=4
b jXj + ac + µcm + eicm
where ac and µcm note, respectively, county and municipality error terms and eicm
denotes year-county-municipality error term.
To further test the effect of corruption compensation policies on the DP’s electoral
returns, I also test the effect of changes in the explanatory interactive term on
changes in the DP’s vote share between the 2005 and 2009 elections. I do so via an
ordinary least squares (OLS) model with panel corrected standard errors a method
that produces accurate coefficient standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Formally,
D(Vote Share)cmt = b0 + b1D(UT Per Capita)cmt + b2D(Increased CP)cmt (2.2)
+b3[D(UT per Cap⇥High CP)cmt] + gXj + acm ++ecmt,
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where Xj is a vector of controls, acm notes county municipality dummy and ecmt
denotes the error term. The interactive term included in this model is constructed
as follows.
D[UT per Cap⇥High CP]cmt = [UT per Capitacmt  UT per Capitacmt 4] (2.3)
⇥[High CPcmt  High CPcmt 4]
Where c denotes county, mmunicipality and t denotes year 2009.
2.8 Empirical Findings
Table 2.3 displays regression results of the determinants of DP vote shares in
year t during the period 2005-2010. In models 1-5, the parameter b3 is of primary
analytic interest. It represents the interactive effect of strategic resource allocations
and the electorate’s corruption perceptions on DP vote shares. A positive b3 would
be consistent with the theoretical expectation that in efforts to mediate electoral
punishment and deter potential defectors, corrupt parties allocate greater resources
to regions where the electorate is most likely to punish.
I begin by estimating a simplified version of the hierarchical model to test the
individual effects of resource allocations and corruption perceptions on the DP’s
vote share without the interaction term (Table 2.3, Column 1). The coefficient on
the corruption perceptions variable is significant (p = 0.011 ) and in the predicted
negative direction. This supports the theoretical expectation that higher corruption
perceptions by voters have a negative impact on the electoral standing of corrupt
parties in government (H1). The coefficient on the UT per capita variable is negative
and lacks statistical significance, which suggests that when corruption perceptions
of the electorate are not taken into account, the effect of resource allocation to
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particular regions does not necessarily return positive electoral outcomes for the
party in government.
This direct test of the effect of UT per capita on vote share (Table 2.3, Model 1)
could be misleading for two reasons. First, it assumes that the effect of UT per capita
is the same in both high- and low-corruption regions and second, it does not control
for county-level characteristics that could be correlated with both UT per capita and
the outcome variable the DP’s vote share. To address the first concern, I include
in Table 2.3 (Model 2) the interaction term of UT per capita with the proportion of
respondents who perceived corruption to have increased over the last three years.
The coefficient (b3) of the interactive term is in the predictive positive direction and
statistically significant at the 1% level (p = 0.001). Thus, distributing larger amounts
of resources to regions where high proportions of voters consider the party to be
corrupt results in higher electoral returns for the party in government. I address the
second concern by controlling for voter turnout, party alignment, perceptions on
the opposition’s strength and voter population factors recognized by the literature
to be related to both allocation of benefits and electoral outcomes. In Models 3
through 5, I further incorporate economic measures to assess whether the results
are affected by individual counties’ growth and development characteristics.
The findings presented in Table 2.3, show that the (b3) coefficient of the inter-
action term remains positive and highly significant in the presence of the added
controls. When controlling for turnout and party alignment (Models 4 & 5) the
magnitude of the (b3) coefficients decreases slightly as the added variables may
be likely linked to both allocation of benefits and electoral outcomes. Nonetheless,
the findings hold and are significant at, respectively, the 5% & .1% levels. These
results lend support to Hypothesis 2 and confirm that when accounting for voters’
corruption perceptions, strategic allocation of benefits by parties in government
has a positive effect on the latter’s vote share. The results also lend empirical sup-
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port to previous findings on the effect of party alignment and turnout on electoral
outcomes. The positive and highly significant coefficient of the party alignment
variable (Model 4) suggests that ideological alignment has a positive effect on party
vote shares. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the turnout
variable (Model 5), however, suggests an inverse relationship between the DP’s
vote shares and turnout. That is, vote shares for corrupt parties in government shift
upwards when voters abstain from the electoral process.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Democratic Party Vote Shares (2005-2010)
Model (1) (2) (3) ( 4) ( 5)
UT Per Capita -0.152 -1.115⇤⇤⇤ -1.602⇤⇤⇤ -0.253 -0.534+
(0.208) (0.316) (0.326) (0.282) (0.299)
Increased Corruption
Perceptions (CP)
-5.288⇤ -19.655⇤⇤⇤ -20.298⇤⇤⇤ -11.430⇤⇤ -16.787⇤⇤⇤
(2.076) (4.024) (3.917) (3.538) (3.689)
UT Per Capita ⇥ CP 3.350⇤⇤⇤ 3.554⇤⇤⇤ 1.511⇤ 2.516⇤⇤⇤
(0.813) (0.796) (0.718) (0.750)
Voters Per Municipality -0.206⇤⇤⇤
(0.050)
GDP 0.180 0.137
(0.140) (0.121)
Growth Rate -0.103 -0.080
(0.112) (0.099)
Turnout -25.810⇤⇤⇤ -28.775⇤⇤⇤
(3.399) (3.622)
Party Alignment 6.525⇤⇤⇤
(0.863)
Strong Opposition -1.603 -1.278
(1.830) (1.951)
ln(GDP) -0.612
(3.485)
ln(Growth Rate) -0.648⇤
(0.330)
County-Year Random
Effects
Municipality-Year
Random Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
Note: This table portrays a mixed, multilevel model analysis of the determinants of Demo-
cratic Party vote shares in year t. The dependent variable is Vote Shares for Democratic
Party in electoral municipality m of county i at time t. The main explanatory variables are
Increased Corruption Perceptions (CP) and the interaction term between Unconditional
Transfers Per Capita (UT) and CP. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and
+ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Given that the two main components of the interaction term UT per capita
and corruption perceptions are both continuous in nature, a further empirical
concern rests with the interpretation of their coefficients. Specifically, the negative
coefficient on UT per capita implies that the negative correlation between corruption
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perceptions and vote share only holds when the amount of UT per capita in a
given municipality is zero. Similarly, the negative coefficient of the corruption
perceptions variable suggests that the negative relationship between unconditional
transfers and vote share only holds when the corruption perceptions of a particular
municipality are zero. To address this concern and facilitate the interpretation of
the marginal effects of the interacted explanatory variables on the outcome variable,
I plot predicted changes in the DP’s vote shares due to a one-unit change in UT
per capita at various points of voters’ corruption perceptions (with 95% confidence
intervals). The plot, presented in Figure 2.7, suggests empirical support for the
Corruption Compensation hypothesis (H2). It indicates that allocating greater
amounts of strategic resources to municipalities with larger shares of corruption-
alert voters has a positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares. For instance, when
corruption perceptions shift upward from .3 to .8, an increase in UT per capita
results in reduced electoral punishment as vote shares for DP shift in the positive
direction.
Figure 2.7: Marginal Effects of UT per Capita Conditional on Corruption Percep-
tions
Note: The blue area denotes 95% Confidence Intervals
To visualize this relationship beyond a one-unit increase in UT per capita, the
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marginal plot presented in Figure 2.8 captures the predicted probability of the DP’s
vote shares at various points of UT per capita and corruption perceptions.
Figure 2.8: Marginal Effects of UT per Capita & Corruption Perceptions on DP Vote
Shares
The graph shows that strategic resource allocation by the incumbent has the
effect of boosting electoral support for the allocating party. Thus, increasing the
amounts of UT per capita from 3 to 12 units in a region where the proportion of
corruption-alert voters reaches 60% has the effect of reducing voters’ demand for
accountability from the DP, as the predicted probability of the DP’s vote share shifts
positively from 39% to 49%.
These findings remain consistent when the sample of analysis is narrowed
to the 2005 and 2009 election years. This measure, which checks for empirical
robustness when the data is not repeated across time, inevitably reduces the number
of observations from 336 to 56. Nevertheless, the results, presented in Table B.3,
show that the coefficient of the Higher Corruption Perceptions variable (b2) remains
negative and highly significant throughout Models 6-9. This finding lends empirical
support to Hypothesis 1, which predicts an inverse effect of higher corruption
perceptions on vote shares. Similarly, the coefficient (b3) of the interaction term
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remains in the predicted positive direction and is consistently significant at the
1% and 5% levels. The findings hold when additional controls testing previously
discussed influences on party’s vote shares are included in the analysis. Finally,
the predictive margins plot testing the effect of a corruption compensation strategy
on electoral outcomes (Figure B.4) further suggests that the effect of UT per capita
on the DP’s vote shares increases as the electorate’s corruption perceptions also
increase.
To further test the findings’ empirical robustness, I also estimate the effect of
changes in corruption compensation on changes in vote share during the 2005 and
2009 elections. To do so, I employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with
panel corrected standard errors where the dependent variable is changes in the DP’s
vote share (Equation 2.2). To accommodate data structure and availability, here I
am assuming that voters’ corruption perceptions in year 201035 reflect those formed
in year 2009 the year directly following the Gerdeci scandal. This assumption is
theoretically justified on grounds of the scope and public outrage in response to the
Gerdeci tragedy. Under these conditions, any significant shifts in public perceptions
regarding the tendencies toward graft of the Democratic Party had to have been
formed in the wake of the Gerdeci explosions and were captured by the 2010 wave
of the LIT survey.
Table 2.4 provides the results of three OLS models with panel corrected standard
errors estimating the determinants of the change in DP’s vote share between the
2005 and 2009 elections. These results show that the coefficient of the interaction
term is in the expected positive direction and maintains statistical significance at the
5% and 10% level. While the effect of the explanatory interaction term on changes
in the DP’s vote share is reduced after the reduction in sample size, these effects are
consistent with earlier tests of the same relationship in a sample of 336 observations.
35The year the second wave of the LIT Survey was conducted.
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They also remain robust when accounting for the additional controls associated
with the explanatory and response variables.
Table 2.4: Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Vote Share(2005-2009)
Model (10) (11) (12)
D(UT Per Capita) -0.739 -1.043 -0.956
(0.720) (0.725) (0.713)
D (Increased CP) -11.551⇤⇤ -13.129⇤⇤ -12.061⇤⇤
(4.113) (4.121) (4.254)
D(UT Per Capita) ⇥ D (Increased
CP)
4.001+ 4.700⇤ 4.124+
(2.378) (2.357) (2.376)
mean(Voters) -0.459⇤⇤⇤ -0.412⇤⇤⇤ -0.334⇤
(0.116) (0.116) (0.153)
D (Strong Opposition Perceptions) -2.575 -2.147 -1.502
(3.420) (3.347) (3.387)
mean(GDP) 0.160⇤⇤⇤ 0.167⇤⇤⇤ 0.161⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
mean(Party Alignment) -1.449+
(0.862)
mean(Turnout) 3.812
(3.027)
mean(Growth Rate) -0.597+
(0.328)
Constant 3.132+ 4.658⇤ 4.568+
(1.803) (1.979) (2.652)
Observations 56 56 56
Robust Standard Errors
R2 0.299 0.333 0.339
Note: The above estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with
panel corrected standard error terms of the determinants of Changes in Democratic
Party’s Vote shares between years 2005 and 2009. The dependent variable is D(Vote
Share for Democratic Party) in electoral municipality m of county i between 2005 &
2009. Main explanatory variables are D(Increased Corruption Perceptions) and its
interaction with D (Unconditional Transfers Per Capita). Standard errors are shown
in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively.
The marginal plot of the effect of the interaction term on the change in vote share
for DP between the years 2005 and 2009 is presented in Figure 2.9. The pattern
observed suggests that changes in UT per capita have a positive marginal effect
on changes in party vote shares as the proportion of voters who consider political
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corruption to have escalated increases over time. Thus, under conditions of an
increase in the proportion of people who consider political graft by the party in
government to have escalated, a strategy of higher resource allocation to those
municipalities improves the party’s ability to shield itself from potential electoral
punishment. Under these conditions, higher allocations translate to higher electoral
support for the party.
Figure 2.9: Marginal Effects of Changes in UT per Capita on Changes in Vote Share
Note: The blue area denotes 95% Confidence Intervals
2.9 Conclusion
In this article, I have extended a theoretical account of corruption compensation
that identifies spatial allocation of benefits as a proactive and retroactive reim-
bursement mechanism that parties employ in accordance to voters’ corruption
perceptions to shield themselves from increased demand for electoral accountability.
Specifically, I have argued that parties allocate greater resources to regions where
the electorate’s corruption perceptions and by extension their demand for account-
ability is comparatively higher. Distributed by the national government and left
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to the discretion of local governments, these resources enable corrupt parties to
preempt electoral backlash and ensure marginal gains in voters’ confidence.
This article has 1) provided new and comprehensive evidence of the effect of
corruption compensation policies on incumbents’ electoral outcomes in the case of
Albania, one of Europe’s most corrupt and understudied transitioning democracies;
2) expanded the ongoing conversation on the origins, causes and effects of corrup-
tion to include parties’ and representatives’ response to credible threats of electoral
backlash (a question that has to date received minimal empirical attention in the
literature); and finally, in combining parties’ distributive strategies with voters’
corruption perceptions, this theoretical account contributes additional perspective
on the conditions that drive variation in voters’ demand for accountability for
political graft. It offers insight into the puzzle of why some corrupt parties pay
dire electoral consequences and cease to exist while others survive and mitigate
the electorates demand for accountability for political corruption. In doing so, this
article contributes to the growing literature on how party strategies affect voter
behavior and patterns of democratic consolidation across transitioning states.
This article’s findings indicate that corrupt parties in government can increase
allocation of strategic resources to sub-national regions, but those policies in them-
selves does not solve the party’s credibility problem, nor do they consistently result
in optimal electoral outcomes. It is rather a strategic calibration of distributive
resources in accordance with the degree of the electorates’ corruption perceptions
that ultimately affects parties’ electoral prospects and drives variation in voters
demand for accountability for electoral corruption. One important implication of
these findings is the insight that voters whose corruption perceptions are highest
or undergo higher increases over time tend to be more responsive to corruption
compensation strategies of parties in government. This tendency offers insight into
the puzzle of why despite voters’ protests against political graft, corrupt politicians
across Europe’s transitioning democracies are able to maintain political power.
Investigating this dynamic in a larger cross-national setting can further advance
our understanding of 1) why the voters most aware of corruption tend to also be
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more likely to be compromised by it; and 2) how these tendencies affect patterns of
democratic consolidation across transitioning states.
Finally, these findings have important policy implications for domestic gov-
ernments and aid contributed to transitioning states by international allies and
intergovernmental entities. Misallocation of governmental expenditures and for-
eign aid to regions that present a credible electoral threat to corrupt parties in
government rather than regions in need of it suggests a need for institutions that
monitor expenditure and transfer systems by domestic opposition forces and donor
entities. Given the negative effect of political corruption on the duration of democra-
cies (Figure B), curbing corrupt parties’ ability to buy off demand for accountability
for their non-democratic practices can impede their ability to degrade democratic
institutions in the long run.
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CHAPTER III
Unintended Consequences: EU Funds, Political
Corruption, and Power Consolidation
3.1 Introduction
The European Union spends nearly 94% of its yearly budget on fiscal allocations
to member states. The funds—which in the case of the less-developed EU countries
comprise as much as 80% of their public investment1—aim to boost economic
growth, promote regional and social development, and narrow the wealth gap
among the Union’s developed and developing post-socialist states. The underlying
expectation is that by stimulating socioeconomic outcomes, these fiscal allocations
will advance recipient states’ institutional effectiveness, reinforce EU values, and
ultimately enhance democratic performance across the region.
In practice, however, policy-makers and constituents have increasingly linked
the EU’s fiscal transfers to political corruption and institutional malperformance in
target states—practices that, contrary to the funds’ intent, undermine democratic
effectiveness and jeopardize the EU’s democratic consolidation. For instance, in
2008, the European Commission investigated and responded to high-level corrup-
tion and improper administration of European funds in Bulgaria and Romania by
freezing nearly 500 million Euros in farming and structural aid to Bulgaria and
28 million in agricultural aid to Romania (Initiative 2008). Similarly, in 2012, the
1(EU Budget)
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European Commission withheld an additional 3.5 billion Euros from Romania’s
funding in response to a series of irregularities in managing the human-resources
development sector (The Economist 2012). The misuse of fiscal transfers extends
to the EU’s most developed members as well. In July 2008, Brussels announced
it would recall 400 million Euros from Italy, the UK, and Greece for violations of
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) rules. France, Germany, and the Netherlands
were also implicated in the recall (Initiative 2008).
Citizens and policy-makers in recipient countries have also expressed frustration
at the unintended consequences of the EU fiscal allocations. While voters in the
EU’s East and Central European member states, including Bulgaria, Poland, and
Romania, have participated in organized protests against political corruption, do-
mestic policy-makers and opposition forces have pointed to the EU transfers as an
underlying mechanism that unwittingly supports political corruption in their coun-
tries. In a recent interview with the author, for instance, a Bulgarian policy-maker
noted the following:
The EU funds have actually worsened the situation. Corruption became much
more tempting for political elites when the resources became available. The money
rendered them power. It also led to this new norm shared widely by political
leaders today and that is—corruption is acceptable and it is even justified when
the government is helping its people, even partially. What we are dealing with
now is that over time the people’s share got smaller and politicians’ larger. And
that applies not only to the money, but also to each group’s respective power2.
These events raise the important question of how funds allocated by the EU to
member states exhibiting varying degrees of political corruption shape domestic
politics and incumbent parties’ governing outcomes. Despite concerns about the
linkage between rising political corruption and inefficient use of EU transfers by
member states’ authorities, the impact of EU funds on political corruption has
received surprisingly minimal empirical attention (Fazekas et al. 2013a). Even less
2Interview conducted in July 2018.
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empirical consideration has been given to the question of how allocations to corrupt
EU states affect domestic party politics and the political longevity of recipient states’
governing parties. While the development aid literature has devoted systematic
due diligence and extended critical findings in regards to the effect of foreign
and development aid on the quality of developing states’ institutions, caution is
needed when seeking to generalize these findings to EU member states, especially,
as Fazekas et al. point out, given the variation in context and funding magnitudes
between the world’s developing countries and EU member states (Fazekas et al.
2013a).
Systematic assessment of the impact of EU allocation policies on political corrup-
tion and domestic party politics of recipient countries is relevant for both democratic
theory and distributive policy purposes. By examining whether and how EU fiscal
funds are utilized by member states for personal and political rather than economic
purposes, these findings advance our understanding of the efficiency of the EU’s
fiscal and distributive policies. Hence, understanding this relationship helps explain
variation in the degree of success that EU fiscal policies have garnered in promoting
EU democratic values across the organization’s geopolitical space.
In this paper, I analyze whether fiscal transfers allocated by the European Union
to member states deliver an electoral advantage to recipient countries’ governing
parties, conditional on the degree of executive corruption across recipient states.
I argue that greater allocations to the EU’s corrupt member states increase the
likelihood of misallocation by recipient states’ governing parties. Given their en-
gagement in political corruption, incumbents are more likely to expect electoral
backlash, particularly in the presence of robust opposition (Grzymala-Busse 2007).
Under these conditions, governing parties have incentives to engage in “benefit-
trading” by diverting EU fiscal flows toward strengthening their political networks
and implementing programs and policies that appease their electoral bases. Con-
sequently, rather than promoting balanced economic development within the EU,
greater funds to corrupt EU states may boost corrupt governing parties’ competitive
advantage over the opposition.
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Examining data on fiscal funds allocated by the European Union to member
states between 2000 and 2015, I empirically test my theory that incumbents’ states
with higher executive corruption display a larger electoral boost from external
fiscal funds than their counterparts in less corrupt states. The results support my
theoretical expectations, suggesting that corrupt governments divert EU fiscal funds
toward practices and policies that increase their electoral payoffs. To my knowledge
this study is the first to take into account target states’ political corruption to
document how EU transfers impact internal electoral politics in recipient countries.
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives
In the broader development literature, much research examines foreign aid and
its link to target countries’ corruption, institutions, and governance in Africa, Asia,
or Latin America. Despite the different contexts, the dynamics that characterize
the aid allocation process and the findings extended by the aid literature may
offer insight into mechanisms whereby EU fiscal transfers may impact not only
patterns of political corruption, but also the domestic politics of recipient states.
One hypothesis is that recipient states’ institutional performance and governance
effectiveness shift in ways that optimize continuous flows of aid from donor states.
The literature’s findings in terms of the direction of this shift, however, are mixed.
While some works find no empirical support for the impact of aid on democracy
(Knack 2004), others find that aid inflows can serve as resource rents (Deaton 2013;
De Mesquita et al. 2005; Djankov et al. 2008; Morrison 2007; Rajan and Subramanian
2007) that deteriorate the quality of target countries’ domestic institutions, rights,
and democratic governance (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Busse and Gro¨ning 2009;
de Mesquita and Smith 2013; Dreher et al. 2013; 2014).3
3The hypothesized mechanism here is that aid, similar to natural resources, offers a substitute
for the domestic revenue collection typically associated with enhanced institutional performance
(Moore 2004). By decreasing target states’ dependence on internal revenues, aid diminishes political
accountability, increases political corruption (Bra¨utigam and Knack 2004), weakens incentives for
collective action (Booth 2011), and ultimately devitalizes target states’ domestic institutions (Moss
et al. 2006).
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Other empirical works, however, refute the “curse” effect of foreign aid on
governance (Altincekic and Bearce 2014). Pointing to the conditions attached to aid
allocations by donor states, scholars argue that aid expenditures are conditional and
therefore comparatively more constrained than expenditures financed by domestic
revenues (Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Wright and Winters 2010). Under these
conditions, the use of aid and fiscal allocations as non-taxable resources available
for extraction by recipient states’ elites is limited and therefore the elites’ ability
to engage in political corruption declines (Tavares 2003). Hence, donors’ intent
(Bermeo 2009), restrictions, and ability to withhold aid if conditions are not met
(Epstein and Sedelmeier 2013) help maintain regime stability (Morrison 2009) and
promote democratic institutions (Bermeo 2016; Scott and Steele 2011) by aligning
the interests of domestic elites with those of donor entities (Faye and Niehaus 2012).
This general lack of consensus on a relationship between transfers, political
corruption, and democratic outcomes is echoed in the Europeanization literature.
Existing works focus primarily on the EU’s role in establishing practices and pro-
cedures (Meyer-Sahling 2011) that helped revamp the economic and institutional
structures of the region’s less developed states (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2013), par-
ticularly in the post-Cold War period (Bermeo 2016; Dunning 2004; Fearon et al.
2009). One branch of the literature finds that under effective conditionality, mon-
itoring mechanisms, and credible threats of fund-withdrawal by the EU (Epstein
and Sedelmeier 2013), the EU’s fiscal allocations shape the utility and policy choices
of domestic elites in ways that promote institutional efficiency, human rights, demo-
cratic norms, and economic growth across the region (Carnegie and Marinov 2017;
Mohl and Hagen 2010). Extrapolating from the aid literature, this effect is likely to
increase in the presence of effective rule of law policies and macroeconomic mea-
sures, including the level of trade openness, inflation, and trade regulations that also
reinforce recipient countries’ economic development (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003;
Asongu and Jellal 2013; Quazi et al. 2015; Burnside and Dollar 2000). Hence, when
faced with credible threats of fund-withdrawal from the EU, recipient countries’
elites are constrained in their ability to utilize EU funds for personal and political
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gain.
Only recently have scholars started to examine the impact of EU funds on
governance and patterns of political corruption in target states, particularly those of
the ECE region (Fazekas et al. 2013a). Focusing on the type of investment sponsored
by the funds and the degree of public discretion over said investment, scholars
find that when EU allocations are invested in projects over which domestic actors
and the public have high discretionary power, the likelihood of political corruption
and ineffective governance in recipient states increases (Asongu and Jellal 2013;
Dimulescu et al. 2013; Fazekas and To´th 2017). As the aid literature points out,
these tendencies are stronger in recipient states with a history of poor governance
(Moss et al. 2006) and ineffective institutions that further exacerbate misallocation
of external funds (Mehlum et al. 2006; The´rien and Noel 2000; Van der Ploeg 2011).
Under these conditions, rather than promoting regional growth and economic
convergence within the region, the EU funds provide a resource pool utilized by
actors and political elites to extract rents and promote their personal and political
interests (Ahmed 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). As a consequence, misallocating
tendencies threaten the EU’s economic and democratic norms by impinging on the
recipient states’ political culture and, as observed in the developing, post-socialist
states of Hungary and Romania, reaching the highest strata of political leadership
(Fazekas et al. 2013b; Dimulescu et al. 2013).
While current findings advance our understanding of the relationship between
EU funds and corruption, the range of analysis is limited to the impact of fiscal
transfers on corruption and does not engage with the question of how the EU funds
interactwith recipient states’ corruption tendencies to shape party dynamics and the
political survival of incumbent parties. Specifically, how does fund allocation to EU
member states—taking into account the countries’ degree of executive corruption—
affect the democratic outcomes of executives and political parties with allocating
discretion? And also, how do these dynamics differ across the EU’s political space?
The aid literature, for instance, finds that access to aid flows increases political com-
petition and consolidates electoral support for newly elected leaders (Licht 2010).
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However, these findings offer insight into the longevity of individual politicians
rather than parties, and their empirical scope covers developing countries with
distinct economic and political structures from the EU states. The Europeanization
literature, for its part, assesses the funds’ impact on patterns of political corruption
in a subset of EU countries while leaving open the question of how the EU funds
affect corrupt countries’ internal politics. 4
My paper builds upon these works to address this exact point and contribute a
systematic understanding of this phenomenon. I offer and empirically test a novel
theory that underlines the combined, explanatory effect of EU funds and the degree
of executive corruption in recipient states and find that incumbent parties of highly
corrupt states enjoy a larger electoral boost from EU fiscal inflows than those of less
corrupt states. I present my theoretical rationale and hypotheses in the following
section.
3.3 EU’s Fiscal Transfers & Governing Parties’ Competitive Ad-
vantage
Governing parties and political elites are driven by rational incentives to main-
tain political power and maximize the rewards associated with public office. These
tendencies are especially strong in parties with corrupt dispositions, as their ability
to continue accumulating desired payoffs requires maintaining political power.
For instance, preserving power allows governing parties to use their privilege
and resources to engage in clientelistic, principal-agent interactions with the elec-
torate (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011; Muno 2010). It also allows them
to implement distributive policies that compensate voters for parties’ corruptive
tendencies and appease particular electoral groups in ways that enhance corrupt
incumbents’ electoral returns (Anduiza et al. 2013; Banerjee and Pande 2007; Cox
4For instance, (Fazekas et al. 2013a) examine this relationship in the context of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovakia, while (Dimulescu et al. 2013) do so in the case of Romania. A recent study
by (Fazekas and To´th 2017) takes an EU-wide empirical approach; however, the authors focus on
the effect of EU funds on corruption, rather than the funds’ impact on incumbent parties’ governing
outcomes.
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and McCubbins 1986; Golden and Min 2013; Lederman et al. 2005).
That said, corrupt incumbents’ ability to achieve their optimal outcomes di-
minishes when robust and organized opposition parties induce higher electoral
accountability by providing voters with viable political alternatives (Barro 1973; Fer-
ejohn 1986; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Tavits 2007). Under these conditions, incumbent
parties have incentives to invest in ensuring the loyalty of their close network and
electoral base as a mechanism for consolidating power and securing their competi-
tive viability over opposition forces (De Mesquita et al. 2005). By doing so corrupt
incumbents can, for instance, rely on their supporting networks to recruit “brokers”
who monitor the electorate’s behavior and ensure parties’ continuous electoral sup-
port (Stokes et al. 2013). This form of benefit-trading is key to incumbents’ longevity,
particularly when parties’ past practices of corruption and favouritism inform ex-
pectations of future benefits among their networks and politically aligned regions,
as well as voters expecting tradeoffs for parties’ political misconduct (Shehaj 2018).
Hence, governing parties’ incentives to use EU fiscal flows to gain a competitive
advantage over opposition forces increase even further when they are corrupt.
However, governing parties’ coalitions, which are stronger when parties initially
take office, weaken over time (Licht 2010). These diminishing loyalties threaten
incumbents’ electoral survival, particularly when their history of corruption may be
used by opposition forces and the media to increase voter information and under-
mine incumbents’ electoral returns. Under these conditions, corrupt incumbents’
incentives to maintain their position increase even further: institutional power
grants them greater access, fewer controls, and greater distributive authority over
the state’s budgetary resources, comprised significantly of EU fiscal inflows. In the
absence of effective governance, rule of law, and monitoring mechanisms (Asongu
and Jellal 2013; Keohane 1998; Wright and Winters 2010), corrupt incumbents’ abil-
ity to achieve these objectives and consolidate their position becomes a probable
outcome.
I argue that under these conditions incumbents’ ability to engage in benefit-
trading with members of their personal and political network increases. These
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conditions foster a political climate where corrupt incumbents face limited con-
straints on their ability to misallocate EU funds for purposes of rewarding their
own networks, win the support of potential coalition partners, and implement
policies that appease particular factions of the electorate. There is a potential risk to
the misuse of EU’s fiscal flows by corrupt and illiberal governments: The EU can
choose to withdraw the funds as a punishment mechanism. However, the process
of downsizing member states’ fiscal flows calls for adjustments to the EU budget —
a procedure that must be agreed upon by all national leaders unanimously. Thus,
attempts to withdraw a particular illiberal state’s funds require the approval of
other, potentially illiberal governments who themselves stand to lose access to the
EU’s funds by setting a policy precedent. For instance, EU attempts to withdraw
funds from Hungary require the unlikely approval of Poland—another corrupt
and illiberal EU member uninterested in risking its own future fiscal flows due to
domestic corruption and illiberal politics. Under these conditions, EU’s threats to
discontinue or altogether stop the fiscal flows are evaluated to be non-consequential
and non-credible by the recipient member states. This could explain why despite the
European Commission’s 2021-2027 budget proposal to cut funds to the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, and Poland’s Jaroslaw
Kaczynski remain confident that their countries will remain the largest recipients of
EU funds (Bershidsky 2018). Thus, leaders’ utility costs for engaging in corruption
are low given the revenue streams of EU funds. This in return diminishes their
incentives to curb corruptive practices and increases their governing latitude over
opposition forces. Given these dynamics, I expect EU fiscal transfers to boost the
electoral shares of corrupt incumbent parties over the opposition in EU states.
Additionally, I expect the intensity of this effect to vary across the EU’s devel-
oped and developing states. Fiscal transfers, much like aid, serve as a sizable,
non-taxable resource that incumbents as well as opposition and other factions com-
pete over (Svensson 1999; Tornell and Lane 1999). This is especially the case in the
EU’s post-socialist states. While the EU’s better-performing economies accumulate
the bulk of their financial revenue from trade and other domestic economic initia-
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tives, the main source of income for the less developed, post-socialist economies
is European funding, which finances up to 80% of their public investment (EU
Budget 2015). Hence, the EU’s fiscal transfers comprise the largest resource pool
from which the governing parties of post-socialist states can draw to engage in
rewarding strategies that yield a competitive advantage over the opposition.
In accordance with the above discussion, I offer the following hypotheses:
H1 Increases in the corruption tendencies of recipient states’ governing parties have a
negative effect on parties’ governing shares.
H2 The electoral margins of governing parties in high corruption states increase when
the amounts of the EU’s fiscal allocations also increases.
An important point to make in regards to Hypothesis 2 is the issue of reverse
causality. As argued in the aid literature, the direction of causality is an impor-
tant concern when assessing the relationship between aid and development. For
instance, does aid cause poverty, or is it the case that underdeveloped countries
receive more aid to address poverty? When assessing the direction of causality
between EU funds and corrupt states’ incumbent parties however, this is less of
a concern. It is difficult to imagine that the EU would allocate greater resources
to corrupt incumbents for purposes of combating corruption. This reasoning is
evident in the Commission’s threats to freeze funds to Romania, Czech Republic,
Hungary and other EU states plagued by political corruption.
Prior to testing these expectations, I discuss the EU’s Budget composition and
briefly illustrate these dynamics in the case of Poland.
3.3.1 The EU’s Budget Composition & Fiscal Funds Distribution
The distribution of funds among member states is a central feature of the EU’s
budget. The purpose of the fiscal distribution, understood here as the mechanism
via which fiscal funds are transferred from the EU budget to member states, is to
narrow the wealth gap between the EU’s developed and developing states. The
funds are drawn from a common pool of resources to which all member states
contribute a share proportionate to their gross national income (GNI). These con-
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tributions make up the largest portion of the EU budget and are used to balance
the organization’s revenues and expenditures (European Commission 2013). Addi-
tional revenues contributing to the EU budget are customs duties on imports from
outside the EU and sugar levies, as well as a standard percentage based on the
harmonised value added tax (VAT) payments of each member state (EU Budget).
Other sources of revenue falling under the EU’s “Own Resources” category include
taxes on EU salaries, fines imposed on companies that breach competition laws, and
contributions to particular EU programs made by non-EU countries (EU Budget).
Approximately 94% of the EU’s budget is distributed among its member states.
These expenditures are payments allocated to national governments during a fiscal
year. They are drawn from year t’s appropriations or from year (t -1)’s carryovers of
unconsumed funds. The amount allocated to each member state corresponds with
its national GNI and is distributed according to the EU’s criteria that “all possible
expenditure5 must be allocated” (EU Budget 2015). The fiscal flows are designed
to fund country-specific projects and implement various EU-initiated policies in
recipient states (EU Budget 2015). While the amount of funds allocated to national
governments varies, they constitute a significant portion of income for all member
states and contribute to the improvement of several domestic policy areas, the two
main ones being “sustainable growth and natural resources,” and “economic, social,
and territorial cohesion.” Table 3.1 presents the allocation of the EU’s expenditure
(141,586 million Euros) during fiscal year 2015. It indicates the main policy areas
and projects funded in the EU, the amount allocated to each category, and the
proportion of the total budget they constitute.
The process of fiscal distribution among EU countries serves either as a liability
or an opportunity, given a member state’s degree of economic development and
population size. For the better-performing economies of Austria, the Netherlands,
Germany, Sweden, etc., the responsibility of contributing to the EU budget is dis-
proportionately heavier than for less developed EU countries. Given their relative
5Exceptions to this criteria include expenditure related to external actions, the pre-accession
strategy, guarantees, reserves, and unmarked revenue.
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Table 3.1: EU Budget 2015 - Fiscal Distribution(in million EUR)
Policy Area Amount Proportion of
EU budget
Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs 15581 11%
Economic, Social & Territorial Cohesion 50961 35.99%
Sustainable Growth: Natural Resources 56634 40%
Security & Citizenship 1958 1.38%
Global Europe 7648 5.4%
Administration 8551 6.04%
Compensations 252 0.18%
Special Instruments 0 0%
wealth—measured by national gross national income—the EU’s developed mem-
bers are institutionally obliged to make greater monetary contributions to the EU’s
budget than their developing, post-socialist counterparts. This pattern is reversed
when considering the distribution of benefits and fiscal flows among the EU’s
member countries. Given the EU’s fiscal prioritization of policies geared towards
“Economic, social, and territorial cohesion” and “Competitiveness for jobs and
growth,” the region’s less developed economies receive greater allocations6 while
contributing comparatively smaller shares to the EU’s total revenue. To provide
an example of the imbalance in transfers among EU states: In year 2015, Estonia,
Poland, and Romania—three of the EU’s post-socialist, developing economies—
were allocated, respectively, the amounts of 13,695 million, 13,357 million, and 6,538
million Euros. This funding includes “Cohesion Policy” funds allocated to the
EU’s underdeveloped regions and member states in order to generate growth and
employment in these areas (EU Budgetary System). In turn, the EU allocated the
better-performing economies of Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands the respec-
tive amounts of 1,787 million, 1,467 million, and 2,359 million Euros of its budget
(European Commission 2013). The fiscal disbursements to national governments
have increased further in recent years as the share of the EU’s budget allocated to
policies that promote economic development and narrow the wealth gap between
members has increased by approximately 20 billion Euros since 2014 (European
6European funding in the EU’s poorer countries finances up to 80% of their public investment.
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Commission 2013).
While the disbursements to member states have accrued over time, the funds’
effectiveness in reaching the desired economic, social, and institutional objectives
in recipient states has varied considerably across the region. In some countries,
notably the developing democracies of Romania and Bulgaria, fiscal flows have
been associated with a surge in political corruption (Fazekas and To´th 2017). In
such cases fiscal flows have been strategically diverted by governing parties and
political elites to reward their personal and political networks, favour strongholds
of electoral support, and forestall electoral accountability. Yet in other states, such
as Poland and Hungary, the EU’s fiscal distributions have contributed to imple-
menting programs and policy measures that have boosted their transitions into
well-performing market economies. However, both Poland and Hungary’s increas-
ingly authoritarian political developments may point to weaknesses in the efficacy
of fiscal flows to promote not only democratic robustness in recipient states, but
also political cohesion within the EU. Despite established monitoring mechanisms
7 at both the EU and national levels, success in curbing the misallocation of fiscal
funds in recipient states has been limited.8
7The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigates “fraud against the EU budget, corruption
and serious misconduct within the European institutions” (OLAF 2018). The OLAF works closely
with the “Anti-Fraud Coordination Service” of each member state and attaches repercussions to
intentional misallocation of funds. It places accountable parties either in the “Early Detection and
Exclusion System” (EDES) or the “Exclusion” category which prohibits them from future fiscal
flows from the EU. An additional EU-monitoring institution is the European Court of Auditors
(ECA). The ECA reviews the parties responsible for managing European funds and conducts routine
“Compliance Audits” on the European institutions to prevent and reduce fraud within them. The
ECA’s findings are reported to the OLAF.
8A primary reason for this is lack of enforcement mechanisms at the EU level. While the OLAF
has the power to identify and ban misallocating parties from receiving future funds, the authority to
hold these parties legally accountable rests with the national governments. This lack of supranational
enforcement mechanisms makes it feasible for individuals and parties in recipient states to continue
misusing the funds for personal and political purposes with little to no legal ramifications (Fazekas
et al. 2013a). To illustrate, between 2010 and 2017, the OLAF conducted over 1,800 investigations
into the misuse of EU funds and issued over 2,300 recommendations for disciplinary actions to
be taken. Nonetheless, deliberate mismanagement of the EU’s fiscal flows persisted in recipient
countries, particularly in the newer democracies, despite efforts to combat practices of bid rigging
and kickbacks by the EU (Ferwerda and Deleanu 2013).
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3.3.2 An Illustrative Case
The relationship between fiscal flows, corruption, and electoral returns for
domestic governing parties is evident in the case of Poland. Having joined the
European Union in 2004, Poland—a country increasingly marked by cases of po-
litical corruption9—has been the recipient of large shares of EU funds, with this
total peaking in 2014 at nearly 17.5 billion. From the time of its accession to the
EU through 2015, Poland was governed by the Civic Platform (PO), led by Donald
Tusk, in coalition with the Polish People’s Party. The PO and the People’s Party
combined for 47.5% of the vote and 235 seats in the Sejm, the Polish lower chamber,
an absolute majority, in the 2011 parliamentary elections. Aided by a first-past-the-
post electoral system, the increasingly authoritarian Law and Justice (PiS) party
were also able to secure a 235-seat majority after the 2015 elections, despite having
only won 37.6% of the vote.
PiS has made strategic use of the EU’s transfers to reward its political network
and constituent base. Two particular measures used by PiS have been appointing
party supporters to key allocating posts and implementing domestic policies aimed
at garnering the electoral support of targeted constituencies. To illustrate, in 2016,
former PiS Prime Minister Beata Szydlo appointed Marek Chrzanowski—who in
November 2018 resigned over corruption allegations10 —to the position of Poland’s
Financial Supervision Authority (KNF)— a position that granted Chrzanowski ac-
cess and authority over Poland’s fiscal resources, comprised heavily of EU transfers.
Additionally, PiS has utilized EU funds implement domestic policies aimed
at garnering the electoral support of the parties’ constituent base. PiS derived
much of its success from its 500+ Initiative, which provides Polish parents with a
tax-free benefit of PLN 500 (about 120 Euros) per month for their second and any
further children until the age of 18. This accounts for 12% of the Polish average
9Poland’s 2003, 2007, and 2015 governments have routinely engaged in bribery and corruption
scandals.
10Chrzanowski was reported to have solicited a bribe in the amount of 40 million zloty (9.3
million Euros) in return for lenient treatment to a national bank with a history of large numbers of
non-performing loans.
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wage and costs the Polish government about 4 Billion Euros per year. Families
below a further income level also receive financial support for their first child. While
targeted at strengthening birth rates and family values, the policy led to a significant
electoral boost for PiS, which gains most of its support from Poland’s poorer, rural
population, who benefit disproportionately from this policy (Marcinkiewicz and
Stegmaier 2016). Economically insecure voters were more likely to support PiS
than their economically secure counterparts, with this policy being one of the main
drivers of their electoral success (Piotrowska 2016). PiS was able to pursue this
policy due to the relatively large amount of funds Poland receives annually from
the European Union. These funds allow the Polish government to reduce spending
in projects such as infrastructure investments, which the EU often helps fund, and
redirect it toward welfare programs such as the 500+ Initiative.
With access to a large amount of EU funds and a political climate that lacked
strong leadership after Tusk became the President of the European Council, PiS
were able to win an absolute majority by using the EU’s fiscal transfers to engage in
activities that targeted their voting base.
3.4 Research Design
3.4.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
To assess how EU disbursements shape domestic party politics and the competi-
tive advantage of recipient countries’ governing parties, I concentrate my analysis
on twenty-six member states over the period 2000-201511. These countries share
common institutional structures while displaying distinct development trajectories.
Their commonalities include EU-defined institutional and regulatory frameworks
and participation in the EU’s legislative and executive bodies via elected represen-
tatives. Yet they differ in terms of economic performance, democratic robustness,
and historical legacies—with several post-communist members, including Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, etc., lagging behind in economic growth and effective
11To accommodate data availability, Cyprus and Malta are excluded from the analysis.
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governance.
Importantly, these countries differ along twomain theoretical dimensions argued
here to shape incumbent parties’ political gains— the amount of fiscal flows and
degree of executive corruption. First, given their respective GNI and population
sizes, the amount of EU funds per capita distributed to member states differs
significantly across the region and over time ( Figure 3.1). For instance, in 2015,
Sweden received 150 Euros per capita in EU disbursements while Poland and
Bulgaria received, respectively, 352 and 689 Euros per capita. (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.1: EU Transfers Per Capita (2000-2015)
Note: The box plot displays the distribution of EU fiscal transfers across member states during
2000-2015. The graph indicates the range, median, and means of the ratio of the total amount of EU
funds received by recipient country i in year t to country i’s population over year t.
Additionally, the countries under consideration demonstrate distinct patterns
of political and executive corruption. Despite established monitoring mechanisms
and uniform expectations of corruption controls and fiscal transparency by the EU,
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Figure 3.2: A Graphical Representation of EU Transfers per Capita
EU Member States, 2015
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Note: The graph represents the amount of EU transfers allocated to each recipient country relative to
each country’s population in 2015. Darker areas indicate greater EU transfers per capita allocated to
the recipient country.
political and executive corruption is particularly high among the EU’s post-socialist
members and reaches the highest executive ranks (Fazekas and To´th 2017). As
captured in Figure 3.3 the post-socialist members display comparatively higher
levels of executive corruption than their Western counterparts.
The empirical analysis utilizes a combination of original and preexisting data. To
collect indicators on one of the study’s main explanatory variables—the amount of
EU disbursements to recipient states—I rely on the European Commission’s Budget
Reports for years 2000-2015. Additional data on the explanatory and main control
variables included in the analysis are obtained from several datasets, including the
Database of Political Institutions (Keefer and Scartascini 2016), Polity IV Democracy
(Marshall and Gurr 2015), Varieties of Democracy Dataset (VDEM) (Coppedge et al.
2017), World Development Indicators from the World Bank (WDI) (World Bank
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Figure 3.3: A Graphical Representation of the Executive Corruption Index
EU Member States, 2015
Note: The graph represents each EU member state’s Executive Corruption Index in the year 2015.
2017), World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al. 2011), and Boix, Miller,
and Rosato Democracy Data (Boix et al. 2013).
3.4.2 Dependent Variable
My main expectation is that higher fiscal inflows to politically corrupt EU
countries deliver a political advantage to incumbent parties over opposition forces.
To capture this effect, the empirical analysis focuses on the seat share of recipient
states’ governing parties as the main outcome of interest. This variable captures the
fraction of seats held by government parties in country i during year t. The measure
is calculated by dividing the total number of government seats by the total number
of government plus opposition plus non-aligned seats (Keefer and Scartascini
2016). The dependent variable remains constant in the years between parliamentary
elections. Therefore, to take advantage of the variation in the outcome variable, I
71
concentrate the analysis only on years during which parliamentary elections were
held.
3.4.3 Explanatory Variables
In accordance with my theoretical expectations, this study’s main explanatory
variable is the interacted effect of the total shares of fiscal flows distributed by the EU
to national governments ⇥ the degree of executive corruption in recipient countries.
I collect the data on the total amount of fiscal transfers allocated to EU member
states from the European Commission’s Budget Reports for the years 2000-2015. The
transfers are distributed across several categories, including agriculture, structural,
development, etc. My theory, however, is primarily focused on 1) the quantity of
funds received by recipient states; and 2) access to the funds by governing parties.
Thus, my interest lies less with the transfers’ intended policy objective and more
with the total shares of fiscal flows available to the governing parties of recipient
states. For this reason, I aggregate my measure of fiscal transfers across the various
divisions of EU expenditure.
Consistent with the larger aid literature, I then calculate two different measures
that capture, respectively, the short-term value of EU fiscal flows and the size of
transfers received by member states: 1) fiscal transfers per capita, and 2) fiscal
transfers by government expenditure. In regards to the first: a contested feature
of the EU’s redistribution mechanism as well as its decision-making system is
the size of member states’ populations. Member states with smaller populations
are favoured by the EU’s institutional structure (Mattila 2006). They are routinely
overrepresented in EU legislative bodies, including the Council ofMinisters, and use
their powers within the organization to influence EU budget decisions and increase
their fiscal inflows. I account for this empirically, by constructing the share of fiscal
flows per capita variable. The variable is calculated by dividing the total amount of
expenditures that EU allocates to state i in year t by the population of state i during
year t, where, as indicated earlier, the amount of transfers allocated to state i over
year t is the aggregate sum of all different categories of EU expenditure directed
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to country i in year t. Normalizing disbursement size by population accounts for
the likelihood that smaller states that are overrepresented in the European Council
receive greater allocations by the EU (Mattila 2006; Rodden 2002). Also, I measure
the size and relative value of EU fiscal flows to each recipient country’s economy
by taking the ratio of the funds allocated to state i in year t to the total government
consumption of state i during year t. The distribution of this variable across the EU
states during the period 2000-2015 is presented in Figure C.1.
The second component of the main explanatory variable is the Executive Cor-
ruption Index (ECI) of country i at year t. I obtain this variable from the Varieties of
Democracy Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). The index is formed by taking the aver-
age of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for
executive bribery12 and executive embezzlement13. These indicators provide a good
estimate of the corruption practices of governing parties and elected executives.
They are derived from responses to the question “How routinely do members of the
executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other
material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate
public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?” The data is in
interval format and its direction runs from less to more corrupt.
3.4.4 Control Variables
The control variables included in the analysis account for factors plausibly
associated with the study’s main explanatory and dependent variables that is,
the share of EU funds, the degree of executive corruption and the seat shares of
receiving states’ incumbent parties. Previous research argues that countries with
shared democratic norms and institutions are less likely to misallocate aid and
external funds for political purposes. To account for these effects, I control for the
degree of variation in recipient states’ political institutions. I obtain the data from
the Polity IV dataset ((Marshall and Gurr 2015). The continuous (versus binary)
12(v2exbribe)
13(v2exembez)
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nature of the Polity IV combined score allows me to effectively capture any changes
caused by the inflow of fiscal transfers.14
Equally important is the degree of effective governance in recipient states.
Higher fiscal inflows to inefficient governments provoke higher corruption risks
and fewer limits on incumbents’ opportunity to misuse fiscal flows for electoral
gains. I account for this tendency by controlling for government effectiveness in re-
cipient states. The data for this variable is obtained from theWorld BankWorldwide
Development Indicators (WDI).
Moreover, the politics of fiscal allocations and party outcomes differ among
recipient countries based on their experience with democratic governing. Previous
literature suggests that in the case of the EU’s post-socialist states, communist lega-
cies and prior government quality continue to influence the quality of institutions
and domestic politics in transitioning states (Moss et al. 2006). I account for these
effects by controlling for the duration of democracy and whether recipient countries
have undergone a democratic transition in the post-1990s period. The data for
democracy duration comes from the Data Set of Political Regimes (Boix et al. 2013).
I code the variable for democratic transition by assigning it a value of 1 if country i
underwent a democratic transition in the post-1990s period and 0 otherwise.
The analysis also includes controls for political stability and the rule of law—
factors found by previous works to influence the relationship between aid flows,
corruption, and party politics. Political stability facilitates the strength of the
judiciary, which in return promotes the rule of law. Under these conditions, the
opportunity of domestic elites to misallocate aid and other external funds for
personal and political purposes is constrained by legal bounds (Staats and Biglaiser
2012). I account for these dynamics by controlling for recipient countries’ political
stability and the rule of law. The data for the political stability are derived from the
State Fragility Index (SFI) while the rule of law variable comes from World Bank
Worldwide Development Indicators (WGI).
14Polity scores combine several measures key to the analysis, among them constraints on the
executive, competitiveness and regulation of participation, as well as openness and competitiveness
of executive recruitment.
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Additional controls included in the analysis account for the robustness of civil
societies and equal distribution of resources in recipient states. Similar to aid, EU
allocations influence the political environment and civil societies in ways that pro-
mote dialogue among polarized actors, change their incentive structures (Santiso
2001), and affect citizens’ political behavior and vote choices (Carothers and Barndt
1999). This political atmosphere may also shape demands for equal distribution of
resources by active citizens informed about states’ fiscal inflows. Thus, robust civil
societies relate to the efficiency of allocations as well as incumbents’ outcomes. I
account for these effects by controlling for robust civil societies and equal distri-
bution of resources. The data for these variables is derived from the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) data set.
Finally, I include in the analysis a control for the year during which legislative
elections are held. This is a binary variable that takes on the value of “1” in
legislative election years and “0” in the years between elections. The GDP (logged)
of each target country i in year t is also included to account for the macroeconomic
performance of recipient states. Table D.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all
control Variables.
3.4.5 Empirical Strategy
To regress the dependent variable, seat shares of recipient states’ governing
parties, Seat Shareit, on my main explanatory variables, Share EU Transfersit,
Executive Corruption Index (ECI)it, and their combined effect [Seat Shareit ⇥ ECIit], I
use a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis with
country clustered standard errors. Formally,
Seat Shareit = b0 + b1Share (EU Funds)it + b2Executive Corruption Index (ECI)it
+b3[Share (EU Funds) ⇥ (ECI)]it + b4Polityit + b5ln(GDP)it
+
n
Â
k=6
⇣
bkControl Variable(k 4),it
⌘
+ ai + µt + eit,
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where ai and µt denote respectively, country and year dummies and eit denotes the
country-year error term.
Given that incumbent parties’ vote shares remain constant in the years between
elections, I only regress the portion of the sample during which legislative elections
were held. This permits me to effectively capture variation in the dependent
variable, governing parties’ Seat Shareit. I also include in the analysis country and
year fixed effects. Country fixed effects capture country-specific, time-invariant
variables that associate with the dependent variable, while year fixed effects capture
global factors that may affect incumbents’ seat shares in recipient state i during year
t. I report the empirical results in the following section.
3.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.2 presents regression estimates of the determinants of seat shares for
incumbent parties in EU member states during the period 2000-2015. The measure
for EU transfers in models 1-4 is amount of fiscal transfers per capita. The main pa-
rameter of interest in all presented models is b3, which captures the combined effect
of [Seat Shareit ⇥ ECIit] on the dependent variable, governing parties’ Seat Sharesit.
A positive b3 estimate corroborates the theoretical expectation that increases in fiscal
flows to member states with high degrees of executive corruption are associated
with increases in electoral margins for recipient states’ governing parties.
Model 1 estimates a simple version of the relationship between EU funds, ex-
ecutive corruption, and incumbents’ seat shares. The coefficient on the executive
corruption variable is highly significant (p = 0.001) and in the predicted negative
direction. This suggests an inverse effect of executive corruption on governing
parties’ seat shares, which corroborates Hypothesis 1. However, the direction of
this effect shifts to positive—while maintaining its statistical significance—when
recipient states’ ECI index is interacted with the amount of EU funds per capita
received by member states. These findings also hold when additional governance
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and macroeconomic controls are added to the analysis. Models 2, 3, and 4 control
for recipient states’ GDP (logged), Polity IV score, government effectiveness, rule
of law, and other indicators plausibly associated with the dependent and explana-
tory variables. Throughout all models, the b3 coefficient maintains its statistical
significance and predicted positive direction. These findings lend support to the
expectation that higher fiscal flows to recipient states with high degrees of executive
corruption have a positive effect on incumbent parties’ competitive advantage
(Hypothesis 2).
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Governing Parties’ Seat Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU Transfers per Capitait -0.000+ -0.000+ -0.000+ -0.000⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ECIit -1.141⇤⇤⇤ -1.213⇤⇤⇤ -1.152⇤⇤⇤ -1.363⇤⇤⇤
(0.247) (0.273) (0.254) (0.324)
EU Transfers per Capitait ⇥ ECIit 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Polity IVit -0.038 -0.037 -0.043
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
ln(GDP)it -0.306⇤ -0.201 -0.264
(0.138) (0.119) (0.155)
Political Stabilityit -0.003 0.008 -0.019
(0.049) (0.051) (0.054)
Civil Society Indexit 0.342 0.351 0.288
(0.235) (0.255) (0.241)
Rule of Lawit 0.126 0.119
(0.084) (0.085)
Government Effectivenessit 0.010 0.032 0.017
(0.041) (0.047) (0.042)
Equal Resource Distributionit 0.192 0.483 0.040
(1.011) (1.049) (1.002)
Democracy Durationit 0.004
(0.004)
Democracy Transitionit -0.110
(0.071)
Constant 0.760⇤⇤⇤ 8.432⇤ 5.370+ 7.629⇤
(0.051) (3.254) (2.775) (3.581)
Observations 110 104 104 104
Countries 26 26 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.365 0.447 0.425 0.460
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of the determinants of Governing Parties’ Seat Shares in year t. Cluster-robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5,
and 10 percent, respectively. All models include country and year fixed effects.
Figure 3.4 focuses on Model 2 to illustrate this relationship. As shown, the
marginal effect of higher fiscal flows to corrupt member states has a positive effect
on the seat shares of target states’ governing parties.
The positive effect of the interacted term on the dependent variable persists when
I use the share of EU transfers to government expenditure as an alternative measure
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Figure 3.4: Average Marginal Effects of EU Funds (Model 2)
Note: The grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.
to capture the value of EU fiscal flows to recipient states. The results, presented in
models 5-8 in Table 3.3, show that the coefficient b3 on the interacted termmaintains
its statistical significance and positive direction.15 As shown, while the size of the b3
coefficient varies slightly across the models, the results remain relatively consistent
and highly significant when controlling for other factors expected to be associated
with the dependent and explanatory variables. In addition to the interaction term,
the rule of law variable also has a positive and significant affect on incumbent
parties’ seat shares. This effect supports the literature’s previous findings of a
positive association between the rule of law, aid, and domestic politics.
15In the interest of consistency, the specification of these models includes all variables accounted
for in models 15.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Governing Parties’ Seat Share
(5) (6) (7) (8)
EU Transfersit -0.298 -0.401 -0.286 -0.401
(0.332) (0.294) (0.354) (0.294)
ECIit -0.798⇤⇤⇤ -0.816⇤⇤⇤ -0.761⇤⇤⇤ -0.816⇤⇤⇤
(0.188) (0.163) (0.153) (0.163)
EU Transfersit ⇥ ECIit 2.915⇤⇤ 4.114⇤⇤⇤ 3.396⇤⇤ 4.114⇤⇤⇤
(0.911) (0.856) (0.984) (0.856)
Polity IVit -0.045 -0.042 -0.045
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ln(GDP)it -0.370⇤ -0.249⇤ -0.370⇤
(0.139) (0.116) (0.139)
Political Stabilityit -0.014 0.005 -0.014
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Civil Society Indexit 0.153 0.183 0.153
(0.228) (0.236) (0.228)
Rule of Lawit 0.153⇤ 0.153⇤
(0.073) (0.073)
Government Effectivenessit 0.013 0.030 0.013
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046)
Equal Resource Distributionit 0.669 0.981 0.669
(0.930) (0.973) (0.930)
Democracy Durationit 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.705⇤⇤⇤ 9.781⇤⇤ 6.249⇤ 9.559⇤⇤
(0.040) (3.269) (2.567) (3.195)
Observations 110 104 104 104
Countries 26 26 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.340 0.450 0.419 0.450
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of the determinants of Governing Parties’ Seat Shares in year t. EU Transfers
represents the amount of EU transfers to country i in year t divided by country i’s general
government final consumption expenditure during year t. Cluster-robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1,
5 and 10 percent, respectively. All models include fixed effects for year and recipient
country.
The positive, marginal effect that higher fiscal flows have on the seat shares of
corrupt recipients’ governing parties is further supported by the graph presented
in Figure 3.5. The graph focuses on Model 6 to illustrate the marginal effect of EU
transfers on incumbents’ seat shares across different levels of executive corruption.
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As shown, themarginal effect of EU transfers on incumbents’ seat shares increases in
recipient states with high levels of executive corruption (ECI = .7) while remaining
relatively stable in low-corruption recipient states (ECI = .1). Thus, the positive
affect of higher fiscal flows on incumbent parties’ competitive advantage appears to
be a concern only when recipient states’ governing parties display high tendencies
of executive and political corruption.
Figure 3.5: Average Marginal Effects of EU Funds (Model 6)
Note: The light grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. EU transfers measured relative to
recipient states’ government expenditure.
3.6 Robustness Checks
I place my theoretical expectations under further empirical scrutiny as follows.
To test whether higher fiscal flows to corrupt EU states help consolidate governing
parties’ political advantage relative to opposition forces, I measure the effect of the
interacted term on the change in seat shares between government and opposition
parties. I present these results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The common dependent
variable in both tables is,
D[(Government Seats)it - (Opposition Seats)it].
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The main explanatory variable for models 9 and 10 presented in Table 3.4 is the
interacted term presented in equation (1). For models 11 and 12 the explanatory
variable takes the form expressed in equation (2).
[(EU Transfers)it/(Population)it]⇥ (ECI)it (3.1)
[(EU Transfers)it/(Gov Spending)it]⇥ (ECI)it. (3.2)
Table 3.4: Determinants of D(Seats)Between Governing & Opposition Parties
(9) (10)
EU Transfers per Capitait -0.065 -0.053
(0.065) (0.081)
ECIit -256.525⇤ -223.528+
(123.019) (121.823)
EU Transfers per Capitait ⇥ ECIit 0.594⇤ 0.642⇤
(0.253) (0.286)
Polity IVit 0.170
(11.147)
ln(GDP)it -197.133+
(103.956)
Political Stabilityit 25.418
(28.990)
Rule of Law it 27.494
(42.988)
Government Effectivenessit -3.004
(21.306)
Equal Resource Distributionit 394.528
(445.797)
Observations 112 106
Countries 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.301 0.392
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis of the determinants of Changes in Seats between governing and
opposition parties in year t. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent,
respectively. All models include fixed effects for year and recipient country.
As shown, in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 the effect of the interacted term on the difference
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in seat shares between governing and opposition parties maintains the predicted
positive direction and it is significant at the respectively 5% and 1% level.
Table 3.5: Determinants of D(Seats)Between Governing & Opposition Parties
(11) (12)
EU Transfersit -154.896 -130.620
(134.413) (138.576)
ECIit -228.729⇤ -185.171⇤
(89.393) (77.118)
EU Transfersit ⇥ ECIit 1562.370⇤⇤ 1960.490⇤⇤
(489.794) (540.456)
Polity IVit -9.126
(10.157)
ln(GDP)it -244.792⇤
(90.689)
Political Stabilityit 16.672
(25.762)
Rule of Lawit 55.274
(40.528)
Government Effectivenessit 6.399
(23.318)
Equal Resource Distributionit 452.524
(389.546)
Constant 63.193⇤⇤ 5971.473⇤
(18.958) (2480.537)
Observations 112 106
Countries 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.326 0.461
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis of the determinants of Changes in Seats between governing and
opposition parties in year t. EU Transfers represents the amount of EU transfers to
country i in year t divided by country i’s general government final consumption
expenditure during year t. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent,
respectively. All models include fixed effects for year and recipient country.
To further assess the findings’ robustness, I also estimate the effect of the inter-
acted term on the incumbent parties number of seats. I estimate this relationship
by taking into account both different measures of Funds’ allocations—that is, EU
funds per capita (Results presented in Table 3.6) and EU funds relative to government
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spending (Results presented in Table 3.7). As in earlier tests, the interactive term
maintsins its predicted direction and statistical signficance (at the 5% level).
Table 3.6: Determinants of Governing Parties’ Seats
(13) (14) (15) (16)
EU Transfers per Capitait -0.015 0.007 0.009 -0.007
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
ECIit -117.253⇤ -109.234+ -107.604+ -104.526+
(55.933) (56.524) (56.747) (60.017)
EU Transfers per Capitait ⇥
ECIit
0.260⇤ 0.259⇤ 0.252⇤ 0.261⇤
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.123)
Polity IVit 6.762 7.046 0.101
(8.974) (9.011) (9.514)
ln(GDP)it -58.451 -73.295+ -68.521
(36.979) (41.933) (51.385)
Equal Resource Distributionit 219.124 285.373
(288.550) (293.736)
Political Stabilityit 7.985
(17.695)
Government Effectivenessit -5.459
(19.996)
Democracy Transitionit -4.525
(31.965)
Observations 112 112 112 106
Countries 26 26 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.268 0.297 0.303 0.323
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of the determinants of governing parties’ number of seats in year t. Cluster-robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance
levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All models include fixed effects for year and
recipient country.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Governing Parties’ Seats
(17) (18)
EU Transfersit -33.308 -4.734
(75.294) (91.733)
ECIit -101.900+ -83.572
(52.953) (56.095)
EU Transfersit ⇥ ECIit 660.046⇤ 718.562⇤
(269.097) (293.819)
Polity IVit -4.030
(9.292)
ln(GDP)it -80.485
(51.198)
Political Stabilityit 7.915
(17.912)
Government Effectivenessit -1.710
(20.596)
Equal Resource Distributionit 329.064
(284.343)
Democracy Transitionit -1.781
(30.936)
Observations 112 106
Countries 26 26
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.279 0.357
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis of the determinants of determinants of governing parties’ number of
seats in year t. EU Transfers represents the amount of EU transfers to country i in
year t divided by country i’s general government final consumption expenditure
during year t. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and
+ indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All
models include fixed effects for year and recipient country.
Finally, I assess whether fiscal transfers have a greater influence on governing
parties’ political payoffs in transitioning versus established democracies. This test
is driven, as seen in Figures 3.2 & 3.3, by patterns of variation in EU allocations
and degree of executive corruption within the EU’s political space. Therefore, to
test whether the effect of the interacted term on the seat shares of recipient states’
governing parties varies across member states with distinct democratic experiences,
I separate the countries in two groups: the transitioning and non-transitioning
democracies. The transitioning democracies include all post-socialist member states
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of the EU.16 The non-transitioning cluster includes all member states that have not
undergone a change in political regime in the post-1990s period. This variable is
coded 1 for the post-socialist states and 0 for the non-transitioning EUmember states.
The results, presented in Table 3.8, show that the coefficients on the interacted term
preserve their expected positive direction and statistical significance in the cases
of both transitioning and non-transitioning states. In the case of the Western, non-
transitioning democracies, the degree of significance declines slightly, although it
still persists at the 1% level. These findings suggest that despite a recipient country’s
democratic experience, higher fiscal inflows have a positive impact on incumbents’
vote shares, as long as the governing parties of recipient states demonstrate higher
levels of executive and political corruption.
16The countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Majority’s Seat Share (By Transitioning Criteria)
(Transitioning) (Non-Transitioning)
EU Transfers per Capitait -0.000+ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ECIit -1.196⇤⇤⇤ -1.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.228) (0.283)
EU Transfers per Capitait ⇥ ECIit 0.002⇤⇤ 0.002⇤
(0.000) (0.001)
Polity IVit -0.108⇤⇤ 0.030
(0.028) (0.049)
ln(GDP)it -0.342⇤ -0.071
(0.139) (0.222)
Political Stabilityit -0.021 0.093
(0.068) (0.078)
Party Age it 0.003+ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Civil Society Indexit 0.317 -0.506
(0.317) (0.664)
Equal Resource Distributionit 3.580⇤⇤ -2.676+
(0.892) (1.417)
Observations 46 58
Countries 11 15
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2 0.797 0.537
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis of the determinants of Seat Shares during year t in the EU’s Transi-
tioning and Non-Transitioning member states. Cluster-robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5,
and 10 percent, respectively. All models include fixed effects for year and recipient
country.
3.7 Conclusions
One of the EU’s primary objectives is to narrow the wealth gap between its mem-
ber states and promote economic development across the region. Fiscal transfers
made through the EU’s fiscal budget serve as a key mechanism for achieving these
outcomes. Designed to promote economic and policy initiatives that boost recipient
states’ economic performance, the funds’ long-term objective is to promote recipient
states’ institutional effectiveness and advance the EU’s democratic values across
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the region. These expectations are, however, consistently challenged. Distinct pat-
terns of economic growth among EU states point to continued economic disparities
between the EU’s developed and developing states, including Bulgaria, Romania,
and other post-socialist members. In parallel with these developments, the rise of
political corruption and authoritarian tendencies of governing parties in several
EU states, particularly Hungary and Poland, further challenge the success of EU
fiscal allocations in enhancing institutional performance and reinforcing democratic
norms.
These developments raise important questions about the ways in which EU
fiscal allocations impact the domestic politics of recipient states. This paper has
sought to advance our understanding of this impact. In examining the link between
EU transfers, political corruption, and the electoral outcomes of recipient states’
incumbent parties, this paper has examined whether fiscal funds allocated by the
EU to its member states deliver an electoral advantage to corrupt incumbent parties.
Whereas previous works have examined the effect of EU funds on political corrup-
tion in recipient states, my approach examines the impact of funds on incumbent
parties’ political and electoral outcomes, taking into account the degree of executive
corruption in recipient states. By analyzing new data on EU fiscal allocations over
the period 2000-2015, I have tested and confirmed my novel theory that fiscal flows
to corrupt EU states deliver political latitude and an electoral advantage to recipient
states’ governing parties.
These findings are relevant for purposes of both democratic theory and distribu-
tive policy. The aid literature finds that corrupt governments with underperforming
institutions are equally likely to receive the same amounts of aid as their less corrupt
counterparts (Alesina and Weder 2002). Understanding whether funds allocated
to the EU’s highly corrupt member states serve to promote or jeopardize the EU’s
economic interests and democratic values is essential to the formulation of EU-level
anticorruption policies.
The implication appears to be that recalibrating the EU’s allocation calculus to
corrupt member states could undercut the political momentum of corrupt governing
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parties. Limiting the funds to corrupt member states would constrain governing
parties’ ability to utilize the EU transfers as a resource pool for advancing personal,
political, and policy objectives that garner voters’ electoral support. Building on
these findings, further research should aim to test the link between EU funds and
political corruption to governing parties’ political behavior, including authoritarian
and populist tendencies. Examining the range of these influences will enhance our
understanding of continued disparities in patterns of economic and democratic
developments across EU member states. By providing insight into the source of
challenges faced by the EU and its member states, these findings would serve as a
foundation for policy remedies to control their proliferation.
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CHAPTER IV
IMF: International Migration Fund
4.1 Introduction
1 Why do international organizations (IOs) favor some countries over others?
The role of IOs in facilitating interstate cooperation is well documented. Their
perceived impartiality, expertise, and organizational capacity lend them consider-
able influence in both international and domestic politics (Abbott and Snidal 1998;
Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Krasner 1982). Yet IOs
also operate in the shadow of state power. When the interests of states diverge
from the policy goals of IOs, powerful states may seek to “capture” the functions of
the organization. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—one of the core
Bretton Woods institutions—is frequently argued to be an agent of its most pow-
erful shareholders (e.g., Copelovitch 2010b; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher et al.
2009; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2004; 2008; Thacker 1999). This has led some
borrowing countries receiving better (or worse) treatment from the IMF depending
on the strategic and special interests of creditor states. Such behavior is important
to understand given that favoritism is likely to compromise the independence and
legitimacy that constitute IO influence and authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Stone 2011, p. 1-2). Using the IMF as a point of focus, this article aims to better
explain what drives differences in treatment from IOs.
We complement previous research that underscores the role of state interests,
1This chapter is co-authored with Merih Angin and Adrian J. Shin.
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but we instead highlight international migration as a concern that governs the
decision-making calculus of the IMF’s major shareholders. Specifically, we argue
that when IMF recipients are major migrant-sending countries with large diasporas
in G5 states, they are more likely to receive larger loans and less stringent forms
of conditionality than otherwise. We propose the following causal mechanism:
stringent loan conditions exacerbate short-term economic distress in the recipient
country, which in turn encourages more citizens to migrate to countries where
their co-ethnics reside. Accordingly, major IMF donors that host a large number of
nationals from the recipient country face disproportionately high levels of migration
pressure when the IMF imposes relatively demanding loan conditions. Since citizens
of major IMF shareholders generally oppose immigration inflows—especially those
from sending countries under financial distress—policymakers of IMF shareholder
states are likely to use their influence within the IMF to assuage migration pressure.
In assessing our central argument, this article focuses on three particular aspects
of IMF program design: (1) the size of loan; (2) the stringency of conditions attached
to IMF loans; and (3) the number of condition waivers granted to the borrowing
country during program implementation. To test our theoretical expectation that
migration concerns drive the conditionality of IMF programs, we analyze the policy
space from 1978 to 2013 by utilizing a new dataset on IMF conditionality from
Kentikelenis et al. (2016). This comprehensive dataset allows us to disaggregate IMF
conditionality by targeted policy types—a relatively new practice in the literature.
We find support for our theoretical expectations that IMF loan recipients with large
diasporas in the G5 countries receive larger loans and more favorable conditions
that can minimize short-term adjustment costs. This is especially the case when the
recipient country experiences negative or slow economic growth. We further find
that European IMF shareholders focus primarily on loan size to lessen migration
pressure, while the US reduces labor and fiscal conditions to meet the same goal.
While previous studies of IMF lending focused on the politics of special interests
in the G5 countries (Breen 2014; Copelovitch 2010a; b), our emphasis on migration
pressure highlights how domestic concerns over migration shape the preferences of
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G5 policymakers, which in turn influence the Fund’s lending decisions. In other
words, our argument demonstrates that the G5 countries use their influence at
the Fund not only to appease their powerful domestic interest groups but also to
preempt voter anxiety about economic globalization. In this article, we focus on
international migration, as it is arguably the most unpleasant aspect of international
economic integration for many voters in the G5 countries. Our approach opens up
a new venue of research in the literature on IMF lending, specifically how popular
politics within the G5 states shapes the global governance strategy of a powerful
international organization.2
We organize our article in the following manner. We begin with a discussion
of IMF conditionality and then formulate a series of testable hypotheses in line
with the main argument. We use the case of Romania—one of the largest migrant-
sending states that received a sizable loan from the Fund in 2009—to illustrate
how Romanian immigration patterns have shaped the conditionality of its IMF
program. We proceed by detailing the research design used to test each of our
hypotheses. Finally, we discuss our findings and their implications for both the
international political economy and international migration literature. These impli-
cations suggest several avenues of future research on the link between migration
and the conditionality of IMF loan programs.
4.2 G5 Countries and the IMF: International Migration Fund
4.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives
Why does the IMF favor some countries over others? Given the enormous
economic, social, and political implications of IMF lending, conditionality has been
a popular academic research topic and the subject of a heated policy debate. At
the center of the Fund’s influence lies the Executive Board (EB).3 The EB, chaired
2Previous studies have explored how migration pressure shapes the political economy of
sovereign debt (Bernhard and Leblang 2016) and foreign aid flows (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).
3Executive boards of international organizations generally serve four primary roles—
performance police, strategic thinker, political counterweight, and democratic forum (Martinez-Diaz
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by the managing director of the Fund, consists of 24 executive directors. The G5
countries—the five largest contributors to the IMF (i.e., the US, Japan, Germany, the
UK, and France)—appoint their own Executive Directors. China, Saudi Arabia, and
Russia also have their own seats, while the rest of the seats are elected by separate
constituencies formed by the remaining member states. Executive directors are
expected to be loyal to the IMF, not to their home country. Yet this has proven
more of a principle than a hard-and-fast rule since some countries, such as “the
United States and the United Kingdom, have not consistently abided by this model”
(Momani 2010, p. 165). In fact, the EB seating arrangements provide the G5 countries
with substantial power on the Board, which they use to advance their own national
interests.
Given the G5 seats on the EB and their unrivaled voting power, many studies of
IMF lending have adopted a state-centric approach. These studies emphasize the
preferences of the powerful G5 states, particularly the US, in explaining the variation
in IMF conditionality. While some argue that countries of political importance,
measured by memberships (permanent and non-permanent) of the United Nations
Security Council, receive softer conditionality (Dreher et al. 2015), others highlight
US influence via “informal governance” within the Fund (Stone 2008). In addition,
powerful domestic interest groups of the G5 states often sway the Fund’s lending
decisions to protect their economic interests in recipient countries (Breen 2014).
In this regard, several high-profile IMF lending cases—such as those involving
Russia, Ukraine, Argentina, and Turkey—are cited as instances where US pressure
for lax conditionality caused IMF programs to fail eventually (Stone 2008, 617).4
While other IOs have worked to resolve the tension between national interests and
2009, p. 86). The IMF’s Executive Board is generally seen as a strategic thinker and a democratic
forum while it is less equipped for acting as a performance police (Martinez-Diaz 2009, p. 91).
4US pressure was particularly visible in the case of Russia, where the Unites States pushed for a
generous lending package for Russia (Gould-Davies and Woods 1999, 10). The program included
a Special Drawing Right (SDR) of 6.9 billion under an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Russia on
March 26, 1996, by the Executive Board, which was at that time the largest EFF in IMF history (IMF
2018a). This was the case even as the IMF staff “did not think that the 1998 loan to Russia made any
sense... [y]et the IMF is a hierarchical organization, and the people at the top actually believed that
the program would work” (Stiglitz 2003, 130).
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international objectives by strengthening the independence and accountability of
decision-making bodies, the tension between national policymakers and the Fund’s
technocrats has persisted (Woods and Lombardi 2005).
We build on this literature of G5 influence within the IMF to argue that the
G5 countries use the Fund’s resources to meet their immigration policy objectives.
Assuming that G5 policymakers are aware of the relationship between short-term
adjustment costs and migration patterns, G5 countries do not necessarily care about
the long-term success of an IMF programwhen the target country is a major migrant-
sending state. Instead, incumbents in G5 countries should be more concerned about
the electoral and political implications of potential immigration inflows into their
countries if the Fund fails to reduce short-term economic distress in the recipient
country’s economy.5
In this way, international migration can help elucidate IMF policy stances that
are otherwise puzzling. For instance, regarding emigration from Eastern to Western
Europe, the Fund explicitly expressed in 2016 that “policies in sending countries
should focus on creating an environment that encourages potential emigrants to
stay” (Atoyan et al. 2016, p. 30). The Fund also emphasized the need to promote
return migration, to institute active labor market (ALM) policies within sending
states, and to direct EU structural funds in order to better raise labor productivity
and incomes in Eastern European economies (Atoyan et al. 2016, p. 31-34). Here,
G5 policymaker concerns over migration can explain why the IMF—an organiza-
tion typically viewed as an advocate of free factor flows and limited government
intervention—would nevertheless oppose the movement of workers across interna-
tional borders.
Decision-making in the IMF starts as early as the phase during which the staff
prepare proposals. Before a proposal reaches the EB for approval, informal commu-
nications between national authorities, Board representatives, staff, and manage-
5Numerous studies examine the roots of anti-immigration attitudes in wealthy, advanced
democracies, and the implications for immigration policymaking. For instance, see Freeman (1995);
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007; 2010); Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Zolberg (1989). For the influence
of anti-immigrant right-wing populists, see Messina (2002); Swank and Betz (2003). For labor unions,
see Haus (2002); Briggs (1984; 2001).
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ment take place to set the scope for bargaining and negotiation of proposal details.
After reaching the EB, it is unlikely that the proposal will be rewritten (Woods and
Lombardi 2005). In this regard, following the informal governance approach, we
expect G5 Executive Directors to engage in informal negotiations behind closed
doors to shape IMF programs in ways that create incentives for potential migrants
to remain in their home country.
G5 Executive Directors can ensure this by: (1) securing a large loan for the
borrowing country, which could increase potential migrants’ opportunity cost of
emigration in the foreseeable future; (2) attaching less stringent labor or fiscal
conditions to programs, which are typically perceived to exacerbate the short-term
adjustment costs of IMF programs; or (3) granting condition waivers to the recipient
country during program implementation, thus ensuring that loan disbursements
will be released regardless of country performance. These measures can be effective
in reducing migration pressure by shaping the future expectations of potential
migrants, as well as by their actual economic impacts in the target country.
Labor conditions are known to be one of the most politically contentious types
of IMF conditionality, which explains why earlier studies with a disaggregated
approach examined the determinants of labor market conditions in IMF programs
(Rickard and Caraway 2014). These conditions require implementation of reforms
of the borrowing country’s domestic labor market, which have direct effects on
employment, wages, and social benefits, such as wage freezes and pension reform
(Caraway et al. 2012). The causal mechanism we expect to observe is straightfor-
ward: if workers are losing jobs as a result of the implementation of a labor market
condition, they might have to consider migrating to a wealthier country offering
more job opportunities. In addition, potential migrants may use labor market
conditions set by the Fund as an indicator of their economic prospect in the home
country. Imposing fiscal conditions will also have an impact on the borrowing
country’s economy, which will affect the daily lives of its citizens. However, since
labor conditions have a more direct bite, we expect them to have a stronger link
with potential emigration.
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The Fund’s conditionality can also shape the target country’s behavior toward
emigration. In exchange for a better deal from the Fund, the government of the
recipient country may take measures to reduce emigration, especially when it is a
large migrant-sending state for the G5 countries. The Fund can deploy several types
of IMF conditionality that differ in how specific they are, what they include, and
their monitoring requirements (Copelovitch 2010b). The measures that a country is
required to take before the EB approves a loan or completes a review are called prior
actions (PAs). On the other hand, structural benchmarks, which are qualitative in
nature, are conditions considered significant in achieving program goals and are
designed as “markers” to assess the implementation of an IMF program during a
review (IMF 2018b).
The Fund also utilizes several indicators to assess whether the program func-
tions as provisioned. Performance criteria are often constructed on the basis of
numeric variables, which are called quantitative performance criteria (QPC). In
case of a failure to comply with any performance criterion, an approval of the IMF
Executive Board is needed to maintain the program and be able to access future
loan disbursements or tranches’.’ Structural performance criteria (SPC) are not
numeric indicators; they reflect changes in structural circumstances such as entry
of a law into effect, or realization of an administrative operation or decision. It is
obligatory to comply with both performance criteria for successful completion of
program reviews. As for indicative targets, they are used for monitoring variables
that are critical for fulfillment of a program.
Regardless of the precise criteria, we posit that more favorable IMF programs
will be associated with recipient countries where the threat of migration to major
IMF shareholder countries is greatest. Importantly, this argument requires determin-
ing where the migrants of recipient countries are likely to move. The international
migration literature supports that migrants tend to relocate in destination countries
where their co-ethnics and family members already reside (Portes and Bo¨ro¨cz 1989;
Massey et al. 2005). This is because existing migrant networks provide information
about the host country to potential migrants, as well as help migrants integrate into
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the society and economy of host countries (Boyd 1989; Bailey and Waldinger 1991;
Eric and Ooka 2006). With lower transaction costs and greater access to information,
the threat of future migration should be highest where there is already a large
community of migrants from the IMF recipient country living in the destination
country. Accordingly, we offer the following hypotheses with respect to loan size,
conditionality, and condition waivers:
H1: The IMF grants larger loans to target countries with larger diasporas in the G5 coun-
tries.
H2: The IMF grants less stringent conditions to target countries with larger diasporas in
the G5 countries.
H3: The IMF grants more waivers to target countries with larger diasporas in the G5
countries.
Since economic conditions of target countries affect the degree of migration
pressure, we also test whether there is more empirical support for these hypotheses
when the rate of economic growth is slow or negative. Further discussion of
our empirical strategies and the precise operationalization of the hypotheses are
provided in the research design section.
Although our state-centric approach assumes that G5 countries wield enormous
control over the Fund and its Board, the migration angle of our argument does not
necessarily conflict with the public-choice approach of the IMF lending literature
in terms of the observable implications. From a non-realpolitik point of view,
“bureaucratic politics,” rather than the interests of the major shareholders, are the
main political factors shaping the Fund’s lending policies (Angin 2016; Copelovitch
2010b). In this regard, the IMF staff constitute a highly independent actor while
the Fund staff adopt, interpret, and apply their own norms (Chwieroth 2008, 155)
and have intellectual dominance in the design of loan conditionality, writing of
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surveillance reports, and provision of technical and policy advice (Momani 2007,
23). The IMF, as a bureaucratic entity, may view increased emigration from the
target country as a major failure of its program. Since emigration from the target
country is often the most sensationalized consequence and the most visible sign
of a short-term program failure, the IMF staff have shared interests with the G5
countries when the target country poses substantial migration pressure for the
major IMF shareholders.
4.2.2 Romania and the IMF: An Illustrative Case
The migration dynamics in IMF lending are especially evident in the case of
Romania, one of the largest migrant-sending countries in Europe and a recipient of
one of the IMF’s largest Stand-By-Arrangements (SBAs). The Romanian economy
suffered tremendous economic losses during its phase of democratization, accom-
panied by institutional restructuring and neoliberal policies. With more than 3.5
million jobs lost and a decline in the employed population of 44% (Focus Migration
2017), Romanian citizens turned to labor migration as an economic escape. As of
2017, the number of Romanian migrants working abroad, particularly in France,
Germany, Italy, and other Western democracies reached 3.4 million, only 1.2 million
of which were legal immigrants (Focus Migration 2017).
Romanian immigration triggered political and economic agitation in their host
states at both national and regional levels (Culic 2008; Mai 2010). As Romanian
immigrants became associated with irregular unskilled laborers (Diminescu 2004),
undesired inflows of the historically marginalized Romani (Aradau 2009), and
international trafficking of women and children (Aradau 2008; Mai 2010), wealthy
Western states struggled to curb Romanian immigration inflows by imposing tem-
porary measures to keep Romanians from entering their labor markets (Focus
Migration 2017).
While these wealthy democracies took measures to keep Romanian immigration
at bay, the IMF was actively extending financial assistance to Romania. Facing
domestic and external imbalances as well as asset bubbles and structural fiscal
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deficits, Romania’s short-lived economic boom ended prior to the Great Recession
of 2008. To address the severity of its problems, Romania turned to the Fund to
request an SBA to restore market confidence and achieve fiscal sustainability. The
Fund approved the SBA in May 2009, with an exceptionally large disbursement
of 11.443 billion SDR—equivalent to 1,110.8 percent of Romania’s quota. The loan
package was considered “one of the largest in Fund’s history” at the time, with co-
financing from the EU, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IMF 2012).
When the group of international lenders, led by the IMF, granted Romania a
large loan of 20 billion euros ($27 billion), the country’s application for accession into
the EU border-free Schengen area came to a stop. Rooted in economic andmigration
concerns, the Schengen rejection was perceived by Romania as self-serving of the
interests of France and her recruited ally, Germany—not coincidentally, two of the
European countries with the largest Romanian diasporas. In its analysis of the
decision’s outcome, Romania Libera, a leading Romanian newspaper, pointed in
no ambiguous terms to the border interests of France and its allies as the hidden,
causal factors driving Romania’s Schengen rejection (Serbanescu 2011):6
Romania’s expected but failed accession to the Schengen space was a remark-
able one, and it was not typical of the banalities and demagogy so usual in the
European Union. Only few things were told, but even omissions were meaning-
ful, although the real reasons were hidden under the carpet. The champion of
partially told truths and omissions was Mr Sarkozy’s France. France, which has
been referred to as Romania’s “elder sister” for decades, taught a lesson to its
younger sister. France accused Romania of not being ready to be responsible for
the commercial security of EU’s eastern border, which is true from the point of
view of West European countries.
In addition, the issue of Moldovans in Romania was a source of contention
6This article, published on March 2, 2011, notes the hidden link between Romania’s delayed
entry into the Schengen area, and France’s interests.
Retrieved from http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/135CE3FF2E4AEBF0?p=
AWNB
99
between France and Romania. France was particularly concerned about Moldovans
who acquired Romanian citizenship, and potential migration inflows of these Roma-
nians of Moldovan descent into France. Given the widespread societal perception
that immigrants from the southeast of the European Union were more likely to
commit crimes, France found the Romanian government’s citizenship policy toward
Moldovans as a threat to the commercial security of the EU’s eastern border.
France’s apprehension about Moldovan-Romanians, however, was likely moti-
vated by political pressure from the French electorate, not by reliable statistics or
objective studies (Serbanescu 2011).
Yet, France omitted to say that the citizens of the Republic of Moldova who
had wanted to leave their country and to look for jobs in the European Union
had already done that, and were already in Paris, Rome, or Berlin. When it
talks about the fact that three-quarters of the immigrants who commit crimes
in the Schengen space come from the southeast of the European Union, France
omits to say that the problem is not directly related to Romania, because Romania
has not been responsible for protecting the Schengen space border from illegal
immigrants till now.
Furthermore, the French policy toward the Romani reflects the French elec-
torate’s pervasive concerns over immigration. In August 2010, the French gov-
ernment cleared 300—nearly half of the country’s total—of what they argued to
be unauthorized camps” built by the Romani on council-owned land in Saint-
Etienne. Recent Romani immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria used the camps as
makeshift homes. France justified the closing of the camps on grounds of “illegal
trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of children
for begging, of prostitution and crime” (France Starts Removing Roma Camps
2010). Human rights groups, however, considered it a calculated measure to win
the support of right-wing voters, particularly given President Sarkozy’s declining
poll ratings (France Starts Removing Roma Camps 2010).
Domestic and international groups raised further concerns when the French gov-
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ernment pushed forward with efforts to repatriate Romani immigrants by paying
an amount of 300 euros and an additional 100 euros per child to every Romani im-
migrant who agreed to return to Romania. The measures triggered fierce criticisms
by members of the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
who argued that racism and xenophobia were undergoing a “significant resurgence”
in France (France Sends Roma Gypsies Back to Romania 2010). The French efforts in
the Romani repatriation were only met with reluctant compliance by the Romanian
president Traian Basescu, who argued that while Romania believed in the “right
of every Romanian citizen to travel without restrictions within the EU,” the Roma-
nian government was prepared to assist France in implementing the repatriation
scheme by sending their police troops to France (France Sends Roma Gypsies Back
to Romania 2010). France’s repatriation of 10,000 Romani people in year 2009 alone
encouraged Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden to follow suit.
The French-Romanian case demonstrates the inevitable link between money
and migration. Though the Fund’s G5 countries were willing to open their fi-
nancial doors to ameliorate Romania’s financial difficulties, the same countries—
particularly the ones in Europe—were closing their borders and labor markets to
Romanian citizens seeking economic opportunities abroad. The concurrence of the
Fund’s generous loan package and Romania’s delayed entry into the Schengen area
illustrates the G5’s attempt to resolve the Romanian crisis outside their borders. The
case of Romania thus exemplifies our argument well. When migration pressures
are present, the IMF’s major shareholders can use their influence at the Fund to
ease the adjustment of IMF programs and, in turn, curb immigration inflows into
their own countries. To assess the connection between migration pressures and IMF
lending more universally, the next section details the data and empirical strategy
used to test each of our hypotheses.
4.3 Research Design
To test whether concerns about migration create more favorable IMF programs,
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we utilize new data from Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016) on IMF condition-
ality. Due to the lack of a comprehensive index of Fund structural conditionality
covering a long period of time, scholars used to rely on a set of statistics to measure
conditionality (Goldstein 2000). However, in January 2009 a previously internal
IMF database, MONA (the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements), was released on
the website of the Fund upon recommendation by the Independent Evaluation
Office of the IMF, approved by the Board. MONA is a collection of comparable data
on the economic objectives and results of arrangements supported by the IMF. As
this used to be the only database providing a comprehensive view of all types of
structural conditions by including prior actions, performance criteria, conditions
for completion of program reviews and structural benchmarks, it has been widely
used by scholars to analyze IMF conditionality quantitatively. However, the MONA
database has a significant number of inconsistencies, which have been repaired
by the novel data of Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016). Their data are sourced
from internal IMF documents—including IMF staff reports, the Letters of Intent
(LoI) of national governments, and Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies
(MEFPs)—that collectively contain detailed information on IMF program approvals,
conditionality, and policy implementation.7 This allows us to analyze the Fund’s
behavior at different phases of an IMF program. Specifically, we assess the favora-
bility of IMF lending along three different metrics: (1) loan size; (2) types of policy
conditions imposed; and (3) number of condition waivers granted by the IMF.
While data from Kentikelenis et al. (2016) contains observations for each indi-
vidual policy condition across all IMF recipient countries, we modify their dataset
by treating IMF program as our unit of analysis. To do this, data on individual
conditions are synthesized into a single observation for each IMF program. In
some cases, a recipient country enters simultaneously into two different lending
arrangements that must be separately approved by the Fund’s EB. This typically
7As Kentikelenis et al. 2016 (p. 39-40) describe, the issue area of IMF conditions (e.g., labor
conditions, fiscal conditions, etc.) are manually coded by two researchers and then cross-referenced.
For those interested, every condition in the dataset is referenced to specific text within the source
document.
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includes situations where IMF beneficiaries enter into two different lending facilities
(e.g., SBAs, EFFs, etc.), which are subject to different terms of access and repayment.
We treat such co-existing arrangements as under the same umbrella program since
they are approved concomitantly. However, multiple IMF loan arrangements for
the same country and within the same year are treated as separate observations, so
long as such arrangements are approved by the EB at different dates. Our sample
covers a total of 663 IMF programs and 114 different recipient states, spanning from
1978 to 2013.8
4.3.1 Dependent Variables
The empirical analysis focuses on three outcomes of interest. Our first dependent
variable is the size of the total loan disbursement (in millions SDR) divided by the
total population of the recipient country. Normalizing loan size by population
accounts for the fact that larger countries naturally require greater injections of
capital in order for IMF programs to be effective. We also take the natural log of this
value to account for the diminishing marginal effects of IMF finance. For programs
with multiple loan arrangements, we simply sum together the size of the individual
loans. It is important to note that loan amounts are agreed ex ante between the
Fund’s EB and the recipient country at the onset of a program. Thus, our measure
avoids detecting the effects of loan disbursement size on levels of emigration out of
the recipient country, which could bias the main estimates.
Scholars have used loan per quota to account for the country’s influence or
“entitlement” within the Fund (Stone 2008; Copelovitch 2010b). However, we focus
primarily on loan size per capita since we want to measure the loan amount that
would reduce short-term migration pressure, regardless of the degree of “entitle-
ment.” We agree that loan per quota is a more appropriate measure of loan size for
studies linking IMF lending to other geopolitical issues, especially when scholars
want to investigate loan size in reference to multiple economic indicators of a bor-
rowing country. The IMF quota formula is a weighted average of GDP (weight of 50
8Complete summary statistics are provided in Table D.1 of the Appendix.
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percent), openness (30 percent), economic variability (15 percent), and international
reserves (5 percent). Since migration is a population dynamic, we replace this quota
formula with a borrowing country’s entire population. Nevertheless, we later use
loan per quota as an alternative measure of loan size. We provide the results and
further discussion in Robustness Checks.
We next analyze whether migration pressures affect the types of policy reforms
imposed by the Fund. Policy conditions are explicitly defined in a recipient coun-
try’s MEFP, which is attached to that country’s Letter of Intent at the onset of an
IMF program. IMF conditionality can encompass a broad array of policy reforms,
meaning we have the option to analyze how migrant pressures affect the stringency
of IMF conditionality across a range of issue areas. Our analysis, however, centers
specifically on labor issues, where IMF conditionality is expected to be most lax.9
While adjusting wages downward may increase the long-term competitiveness of
the recipient country’s economy, the short-term costs of such measures are likely to
incentivize emigration out of the country, thus making policymakers more reluctant
to impose labor conditions in the first place. To test this argument, the dependent
variable we use is the total number of labor conditions imposed during a coun-
try’s IMF program. Conditions are coded as relating to labor policy where they
include enacting limits on wages and employment, reforming pension systems, or
modifying social security institutions.10 Some actual examples include to “develop
a satisfactory action plan for reforming the pension regimes for the police and
the military” (Peru 2004), and to “adopt legislation to reduce the minimum wage
for long-term unemployed” (Greece 2012). These data are directly sourced and
coded by Kentikelenis et al. (2016) from the MEFPs of recipient countries. For these
models, we also control for the total number of all IMF policy conditions to ensure
our results are not driven by program size.
9We also show results for fiscal policy conditions, which can have similar effects on the recipient
country’s labor market and rate of emigration.
10Importantly, Kentikelenis et al.’s (2016) coding of labor conditions excludes conditions that are
beneficial to labor. Other types of reforms that are tangential to labor—for instance, payment of
wage arrears (fiscal policy), social safety nets (redistribution policy), and income taxes—are coded
as different issue areas.
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Lastly, we look at whether recipient countries posing a threat to future migration
are given more condition waivers during program implementation. Condition
waivers are granted by the Fund’s EB in the event that a “hard” condition of an IMF
program—such as a prior action (PA), quantitative performance criterion (QPC), or
structural performance criterion (SPC)—is not fully met. Condition waivers can be
crucial for recipient countries, as future loan disbursements, or “tranches,” cannot
be disbursed following unmet conditions unless those conditions are formally
waived. Though the purpose of condition waivers is ostensibly to maintain policy
flexibility, waivers may also be granted as political favors to recipient countries
(Pop-Eleches 2009). Our third dependent variable is therefore the total count of
program waivers granted for an IMF program. In contrast to loan size or ex ante
conditionality, attention to condition waivers allows us to observe IMF behavior
during the implementation of policy reforms. This is important since the Fund
may still favor certain loan recipients over others via policy flexibility, even if the
initially prescribed policy reforms are relatively harsh. While nearly half of IMF
programs include no condition waivers, other recipient countries have a majority of
their conditions waived at least once during program implementation. In extreme
cases, countries obtain more condition waivers than the total number of policy
conditions.11
4.3.2 Independent Variables
Our theory posits that more favorable IMF programs will be associated with
recipient countries where the threat of migration to major IMF shareholder countries
is greatest. Past research supports that migrants tend to relocate in destination
countries where their co-ethnics and family members already reside, since existing
diasporas can lower the transactions costs of migration and provide potential
migrants greater access to information (Boyd 1989; Portes and Bo¨ro¨cz 1989; Bailey
and Waldinger 1991; Massey et al. 2005; Eric and Ooka 2006). For this reason, our
11Countries may have a single condition waived more than once. Therefore, this makes it possible
for countries to obtain more condition waivers than the total number of conditions.
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main independent variable is the existing stock of migrants from the recipient
country living in the IMF’s five largest shareholder countries. In terms of IMF vote
shares, these countries include the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom.
In line with the existing migration literature (Fitzgerald et al. 2014), we believe
the stock variable is the single most important determinant of migration pressure,
especially from the perspective of G5 policymakers. While migrant stock profiles
vary substantially across major migrant-receiving countries, they show relatively
stable trends over time within each country. For instance, once a sizable migrant
network is established, its growth follows an upward trend over time. While a
migrant-receiving country’s immigration policy and economic conditions certainly
affect the growth rate of a migrant network, it is inherently self-perpetuating.12 This
unusually path-dependent nature of migrant networks ameliorates some concerns
about omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity between IMF lending, migrant
stocks, and migrant flows.
Migrant stock data come from the UN Global Migration Database. Because
these data are available at only 10-year intervals, we interpolate values for migrant
stocks using the average annual rate of change occurring over each ten-year period.
Although we are well-aware of the pitfalls of this data source in terms of actual
precision, we argue that this lack of precision does not pose serious problems
in testing our hypotheses. To see why, we emphasize that the numbers in the
dataset are actually computed based on the national statistics of the G5 countries.
Since G5 policymakers rely on the same data source in policymaking, this is the
most appropriate migration dataset to operationalize the decision calculus of G5
policymakers. In other words, G5 policymakers are unlikely to have access to
precise data on migrant stocks within their own countries. Instead, it is more likely
12The growth of migration can be expected to eventually level off over time. For instance, Mexican
migration to the US has slowed over the past decade, despite a large Mexican diaspora present in the
US. We find this less of a problem, however, given the time period of our sample. From the 1970s and
then into the post Cold War period, migration flows have been largely predictable and increasing,
even following the global financial crisis (OECD 2013). The “self-perpetuating” assumption might
become more of a problem in the future given government push-back against open borders and the
natural decline of older migration flows as emerging economies continue to develop.
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that they rely on the same source used in our empirical analysis.
To measure the G5 countries’ migration concerns in IMF lending, we take two
approaches. The first approach considers the collective influence of G5 countries
using a composite measure of migrant stocks from the recipient country. This
measure is constructed in two steps. First, a country’s stock of migrants from
recipient country j is weighted by the destination country’s vote share in the IMF.
For instance, the stock of j migrants living in the US as of 2017 is weighted by
16.53%, while the stock of j migrants living in the UK is weighted by 4.04%. After
doing this for each G5 country, the weighted stocks are then added together. The
composite measure, G5 Migrants, is formally:
G5 Migrants =Â
i
Stockj,i ⇥Vote Sharei
where i denotes the G5 country and Stockj,i denotes the stock of migrants from the
recipient country living in country i. This measure therefore places greater weight
on the threat of migration to the United States—the IMF’s largest shareholder—than
the threat of migration to shareholders with smaller voting shares.
Our second approach instead considers the threat of migration to G5 countries
individually. For these models, we simply disaggregate migrant stocks into five
separate and unweighted independent variables (i.e. one for each G5 country). This
allows us to explore whether the threat of migration to certain G5 countries affects
IMF lending more than the threat of migration to other G5 countries. Moreover,
different G5 countries may ease the burden on IMF recipient countries through
different means (e.g., increasing the loan size, reducing labor policy conditions,
granting condition waivers). For both the composite measure and country-level
measures of migrant stock, we normalize migrant stocks by the population of
recipient country j. This ensures our results are driven by migration pressures
rather than the size of the recipient country.
The conditional hypothesis posits that the threat of migration should be more
pronounced where the growth prospects of the recipient country are particularly
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poor. This is because low economic growth can act as an additional “push factor”
that encourages individuals to seek work and better economic conditions abroad.
Under such circumstances, G5 countries are likely to be especially averse to tighten-
ing the strings on IMF programs. Conversely, G5 countries may perceive a lower
threat of migration for recipient countries with greater underlying prospects for
economic growth since the incentives to migrate will be greatly diminished. To test
this dynamic, we interact the migrant stock variables with the real annual GDP
growth rate of the recipient country. GDP growth data are calculated using the
Penn World Tables.
4.3.3 Controls
Our models control for factors plausibly associated with both international
migration flows and IMF lending behavior. Previous research supports that allies
of major IMF shareholders are likely to receive bigger IMF loans and less onerous
conditionality than non-allies. Countries may ally for a variety reasons—such as
sharing similar cultural attributes, geographic proximity, or common interests—that
may also be correlated with international migration flows. For instance, migrants
are likely to move to destination countries with the same language or a similar
culture. In addition, allied states with more cordial relations could be more willing
to permit free movement of individuals between them than otherwise. We therefore
control for common security interests by including a dummy variable for whether
the recipient country is a formal ally with any G5 country. These data come from
the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance dataset.
The commercial relationship between G5 members and IMF recipients is also
important. Countries vital to G5 economic interests, such as those that constitute
large export markets, are likely to receive more favorable treatment since the nega-
tive effects of austere policy conditions can reverberate to foreign countries when
economic interdependence is high. At the same time, migration flows may rise
between countries that are economically connected, as result of the freer flow of
information and growing familiarity between the host and home country. We ac-
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count for shared commercial interests by controlling for the recipient country’s total
imports (logged) and total exports (logged) vis-a`-vis G5 countries.13
To account for the political institutions of the recipient country, we control
for level of democracy using the recipient country’s Polity score. Democratic
recipient countries are likely to receive more favorable loan packages, whether
due to their similar political institutions with G5 countries or due to the fears of
G5 policymakers over democratic backsliding. Migration patterns may also differ
between democratic dyads since migrants are likely to move where they are granted
greater (and more secure) social and political rights.
Our last set of controls are standard macroeconomic measures of the IMF recipi-
ent country. These include (log) GDP and (log) GDP per capita. Annual GDP growth
is also included as a control for testing the unconditional relationship between mi-
gration pressures and IMF lending behavior. This ensures that our independent
variables are not instead picking up growth and development characteristics of the
recipient country that are likely to drive both migration and IMF lending decisions.
Data for GDP and GDP per capita are obtained from the Penn World Tables. We
also supplement some missing data on GDP per capita using World Bank data.
4.3.4 Statistical Models
Because the logged measure of IMF loan size is continuous and normally dis-
tributed, while labor policy conditions and waivers are count variables, we test
each of our hypotheses using different econometric methods. For the analysis of
IMF loan size, we first estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model
with standard errors clustered on country:
ln(Loan Size per Capita) = b0 + b1G5 Migrantsj + gXj + dt + #
whereG5Migrantsj is the existing stock ofmigrants living in G5 countries (weighted
by G5 country vote share and then normalized by the recipient country’s popula-
13These data also come from the Correlates of War International Trade dataset.
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tion), Xj is a vector of controls, and dt denotes year fixed effects. For models testing
the importance of migration pressures to individual G5 countries, we simply dis-
aggregate G5 Migrants into five separate independent variables. Year fixed effects
control for time-trends and omitted system-level variables—such as commodity
price shocks or global economic crises—that are likely to bias our estimates. We do
not, however, include country fixed effects for borrowing countries since many have
a single-year observation. While some IMF programs span several years, the mi-
gration stock variable is generally time-dependent within each borrowing country.
Not only do migrant stocks tend to grow over time, but also our data construction
method uses linear interpolation. Even if we abandon linear interpolation in favor of
carrying forward ten-year intervals’ known values to unobserved years in between,
we would not get much within-country variation in the migration variable given
that our panel is relatively short. In the end, we exploit cross-national differences in
migrant networks to explain why some countries receive better packages from the
Fund, not why the Fund treats a particular borrowing country differently at various
times.
Our unconditional hypothesis predicts b1 to be positive—that is, where the
threat of migration to G5 countries is greatest, recipient countries will be granted
larger IMF loans. To test the conditional effect of G5 migrant stocks, we instead
estimate an OLS model that interacts G5 Migrants with annual GDP growth. Here,
we expect the constituent term for G5 Migrants to be positive, but the interaction
term to be negative. This would signify that the threat of migration is perceived as
less of a concern by G5 policymakers when the growth prospects of IMF program
recipients are relatively good.
Because labor policy conditions and condition waivers are count variables,
estimating an OLS model would yield biased and inefficient estimates. In addition,
both dependent variables have variances nearly twice the size of their mean, which
indicates overdispersion in the data. Goodness-of-fit tests of Poisson models also
suggest that the Poisson distribution is a poor modeling choice.14 We therefore use a
14For all Poisson models, Prob > c2 = 0.000. The dispersion parameter for all negative binomial
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negative binomial model for estimating both labor policy conditions and condition
waivers:
p(yi) =
G(1/a+ yi)
G(1/a)G(yi + 1)
(
1
1+ aexi b
)1/a(
aexi b
1+ aexi b
)yi , i = 1, 2, ..., n.
where yi = number of labor market conditions or waivers granted; a > 0 is the
heterogeneity parameter; predictor variables x1, x2, ..., xp are given; and regression
coefficients b0, b1, b2,..., bp are to be estimated. Standard errors are again clustered
on country. The control variables of these models is identical to our model of
loan size. For labor and fiscal policy conditions, we predict the coefficient on
G5 Migrants to be negative. For condition waivers, we predict the coefficient on
G5 Migrants to be positive.
4.4 Empirical Findings
4.4.1 Migration Pressures and the Size of IMF Loans
We first present the statistical results for IMF loan size. Table 4.1 provides
estimates for the relationship between our G5 Migrants composite measure and
per capita loan size (logged). Model 1 controls only for alliance membership,
trade with G5 countries, and democracy. Models 2 through 4 each incorporate
different macroeconomic measures to assess whether the results are affected by
the recipient country’s growth or development characteristics. These measures
are included separately from one another since they are highly collinear. Model 5
tests the conditional relationship between migration pressures and IMF loan size
by interacting G5 Migrants with the recipient country’s GDP growth. All models
include year fixed effects.
InModel 1, G5 Migrants is statistically significant (p < 0.05) and in the predicted
positive direction. When G5 countries host a relatively large stock of migrants from
the IMF recipient country, the IMF tends to grant larger loans. The size of this
models is also statistically distinguishable from zero, which further confirms a Poisson model would
be inappropriate.
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Table 4.1: G5 Migration and IMF Loan Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G5 Migrants j,i (per capitaj) 35.637⇤ 33.175⇤ 12.847 28.408+ 33.942⇤
(14.149) (16.303) (14.156) (14.901) (14.481)
G5 Alliances 0.175 -0.005 0.191 0.219 0.235
(0.230) (0.149) (0.214) (0.228) (0.228)
Polity 0.028⇤ 0.007 0.032⇤⇤ 0.028⇤ 0.028⇤
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Total Imports from G5 (log) 0.021 -0.143⇤ 0.229⇤ 0.031 0.033
(0.089) (0.061) (0.095) (0.092) (0.092)
Total Exports to G5 (log) 0.147⇤ 0.079 0.205⇤⇤ 0.135+ 0.135+
(0.070) (0.053) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.727⇤⇤⇤
(0.091)
GDP (log) -0.293⇤⇤⇤
(0.077)
GDP Growth -2.560⇤⇤⇤ -1.749⇤
(0.742) (0.846)
G5 Migrants ⇥ GDP Growth -375.945⇤
(148.820)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! !
Observations 663 658 648 647 647
Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is
the (logged) size of the loan for a given IMF program. Standard errors are clustered on country
and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of 0.1, 1, 5, and
10 percent, respectively.
effect is quite large. A 1 SD increase in G5 Migrants is associated with a roughly
27 percent increase in the per capita size of the IMF loan. This finding also holds
when controlling for the growth and development characteristics of the recipient
country. G5 Migrants remains positive and statistically significant in Models 2 and
4 (at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively). The coefficient shrinks slightly in these
models, as economic growth and development in the recipient country are likely to
be tied to both migration patterns and the need for IMF finance. Nevertheless, a
1 SD increase in G5 Migrants is still associated with a 21 to 25 percent increase in
loan size per capita. This lends further support to Hypothesis 1 and confirms that
the relationship between migration pressures and loan size is not simply an artifact
of the size or poverty level of recipient countries. G5 Migrants remains positive,
but loses statistical significance in Model 3.
Model 5 shows support for our unconditional hypothesis. The interaction term
of our G5 migrant stock measure and GDP growth is statistically significant at the
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0.05 level and in the predicted negative direction. This suggests that G5 policy-
makers become less concerned about the threat of migration when the recipient
country’s economy is growing. The nature of this relationship also makes intuitive
sense. Note first that the constituent term for the G5 migrant stock measure is statis-
tically significant at the 0.05 level and reflects the relationship between G5 Migrants
and IMF loan size under conditions of zero growth in the recipient country. Thus,
for IMF recipients at zero growth rates, a 1 SD change in G5 Migrants is associated
with a 25 percent increase in the per capita loan size. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
marginal effect of G5 Migrants across different levels of GDP growth. As shown,
lethargic growth rates in the recipient country tend to exacerbate policymakers’
concerns with migration. Interestingly, too, the marginal effect of G5 Migrants be-
comes statistically indistinguishable from zero when recipient countries experience
some positive level of economic growth. Migration pressures therefore appear to be
a concern only when the preexisting economic conditions within recipient countries
are particularly dire.
Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of G5 Migrant Stocks (Model 5)
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Note: The blue area denotes 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 4.2 next provides results when disaggregating the migrant stocks of G5
countries into five separate (and unweighted) variables. This allows us to see
whether migration pressures are salient for certain G5 destination countries more
than others. The specification of these models mirrors those of Models 1 through
4. From Table 4.2, there is a clear relationship between loan size and migration
pressures on the European G5 members. In all four models, the migrant stock
measure for the UK is statistically significant and in the predicted positive direction.
Depending on the model, a 1 SD increase in UK Migrant Stockj elicits a 25 to 32
percent increase in loan size per capita. With the exception of Model 7, which
includes GDP per capita, the stocks of migrants living in Germany and France
are also statistically significant and positive. For Germany, a 1 SD increase in the
migrant stock measure is associated with as much as a 19 percent increase in per
capita loan size, whereas for France, this number is closer to 11 percent.
In contrast, the stock of migrants from recipient countries seems to not matter for
the United States and Japan. It appears then that the connection between migration
pressures and IMF loan size is primarily driven by the major European shareholder
countries. This is not too surprising. Europe is in close geographic proximity to
major migrant-sending states in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. About
66% of IMF programs in our sample are directed at countries in Africa, Europe,
and the Middle East. France and the UK are also former colonial powers that have
consequently served as common destinations of migrants from former colonies. For
these reasons, it is likely that the relationship between IMF loan size and future
migration is a greater consideration among policymakers in Europe. This is not to
say that the US—the Fund’s largest shareholder—is unable to exert any influence,
but only that US power in the IMF is used to serve other foreign policy concerns, at
least when it comes to loan size.
Table D.2 in the Appendix provides the results of the conditional effect of mi-
gration pressures.15 Model A1 first tests the conditional relationship between
15Interactions with US and Japan migrant stock measures are not shown. These are statistically
insignificant.
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Table 4.2: Migration to Individual G5 Countries and IMF Loan Size
(6) (7) (8) (9)
US Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 0.038 1.779 -4.441⇤ -1.752
(2.676) (3.066) (2.207) (2.469)
UK Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 30.817⇤⇤ 24.398⇤ 29.277⇤⇤ 30.450⇤⇤
(11.541) (9.693) (8.861) (9.771)
Japan Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) -12.896 0.774 -29.093+ -6.127
(17.381) (12.543) (16.083) (17.649)
Germany Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 15.701⇤ -4.866 16.660⇤⇤ 14.777⇤
(6.772) (5.272) (5.605) (6.503)
France Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 15.121⇤⇤ 6.721 9.587+ 14.685⇤⇤
(5.592) (5.839) (5.705) (5.206)
G5 Alliance 0.455+ 0.054 0.482⇤ 0.496⇤
(0.243) (0.165) (0.218) (0.238)
Polity 0.015 0.004 0.017 0.015
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Total Imports from G5 (log) 0.002 -0.129⇤ 0.216⇤ 0.020
(0.086) (0.061) (0.090) (0.088)
Total Exports to G5 (log) 0.135⇤ 0.066 0.189⇤⇤ 0.120+
(0.065) (0.052) (0.069) (0.069)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.740⇤⇤⇤
(0.098)
GDP (log) -0.289⇤⇤⇤
(0.075)
GDP Growth -2.465⇤⇤⇤
(0.721)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! !
Observations 663 658 648 647
Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent
variable is the (logged) size of the loan for a given IMF program. Standard errors are
clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical
significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
UK Migrant Stockj and IMF loan size. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coef-
ficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10
level. As seen in Figure D.1, concerns about migration appear to only matter at
low or negative rates of economic growth in the recipient country. This lends fur-
ther support to the argument that G5 policymakers perceive migration as less of a
threat when the growth prospects of recipient countries are relatively good. The
interaction terms, however, are statistically insignificant for Germany and France in
Models A2 and A3, respectively.
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4.4.2 Robustness Checks
To further assess the robustness of our results, we next consider alternative
mechanisms that may explain the positive relationship between migration pressures
and IMF loan size. One concern is how the colonial history between G5 countries
and the borrowing country may shape both IMF lending decisions and migrant
networks in G5 countries. Within migrant-sending countries, individuals are likely
to have greater knowledge of the laws, economy, and culture of their former colonial
powers (Fitzgerald et al. 2014, p. 418). This type of information is often critical
for potential migrants when seeking employment opportunities and new places of
residence. Indeed, our results suggest that it is primarily the UK and France, the
two major former colonial powers, that drive the relationship between migration
pressures and loan size. If major IMF shareholders treat their former colonies more
favorably than other loan recipients (e.g., Stone 2004), this could bias our estimates
upwards. In addition, former colonies may attract greater amounts of foreign direct
investment (FDI) which could also factor into the calculus of policymakers.16
Table 4.3 presents correlations between each major shareholder’s migrant stock
and whether the migrant-sending country is a former colony of the specific IMF
shareholder (indicated in the left column).17 As shown, major IMF shareholders host
a greater number of migrants from their former colonies than non-colonies. Still,
with the exception of Japan, these coefficients are smaller than expected. Moreover,
the G5 colony dummy is negatively related to the size of G5 migrant stocks as
a whole. This is more consistent with conditional relationships found between
colonial history and international migration patterns (e.g., Neumayer 2005; Riley
and Emigh 2002).
Nevertheless, we control for colonial relationships in Model (A4) and (A5). Table
D.3 in the Appendix provides the complete estimates for these models. Model (A4)
first estimates the effect of G5 migration pressures conditional on GDP growth
16While we recognize FDI flows as a potential confounder, limited data on bilateral FDI flows
prohibits us from exploring this quantitatively. Including FDI inflows causes roughly a third of our
statistical sample to drop.
17Note that these correlations are calculated for the sample within our dataset.
116
Table 4.3: Relationship between Former Colonial Relationships and Migration
Correlation with Migrant Stock
FRA Colony 0.2087
GER Colony 0.2073
JPN Colony 0.9347
UK Colony 0.4186
US Colony 0.1371
G5 Colony -0.1450
rates. When including a dummy for whether a loan recipient is a former colony of
a G5 country, the interactive term is again negative and statistically significant at
conventional levels. Substantively, the results are similar to previous models. As
shown in Figure D.2 in the Appendix, greater migrant stocks in G5 countries are
associated with larger IMF loans only when GDP growth is at or below zero. This is
further evidence that migration pressures are a particularly relevant concern for G5
policymakers when economic conditions in the borrowing country deteriorate.
Model (A5) instead looks at individual migrant stocks and includes separate
former colony dummies for each G5 country. UK Migrant Stock and France Migrant
Stock are positive and the only migrant stock measures that reach statistical signifi-
cance (p < 0.01 and p < 0.10, respectively). Thus, the association between IMF loan
size and migration pressures for the major former colonial powers remains robust.
For policymakers in these countries, concerns about migration exist independently
of the networks and diplomatic relations established with their post-colonial states.
We next look at whether accounting for remittance inflows into IMF recipient
countries affects the main findings. Remittance flows are naturally associated with
largermigrant populations and can also serve as an additional insurancemechanism
for the IMF. This means the IMF may be more willing to lend to countries that have
greater access to remittances inflows, which are typically countercyclical in nature.
Model (A6) of Table D.3 tests for the effect of migration pressures conditional on
GDP growth once controlling for remittance inflows (log). The interactive term
is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, which is again consistent
with the main findings. The Remittances coefficient is negative, suggesting that
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remittances may instead act as a substitute for large IMF programs.
It is worth noting too that remittances partially capture the wealth and politi-
cal influence of migrants abroad. Remittances therefore control for an alternative
mechanism involving migrant lobbying, where existing diasporas lobby host gov-
ernments to offer more favorable policies to their home states (Bermeo and Leblang
2015). We do not find this counterargument convincing in the IMF context since it
is unlikely migrants possess the resources and political access to influence policy-
makers’ decisions within an IO as large as the Fund. At times,b b d too, migrants
may actually oppose accommodative policies toward their native states, such as in
the case of Cuban Americans’ attitudes toward sanctions against the Castro regime
(Shain 1994; Vanderbush 2009). The results of Model (A6) therefore confirm our
skepticism.
Lastly, we test whether our initial findings are sensitive to our scaling of the
dependent variable. Rather than scale loan size in terms of the recipient coun-
try’s population, we instead divide loan size by the recipient country’s quota size
(logged). This is a common method in the literature since IMF quotas are roughly
proportional to the size of a country’s economy and trade volume (Stone 2002, p.
57). Loan Size per Capita (log) and Loan Size per Quota (log) are highly correlated
(r = 0.76), though there is some difference since quotas are not perfectly represen-
tative of country’s population size. Model (A7) in Table D.3 tests for the effect of
migration pressures conditional on GDP growth using the baseline of controls as
well as a G5 colony dummy. Here, the interactive term is negative and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. Larger migrant stocks are again associated with more
sizable IMF loans, but only at negative rates of economic growth.
4.4.3 Migration Pressures and IMF Conditionality
Do migration pressures also affect the types of conditionality imposed by the
Fund? We first address this question by analyzing the number of labor policy
conditions for a given program. Models 10 and 11 in Table 4.4 present the main
results for the relationship between migration and labor conditionality. Additional
118
robustness checks are also provided in Table D.4 in the Appendix. Consistent with
our main argument, G5 Migrants is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10
level in Model 10. Recipient countries are less likely to have labor policy reforms
imposed on them when they have a large stock of their citizens already living in
G5 countries. In such cases, G5 policymakers are likely to fear that labor policy
reforms—such as lowering the minimum wage and establishing limits on public
employment—will lead to increased migration into their country.
Model 11 next estimates the number of labor conditions using migrant stocks for
each individual G5 country. In contrast to our findings on loan size, the results sug-
gest that migration pressures on the IMF’s largest shareholder, the US, matter most
in determining labor policy conditionality. The coefficient on US Migrant Stockj
is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The size of the coefficient
increases further and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level once controlling
for economic characteristics of the recipient country in Models A11 and A13. The
migrant stock measures for European shareholders, however, are statistically in-
distinguishable from zero and in the wrong direction, regardless of the model
specification.
We also find evidence that migration pressures to the US are important consid-
erations of IMF fiscal conditionality. In Models 12 and 13, we estimate the number
of fiscal policy conditions for IMF programs using the same set of controls.18 Fiscal
policy conditions include government budget-related issues and government bor-
rowing. We again expect a negative relationship between migrant stocks and these
types of conditionality, as fiscal consolidation and cuts to public service provisions
are likely to exacerbate the costs of internal adjustment within the recipient country.
Similar to labor policy conditions, we find evidence that migration pressures to
major shareholder countries are a significant predictor of the number of fiscal policy
conditions. In Model 12, G5 Migrantsj,i is negative and statistically significant at
the 0.01 level. We also find that it is again US migration pressures primarily driving
18Fiscal conditionality models are estimated using Poisson regression due to problems of conver-
gence in our negative binomial models.
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this relationship, as the US migrant stock measure is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at 0.001 level in Model 13. Robustness checks provided in Table D.5 of the
Appendix further confirm these findings. Note that the coefficients of the migration
variables for labor conditions are more substantial than those for fiscal conditions.
This is in accordance with our initial expectation that labor conditions are more
closely linked to migration dynamics and are a more important consideration than
fiscal conditions for the Fund.
These results may be interpreted in two ways. First, while we argue that mi-
gration pressures are certainly a main driver of the policy preferences of European
G5 members, it might be true that these countries seek to ameliorate the threat of
migration through means other than altering conditionality. The empirical evidence
we have provided above suggests increasing the size of IMF loans is one such
alternative means. Second, the US may be more forceful in using its formal and
informal influence in the areas of conditionality vis-a`-vis other IMF shareholders.
This would make it harder for the IMF’s European shareholders to impose their
preferences over conditionality during the negotiation of IMF programs.
Finally, we assess whether migration pressures dictate flexibility during the
implementation of IMF programs by looking at the number of condition waivers
granted by the Fund. These results are shown in the far right column of Table
4.4. The coefficient on G5 Migrants is insignificant in Model 14. Thus, we find no
support for the argument that migration pressures to G5 countries—at least when
measured as whole—lead to greater flexibility in implementing IMF programs.19
The results indicate a different story when considering migrant stocks separately
for each G5 member in Model 15. UK Migrant Stockj is positive and statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. Consistent with our first hypothesis, this shows migra-
tion pressures on the UK are likely to lead to greater flexibility by the Fund when
implementing IMF programs. By contrast, the coefficient for US Migrant Stockj is
negative. That is, there is some evidence to suggest migration pressures on the US
are associated with less policy flexibility by the IMF during program implemen-
19This null finding also holds in robustness checks provided in Table D.6.
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tation. Though past the scope of this article, we posit two explanations for this
counterintuitive result. First, strict enforcement of IMF conditionality may be a form
of punishment issued by the US. Withholding condition waivers might therefore
be an attempt by US policymakers to alter the behavior of abusive governments,
where emigration is also a concern. Second, the US may view the implementation of
prescribed policy reforms as likely to improve economic conditions of the recipient
country in the long run, especially for poor migrant-sending countries.
In sum, the findings in this article suggest a highly nuanced relationship between
migration pressures and the Fund’s behavior in lending. We find the most robust
support for our hypotheses in the context of IMF loan size. When migration pres-
sures are a concern for G5 countries, the IMF tends to grant larger loans—especially
when the recipient country is experiencing negative economic growth. However,
this relationship appears to be primarily driven by concerns over migration to
Europe. Moreover, G5 countries may utilize different means toward reducing the
“push” effect that IMF conditionality has on future migration. For instance, while
migration pressures on the UK are associated with larger loans and more flexible
IMF programs, US concerns over migration appear to drive the types of policy
reforms imposed by the Fund.
4.5 Conclusion
What does the IMF stand for? While we have known that the IMF has served
the strategic interests of its major shareholders, most studies have focused on the
familiar dynamics of international politics. In this article, we have highlighted
the role of migration pressure as a determinant of who gets what from the Fund.
Specifically, we have argued that the Fund grants larger loans and less stringent
loan conditions to IMF recipients with large diasporas in the G5 states.
Our motivating case illustrates how the concerns of France, Germany, and
the UK over Romanian immigration resulted in a generous loan package for the
country and, at the same time, delayed the country’s accession to the Schengen
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area. Analyzing the policy space from 1978 to 2013 with a new dataset on IMF
conditionality, we have disaggregated IMF conditionality by policy types and
analyzed three particular dimensions of IMF program design: (1) the size of loan, (2)
the stringency of conditions attached to the loan, and (3) the number of condition
waivers granted during the program implementation. Accordingly, our empirical
findings support our theoretical expectation that IMF loan recipients with large
diasporas in G5 countries receive larger loans and more lenient loan conditions that
reduce migration pressures faced by the IMF’s major shareholders. Moreover, the
link between IMF lending and migration pressure is especially striking when the
economy of a borrowing country is underperforming.
Our depiction of the IMF as an International Migration Fund—a first in the
literature to the extent of our knowledge—also paves the way for an exciting
research program within the IMF literature. While this article demonstrates that
the IMF stands for reduced migration into the G5 states, more research should
explore how each G5 state uses the Fund’s resources to reduce migration pressure
into its territory. For instance, we find that the European IMF shareholders focus
primarily on loan size while the US favors labor and fiscal conditions to achieve a
similar outcome. Future research should investigate the inter-member dynamics
within the Fund, and each G5 member’s policy preferences and control over specific
IMF instruments with respect to international migration. In addition, we find
preliminary evidence that IMF lending decisions are consequential in shaping
international migration patterns. We explore this relationship between IMF loan
stringency and emigration in Table D.7 in the appendix. Although the emigration
data used in the analysis are largely limited, the causal directions of the coefficients
are in accordance with our expectations.
Furthermore, this article builds upon broader research on international insti-
tutions and the relationship between state interests and IO behavior. Though the
effectiveness and legitimacy of IOs are said to rest on their autonomy in interna-
tional relations (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004), the actions
of IOs tend to be closely shadowed by state interests in practice (Stone 2011; Lim
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and Vreeland 2013). In the case of the IMF, scholars have largely emphasized the
geopolitical and commercial interests of powerful states in instructing IMF pro-
grams (Thacker 1999; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Broz and Hawes 2006; Stone 2008;
Copelovitch 2010b). Our findings instead suggest that G5 concerns over migration
are important in shaping the size and content of IMF loans. This suggests then that
economic globalization—while arguably increasing the need for global governance—
can at the same time constrain the actions of IOs by inciting interference from the
most powerful states. Future work should aim to test whether migration pressures
lead to similar dynamics in other major international institutions.
Finally, this article contributes to the growing literature on how state concerns
over migration drive their foreign economic policies, including the allocation of
foreign aid (Bermeo and Leblang 2015), exchange rate regimes (Singer 2010), foreign
direct investment (Leblang 2010), sovereign debt (Bernhard and Leblang 2016), and
economic sanctions (Connell et al. 2018). In addition, the findings of this article
exemplify the growing importance of international migration in the international
political economy research, as evidenced by recent research on trade and immigra-
tion policies (Peters 2015; 2017), as well as the implications of natural resources
for immigration policy (Shin 2017). More broadly, our findings exemplify how the
Bretton Woods institutions have evolved to mitigate globalization backlashes by
reducing immigration inflows into the G5 countries in the new era of embedded
liberalism (Ruggie 1982).
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Table 4.4: G5 Migration, Conditionality, and Policy Waivers
Labor Conditions Fiscal Conditions Condition Waivers
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
G5 Migrants j,i (per
capitaj)
-30.423+ -
19.072⇤⇤
-3.382
(17.849) (5.921) (14.282)
US Migrantsj (per
capitaj)
-8.073⇤ -
3.976⇤⇤⇤
-
8.100⇤⇤⇤
(4.017) (1.075) (2.305)
UK Migrantsj (per
capitaj)
11.781 4.566+ 28.432⇤⇤⇤
(13.505) (2.671) (5.184)
JPN Migrantsj (per
capitaj)
-311.654 -189.424 -31.382
(219.397) (265.422) (28.194)
GER Migrantsj (per
capitaj)
1.922 -3.779 1.942
(6.702) (3.857) (6.128)
FRA Migrantsj (per
capitaj)
9.808 6.993⇤ 7.582
(10.001) (3.511) (6.549)
G5 Alliance 0.032 0.163 0.173+ 0.198⇤ 0.267 0.411⇤
(0.213) (0.243) (0.092) (0.095) (0.175) (0.185)
Polity 0.029⇤ 0.027+ -0.012+ -0.011 -0.001 -0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Total Imports from G5
(log)
0.081 0.088 0.022 0.033 0.150+ 0.134+
(0.081) (0.080) (0.046) (0.048) (0.078) (0.081)
Total Exports from G5
(log)
-0.130⇤ -0.143⇤ -0.060+ -0.066+ -0.038 -0.027
(0.065) (0.064) (0.034) (0.035) (0.066) (0.067)
Total Number of
Conditions
0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 663 663 663 663 591 591
Note: Models 10, 11, 14, and 15 provide estimates using negative binomial regression. Models 12
and 13 provide estimates using Poisson regression. Standard errors are clustered on country and
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10
percent, respectively.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The point of departure for this dissertation has been an emerging contradiction
between the theoretical expectations of democratic theory and recent political de-
velopments across the transitioning democracies of post-socialist Europe. That is,
in theory, electoral democracy should root out political corruption, as constituents,
armed with the power of the vote, hold corrupt parties and representatives account-
able for political transgressions by voting them out of office. Political developments
across a number of states in the post-communist region however challenge this
expectation. While recent anti-corruption protests by voters in the cases of Albania
(2018), Bulgaria (2013-2014), Romania (2017-2018), Slovakia (2018) and several other
transitioning democracies signal voters’ rising indignation at the pervasiveness of
political corruption, the degree of electoral accountability that emerges does not
consistently precipitate the political descend of corrupt parties and political elites.
Instead, corrupt governing parties in several countries across the EU’s post-socialist
region, including Albania, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary etc. are able to maintain
and, with some variation, even strengthen their hold on political power.
The contradicting nature of these developments raises questions about not
only the types of strategies and resources that corrupt governing parties utilize to
compromise electoral accountability and promote political longevity, but also the
implications of these developments on the politics and policy-making decisions of
international organizations to which these states partake in. Hence, these develop-
ments lead us to reconsider the relationship between political corruption, electoral
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accountability, and distributive politics in the age of migration.
This dissertation explores the link between these factors from three closely re-
lated perspectives. First, it examines the types of distributive policies that corrupt
incumbent parties establish to curtail electoral backlash and electoral accountabil-
ity; Second, it analyzes the types of resources available to corrupt incumbents for
achieving their desired political ends; And finally, given that immigration is often
a consequence of underperforming economies of corrupt states, this dissertation
analyzes the implications of rising migration pressures on the political economy
of fiscal lending by international organizations, specifically the IMF. In its assess-
ment of these interrelated factors, this dissertation contributes novel theoretical
perspectives and newly assembled datasets that enhance our understanding of
these phenomena from the perspectives of both the democratization as well as the
political economy of fiscal lending literatures.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation focused on examining the combined effect of
political corruption and distributive politics on patterns of electoral accountability.
It analyzed the puzzle of what drives variation in patterns of electoral accountability
and what types of resources and policies do parties employ to assuage potential
electoral backlash. In this chapter, I put forth a new theoretical framework of
“corruption compensation” that took into account voters’ corruption perceptions, to
identify strategic allocation of resources by governing parties as a proactive and
retroactive reimbursement mechanism for mitigating voters’ fury over corruption,
mediating electoral backlash, and bolstering incumbents’ political power at the
expense of democratic effectiveness and public trust in democratic institutions. I
systematically examinedmy theoretical expectations via qualitative evidence and an
originally assembled data set in the case of Albania, one of Europe’s highly-corrupt,
post-socialist states. My findings lent support for my theoretical expectations that
corrupt incumbents tend to inoculate themselves from electoral accountability by
allocating greater shares of resources to regions where the electorate’s corruption
perceptions are higher and electoral accountability is most likely to emerge.
Chapter 3 examined an additional layer of the link between corruption, distribu-
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tive politics, and electoral accountability. It built upon Chapter 2’s findings to ask:
Given that corrupt governing parties employ strategic allocation of fiscal resources
as a defensive shield against electoral accountability, what is the impact of a larger
pool of resources—distributed to recipient states by international organizations—on
governing parties’ electoral endurance? Guided by this motivating puzzle, Chapter
3 engaged in a cross-country, cross-time analysis to empirically examine the impact
that fiscal transfers allocated by the EU to its member states have on the electoral
returns and political power of corrupt governing parties in recipient states. I argued
here that access and allocation authority over the EU’s fiscal inflows enable corrupt
governing parties to engage in a combination of distributive strategies aimed at
maintaining the loyalty of their personalistic networks and appeasing electorally
significant constituencies in ways that ultimately strengthen their hold on power. By
focusing on the EU’s geopolitical space, I analyzed new data on EU fiscal allocations
over the period 2000 to 2015, to systematically test and confirmmy theory that fiscal
flows to corrupt EU states deliver political latitude and an electoral advantage to
recipient states’ governing parties.
The main objective of Chapter 4 was to expand the theoretical framework be-
yond the interaction of political corruption and distributive politics with electoral
accountability to examine how international organizations, in this case IMF, re-
spond to migration pressures, often born as a ramification of socioeconomic under-
performance of highly corrupt, extracting states. In this Chapter, my coauthors and
I put forth a depiction of IMF as an International Migration Fund—a first in the
literature—to argue that IMF grants larger loans and less stringent loan conditions
to IMF recipients that pose a migration pressure to the IMF’s largest shareholder
states. Examining the policy space from 1978 to 2013 with a new dataset on IMF
conditionality, we dissaggregated IMF conditionality by policy type to examine
three key dimensions of IMF program design: (1) loan size granted to recipient
states, (2) the stringency of conditions attached to the loand, and (3) the number
of condition waivers granted during the program implementation. Our analysis
grants support for our theoretical expectations that IMF loan recipients with large
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diasporas in G5 countries receive larger loans and more lenient loan conditions that
reduce migration pressures faced by IMFs major shareholders. We find this to be
particularly the case under conditions of underperforming economies in recipient
countries.
The findings presented in this dissertation have important implications for
democratic theory, economic development, and distributive policy both at the state
and international organizations strata. At the state level: When incumbents misallo-
cate state resources and external fiscal inflows to compromise voters’ ability to hold
them accountable, their own incentives to curb their political misconduct decline
even further—a tendency that jeopardizes economic and democratic developments
by wasting valuable resources, undermining policy outcomes and reducing citizens’
trust in democratic institutions. In a tenuous, post-communist political landscape
increasingly marked by populist politics and cases of authoritarian relapsing, such
strains on the political, institutional and economic infrastructures of Europe’s transi-
tioning democracies threaten the region’s democratic consolidation and sustainable
peace. To enhance our understanding of these phenomena over a larger geopolitical
space, future research should aim to test the “corruption compensation” mechanism
in a larger cross-national setting. This approach would further advance our under-
standing of 1) the factors that drive cross-country variation in patterns of electoral
accountability; and 2) how variation in “corruption compensation” strategies affects
patterns of democratic consolidation across transitioning states.
At the level of international entities: Understanding whether fiscal funds allo-
cated by the EU to highly corrupt member states serve to promote or jeopardize
the EU’s economic objectives and democratic values is essential to the formulation
and proper implementation of EU- and state-level anticorruption policies. Addi-
tionally, findings that higher fiscal transfers by the EU are positively correlated
with higher electoral advantages for corrupt incumbents of recipient states call
for a re-calibration of EU’s distributive mechanism. These findings suggest that
diverting EU funds away from highly corrupt states (for instance, Hungary, Poland,
and Romania) would undercut the political momentum and power consolidation
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of corrupt governing parties while enabling the EU to redirect greater shares of
resources to other member states (for instance, Greece) facing greater economic,
humanitarian, and migration pressures. Building on these findings, further research
should aim to test the link between EU’s distributive policies and political corrup-
tion to governing parties political behavior, including authoritarian and populist
tendencies. By providing insight into the dynamics of these relationships, these
findings would serve as a foundation for the formation of EU policies aimed at
constraining their emergence.
Finally, the findings presented here extend valuable insight on the impact of
migration on the politics of fiscal lending by international organizations. Our
findings that migration pressures faced by IMF’s greatest shareholders drive the size
of loans and conditionalities that IMF grants to recipient countries, suggest that that
economic globalization—while arguably increasing the need for global governance—
can at the same time constrain the actions of international organizations by inciting
interference from the IMF’s most powerful shareholder states. Future work should
aim to test whether migration pressures lead to similar dynamics in other major
international institutions, particularly the EU and the World Bank.
Combined, the recommendations for future research suggested here will ad-
vance our cross-time and cross-space understanding of the relationship between
political corruption, distributive politics and electoral accountability in the age of
migration.
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Figure A.1: Student Protesters, Albania, December 2018
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Figure B.1: Corruption Perceptions, 2010
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Democratic Party Vote Share 41.517 10.224 9.952 67.631 336
Socialist Party Vote Share 39.388 9.536 2.341 62.456 336
Unconditional Transfers Per Capita 4.156 2.009 0.399 12.977 336
Increased Corruption Perceptions 0.372 0.193 0.05 0.952 336
Strong Opposition Perceptions 0.246 0.159 0 0.955 336
Party Alignment 0.544 0.465 0 1 336
Election Year 0.333 0.472 0 1 336
Turnout Per Electoral Unit 0.505 0.102 0.291 1 336
Voters Per Electoral Unit 5.279 5.913 1.289 48.594 336
GDP 9.866 10.417 1.853 44.731 336
Gross Value Added 8.865 9.35 1.678 40.054 336
Growth Rate 5.233 2.269 0.2 10.5 336
ln(GDP Per Capita) 1.957 0.744 0.617 3.801 336
ln(Gross Value Added) 1.851 0.743 0.517 3.69 336
ln(Growth Rate) 1.487 0.729 -1.609 2.351 336
Note: Unconditional Transfers (UT Per Capita)
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Figure B.2: Corruption Perceptions, 2010
Figure B.3: Unconditional Transfers per Capita vs. DP Vote Shares
Albania, 2005 - 2010
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics - (Delta Regressions Variables)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
D (PD Vote Share) -2.287 6.851 -17.689 12.353 56
D (UT Per Capita) 0.367 1.893 -5.837 4.694 56
D (Increased Corruption Perceptions) 0.243 0.239 -0.264 0.777 56
D (Strong Opposition Perceptions) 0.084 0.227 -0.455 0.955 56
mean(Party Alignment) 1.412 1.268 0 4.283 56
mean(Voters Per Electoral Unit) 15.466 17.122 2.372 74.72 56
mean(Turnout Per Electoral Unit) 1.219 0.563 0.388 2.369 56
mean(GDP) 28.989 43.137 2.786 186.37 56
mean(Growth Rate) 13.265 7.421 4.95 31.8 56
Table B.3: Determinants of Democratic Party Vote Shares By Election Years 2005 &
2009
Model (6) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)
UT Per Capita -1.664⇤ -2.658⇤⇤ -2.061⇤ -1.934⇤
(0.810) (0.853) (0.815) (0.828)
Increased CP -19.195⇤⇤ -23.432⇤⇤ -20.598⇤⇤ -19.868⇤⇤
(7.090) (7.126) (6.689) (6.734)
UT Per Capita ⇥ CP 3.497⇤ 4.859⇤⇤ 3.465⇤ 3.287⇤
(1.732) (1.745) (1.662) (1.673)
Voters Per Municipality -0.238⇤ -0.259⇤⇤ -0.253⇤⇤
(0.093) (0.087) (0.088)
GDP 0.109 0.079 0.098
(0.190) (0.189) (0.189)
Growth Rate -0.291 -0.237 -0.211
(0.271) (0.257) (0.258)
Turnout -25.647⇤⇤⇤ -26.108⇤⇤⇤
(6.650) (6.670)
Strong Opposition
Perceptions
-2.878
(3.459)
County-Year Random
Effects
Municipality-Year
Random Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations 112 112 112 112
Note: This table portrays a mixed, multilevel model analysis of the determinants
of Democratic Party vote shares in year t. The dependent variable is Vote Shares
for Democratic Party per electoral municipality m of county i at time t. Main
explanatory variables are Increased Corruption Perceptions (CP) and the interaction
term between UT Per Capita and CP. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,
**, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
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Figure B.4: Marginal Effects of UT per Capita Conditional on Corruption Percep-
tions
Note: The blue area denotes 95% Confidence Intervals
Figure B.5: Political Corruption vs. Duration of Democracy
All European States, 1991-2007
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gov Parties’ Seat Shareit 0.558 0.077 0.321 0.799 430
Total EUTit (in mill. Euros) 3850.944 4345.494 4.37 17436.082 432
ln(Total EUTit) 7.376 1.626 1.475 9.766 432
EUT Per Capitait 337.985 489.877 2.086 3080.864 432
EUTit/ Gov Spendingit 0.189 0.183 0.003 0.788 432
Exec. Corrupt. Index (ECI)it 0.153 0.148 0.011 0.679 416
Gov Consumpt Expenditureit 0.073 0.073 0.001 0.381 432
Share (EUT/Gov Consumpt)it 196.002 224.776 0.294 960.977 432
Number of Gov Seatsit 148.808 105.445 0 504 432
Number of Opposition Seatsit 116.19 79.718 0 346 432
D Party Seats (Gov - Opp)it 32.618 55.115 -86 377 432
Polity IVit 9.634 0.628 8 10 432
Political Stabilityit 0.752 0.416 -0.482 1.663 405
Civil Society Indexit 0.914 0.048 0.638 0.976 416
Rule of Lawit 1.091 0.636 -0.269 2.12 405
Government Effectivenessit 1.156 0.632 -0.435 2.359 405
Equal Resource Distributionit 0.923 0.053 0.755 0.982 416
Legislative Electionit 0.266 0.442 0 1 432
Democratic Transitionit .41 .49 0 1 432
ln(GDP)it 26.103 1.511 23.371 28.938 432
ln(Population)it 15.98 1.302 12.986 18.229 432
Note: EUT denotes EU Transfers;
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Figure C.1: Ratio of EU Transfers to Government Spending2000 - 2015
Note: The box plot displays the distribution of EU fiscal transfers across member states during
20002015. The graph indicates the range, median, and means of the ratio of the total amount of EU
Funds received by recipient country i in year t to country i’s government spending over year t.
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Supplementary Information for Chapter 4
IMF: International Migration Fund
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Table D.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Loan Size (log) 663 2.666 1.143 0.335 8.353
Labor Policy Conditions 663 2.054 3.795 0 24
Condition Waivers 591 4.184 6.970 0 67
Fiscal Policy Conditions 663 7.127 9.172 0 67
G5 Migrants (per capitaj) 663 0.003 0.005 9.48E-06 0.048
US Migrant Stock (per capitaj) 663 0.0123 0.030 4.25E-06 0.262
UK Migrant Stock (per capitaj) 663 0.002 0.009 0 0.089
Japan Migrant Stock (per capitaj) 663 0.0001 0.001 0 0.018
Germany Migrant Stock (per capitaj) 663 0.004 0.010 0 0.064
France Migrant Stock (per capitaj) 663 0.003 0.007 0 0.063
G5 Alliance 663 0.290 0.454 0 1
Total Imports from G5 (log) 663 6.366 1.609 0 11.773
Total Exports to G5 (log) 663 6.099 1.999 .588 11.642
Polity 663 1.337 6.526 -9 10
GDP per Capita (log) 658 8.149 0.941 5.897 10.797
GDP (log) 648 10.400 1.607 6.482 14.689
GDP Growth 647 0.025 0.060 -0.360 0.205
Total Number of Conditions 663 43.403 40.713 2 294
G5 Colony 663 0.570 0.495 0 1
US Colony 663 0.007 0.087 0 1
UK Colony 663 0.259 0.439 0 1
JPN Colony 663 0.006 0.077 0 1
GER Colony 663 0.026 0.158 0 1
FRA Colony 663 0.284 0.451 0 1
Remittances (log) 528 18.216 2.689 9.209 23.353
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Table D.2: Conditional Effect of G5 Migration on IMF Loan Size
(A1) (A2) (A3)
UK Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 30.498⇤⇤ 30.564⇤⇤ 30.441⇤⇤
(9.025) (9.798) (9.775)
UK Migrants ⇥ GDP Growth -223.299+
(115.609)
Germany Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 14.603⇤ 15.419⇤ 15.280⇤
(6.517) (6.585) (6.443)
Germany Migrants ⇥ GDP Growth -24.462
(45.918)
France Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 14.846⇤⇤ 14.877⇤⇤ 17.207⇤⇤
(5.151) (5.189) (5.175)
France Migrants ⇥ GDP Growth -167.378
(135.224)
GDP Growth -2.152⇤⇤ -2.314⇤⇤ -2.100⇤
(0.732) (0.791) (0.803)
US Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) -1.403 -1.755 -1.643
(2.475) (2.474) (2.483)
Japan Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) -5.997 -6.752 -7.307
(17.595) (17.893) (17.606)
G5 Alliance 0.486⇤ 0.499⇤ 0.484⇤
(0.238) (0.240) (0.240)
Polity 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Total Imports from G5 (log) 0.018 0.020 0.020
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Total Exports to G5 (log) 0.121+ 0.119+ 0.121+
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! !
Observations 647 647 647
Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The depen-
dent variable is the (logged) size of the loan for a given IMF program. Standard
errors are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate
statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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Table D.3: G5 Migration and Loan Size (Robustness Checks)
Dependent Variable: Loan Size (log)
Per Capita of Recipient Per Quota
(A4) (A5) (A6) (A7)
G5 Migrantsj,i (per capitaj) 37.408⇤ 45.468⇤⇤ 1.603
(16.480) (16.269) (7.371)
GDP Growth -1.297 -2.095+ 0.130
(0.881) (1.148) (0.716)
G5 Migrants ⇥ GDP Growth -412.378⇤⇤ -385.035⇤ -418.647⇤⇤
(155.853) (173.605) (135.890)
G5 Alliance 0.159 0.797⇤ 0.131 0.165
(0.233) (0.318) (0.221) (0.105)
Polity 0.019 0.002 0.010 0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007)
Total Imports from G5 (log) 0.029 0.199+ 0.074
(0.090) (0.112) (0.056)
Total Exports to G5 (log) 0.133+ 0.073 0.048
(0.071) (0.080) (0.046)
G5 Colony -0.339⇤ -0.392⇤ 0.007
(0.166) (0.166) (0.070)
US Migrant Stockj (per capitaj) 3.921
(2.483)
UK Migrantsj (per capitaj) 36.831⇤⇤
(13.151)
Japan Migrantsj (per capitaj) -219.338
(309.815)
Germany Migrantsj (per capitaj) 1.762
(7.157)
France Migrantsj (per capitaj) 13.987+
(7.750)
US Colony -1.068⇤⇤
(0.393)
UK Colony -0.725⇤
(0.318)
France Colony -0.512
(0.351)
Japan Colony 5.053
(4.434)
Germany Colony -0.208
(0.396)
Remittances (log) -0.083⇤
(0.032)
Controls for Bilateral Trade !
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! !
Observations 647 444 528 550
Note: These estimates are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors
are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical
significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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Table D.4: G5 Migration and Labor Conditionality
(A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12) (A13)
G5 Migrants j,i (per capj) -30.010+ -22.959 -52.812⇤
(18.048) (17.234) (22.591)
US Migrantsj (per capj) -8.973⇤ -6.722 -11.731⇤
(4.113) (4.780) (5.202)
UK Migrantsj (per capj) 15.205 10.075 8.391
(13.469) (14.505) (16.050)
JPN Migrantsj (per capj) -343.354 -268.812 -167.935
(240.985) (201.995) (131.639)
GER Migrantsj (per capj) 7.805 2.297 1.963
(7.119) (6.912) (5.411)
FRA Migrantsj (per capj) 11.564 9.402 1.660
(10.014) (9.599) (9.613)
G5 Alliance 0.050 0.064 -0.013 0.281 0.183 0.097
(0.218) (0.214) (0.159) (0.270) (0.247) (0.171)
Polity 0.032⇤ 0.027+ 0.034⇤ 0.029+ 0.025+ 0.030⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Total Imports to G5 (log) 0.100 0.104 0.462⇤⇤⇤ 0.122 0.112 0.460⇤⇤⇤
(0.084) (0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080)
Total Exports to G5 (log) -0.118+ -0.154⇤ -0.011 -0.122+ -0.167⇤⇤ -0.023
(0.070) (0.064) (0.063) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063)
Total Conditions 0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per Capita (log) -0.086 -0.189
(0.119) (0.127)
GDP Growth -0.716 -0.557
(0.996) (0.975)
GDP (log) -0.584⇤⇤⇤ -0.576⇤⇤⇤
(0.093) (0.095)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 658 647 648 658 647 648
Note: The dependent variable is the total number of labor conditions imposed on the IMF recipient
country. Standard errors are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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Table D.5: G5 Migration and Fiscal Conditionality
(A14) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) (A19)
G5 Migrantsj,i (per capj) -18.968⇤⇤ -12.779⇤ -25.246⇤⇤
(6.156) (5.916) (7.934)
US Migrantsj (per capj) -4.180⇤⇤⇤ -2.790⇤ -4.747⇤⇤⇤
(1.130) (1.108) (1.360)
UK Migrantsj (per capj) 5.945⇤ 3.558 2.188
(2.850) (2.988) (2.313)
JPN Migrantsj (per capj) -193.952 -179.136 -153.292
(272.890) (251.479) (192.626)
GER Migrantsj (per capj) -1.734 -3.998 -3.766
(4.208) (3.974) (3.276)
FRA Migrantsj (per capj) 7.567⇤ 6.917+ 3.473
(3.488) (3.548) (3.523)
G5 Alliance 0.178+ 0.161+ 0.152+ 0.228⇤ 0.177+ 0.167+
(0.095) (0.091) (0.081) (0.098) (0.096) (0.086)
Polity -0.011 -0.011+ -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Tot. Imports from G5 (log) 0.035 0.015 0.137⇤⇤ 0.048 0.027 0.142⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052)
Tot. Exports from G5 (log) -0.059+ -0.061+ -0.015 -0.062+ -0.066+ -0.021
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Total Conditions 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per Capita (log) -0.043 -0.065
(0.048) (0.050)
GDP Growth -0.165 -0.026
(0.406) (0.409)
GDP (log) -0.202⇤⇤⇤ -0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.045)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 658 647 648 658 647 648
Note: The dependent variable is the count of fiscal conditions for a given IMF program. Standard
errors are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical
significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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Table D.6: G5 Migration and IMF ProgramWaivers
(A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) (A24) (A25)
G5 Migrantsj,i (per capitaj) -3.722 1.701 -2.699
(13.876) (16.646) (17.047)
US Migrantsj (per capitaj) -7.559⇤⇤ -8.185⇤⇤ -9.103⇤⇤
(2.315) (3.009) (3.032)
UK Migrantsj (per capitaj) 27.838⇤⇤⇤ 26.845⇤⇤⇤ 27.002⇤⇤⇤
(5.268) (5.490) (5.478)
JPN Migrantsj (per capitaj) -28.975 -15.530 -32.349
(29.275) (30.379) (29.017)
GER Migrantsj (per capitaj) -2.786 3.180 3.262
(6.536) (5.729) (6.308)
FRA Migrantsj (per capitaj) 6.068 9.631 8.113
(6.646) (6.682) (6.757)
G5 Alliance 0.218 0.289 0.286 0.311 0.450⇤ 0.446⇤
(0.183) (0.180) (0.180) (0.206) (0.191) (0.190)
Polity -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Total Imports from G5 (log) 0.097 0.204⇤⇤ 0.190+ 0.091 0.187⇤ 0.177+
(0.077) (0.077) (0.098) (0.078) (0.079) (0.101)
Total Exports from G5 (log) -0.031 -0.070 -0.057 -0.022 -0.062 -0.048
(0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.071)
Total Number of Conditions 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.150+ 0.153
(0.087) (0.098)
GDP Growth -3.148⇤⇤ -3.113⇤⇤
(1.149) (1.152)
GDP (log) -0.005 -0.009
(0.090) (0.090)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 586 577 578 586 577 578
Note: The dependent variable is the count of waivers for a given IMF program. Standard errors are
clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical significance
levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
147
Additional Figures
Figure D.1: Marginal Effect of Migrant Stocks Conditional on GDP Growth (UK)
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Note: The blue area denotes 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure D.2: Marginal Effect of G5 Migrant Stocks (Model A4)
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Note: The blue area denotes 95% confidence intervals.
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IMF Programs and Emigration
An assumption of our main argument is that stricter IMF lending—whether
in the form of smaller loans, more stringent conditions, or less policy flexibility—
is likely to increase the flow of emigration out of the recipient country. More
accurately, it is only important that G5 policymakers believe this dynamic is at play.
Nevertheless, we explore in this section whether IMF lending exhibits an observable
effect on emigration rates in borrowing countries.
IMF lending and emigration rates may associate with each other for two differ-
ent reasons. Most straightforward, IMF programs can induce negative short-term
economic effects, such as a rise in unemployment and reduced public spending,
which encourage workers to seek better economic opportunities abroad. The op-
posite may be true of generous IMF programs with more flexible approaches to
policy conditionality. However, IMF programs can also signal to workers their job
opportunities and socioeconomic welfare will diminish (or increase) in the future.
In this sense, IMF programs can shape the beliefs of individuals, which may alter
how they perceive the opportunity costs (and potential benefits) of migration. If
this is true, the effects of IMF lending on emigration will exist independently of the
macroeconomic conditions within the borrowing country.
As a first cut empirical test of this relationship, we use country-year emigration
data from Bru¨cker et al. (2013), which contains the rate of low-skill emigration
to OECD countries at five-year intervals between 1985 and 2010. The advantage
of this data is that it allows us to detect flows specifically to advanced industrial
democracies, while also measuring the movement of low-skill migrants who are
typically most vulnerable to cuts in public spending and other forms of austerity.
Our sample comprises a total of 111 IMF recipient countries. Because we only ob-
serve emigration rates every five years (e.g., 1980, 1985, etc.), we take the preceding
five-year average of all independent variables. For example, for an observation in
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the year 1985, we take the average GDP per capita from 1980 to 1984 to proxy for a
country’s economic development. The structure of the data prohibits us from mak-
ing any strong claims on the relationship between IMF lending and immigration.
Accordingly, the results are intended to be only suggestive.
Table D.7: IMF Lending and Emigration in Borrowing Countries
(A26) (A27) (A28)
Low Skill Emigration (log)t 1 0.965⇤⇤⇤ 0.862⇤⇤⇤ 0.863⇤⇤⇤
(0.114) (0.083) (0.083)
Loan Size per Capitaj (log) 0.000 -0.005+ -0.005+
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Labor Conditions 0.095 0.031 0.038
(0.065) (0.067) (0.067)
Conditions Waived -0.032⇤ -0.033⇤ -0.040⇤
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
GDP per Capita 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤
(0.000) (0.000)
Polity 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Population (log) -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
GDP Growth 0.000
(0.000)
Year Fixed Effects ! ! !
Observations 377 362 358
R2 0.732 0.740 0.741
Note: The dependent variable is the rate of low-skill emigration at time t. Standard errors
are clustered on country and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, and + indicate statistical
significance levels of .1, 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Model (A26) regresses a country’s rate of low-skill emigration on three variables
of interest: (1) a country’s total loan size per capita (log); (2) the amount of labor
conditions imposed (as a percentage of total IMF conditions imposed); and (3) the
percentage of conditions formally waived by the IMF. To establish causal priority,
these variables are used to estimate the next observed emigration rate. For instance,
a country that receives a loan in 2002 is attached its respective emigration rate
in 2005.1 We also include year fixed effects and a lagged value of the dependent
variable, which is a country’s rate of low-skill emigration at t  5. According to
1If a country experiences multiple IMF programs within a given five-year interval, we simply
treat this as one observation by taking the mean loan size and calculating the percentage of labor
conditions and waivers as a total of all policy conditions across all IMF programs.
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our theory, we predict labor conditionality to be associated with higher rates of
emigration, while larger loans and more condition waivers should be negatively
associated with lower rates of emigration.
As shown in Table D.7, the coefficients on Labor Conditions and Conditions
Waived are in the predicted direction. However, only the percentage of condition
waivers is statistically significant at conventional levels. Among IMF recipients,
a greater percentage of program waivers is associated with lower rates of low-
skill emigration to OECD countries. Loan Size per Capita (log) is statistically
insignificant. Model (A27) introduces a series of controls, including GDP per Capita,
Polity, and Population (log). Conditions Waived is again statistically significant
at the 0.05 level and in the predicted negative direction. Here too, Loan Size per
Capita (log) is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Thus, there is
some evidence that larger IMF loans are associated with lower rates of emigration.
To explore whether IMF programs affect emigration through tangible economic
effects or signaling effects as described above, we next include a control for annual
GDP growth in Model (A28). Relative to Model (A27), the estimates for Loan Size
per Capita (log) and Conditions Waived are virtually unchanged. This tentatively
suggests that IMF programs affect emigration by signaling information about future
policy changes to workers in recipient countries.
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